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Abstract 
There has been an increase in empirical evidence indicating an association between 
governance and health systems, suggesting that better governed countries tend to 
have healthier populations with better performing health systems. This is an 
important finding, as it could point to structural public health interventions having a 
greater impact on health systems performance than individually targeted 
interventions. This doctoral thesis in public health (DrPH) from Brunel University is a 
compilation of three independent research projects undertaken under different 
settings, converging in the examination of the relationship between governance and 
health systems. 
The first project was a study conducted in the African region of the World Health 
Organization with the aim of understanding how and to what extent measures of 
governance are statistically correlated with performance of health systems as 
measured by a key health outcome: the under-five child mortality. The second 
project was a case study from a high income country in Europe during the period in 
which it went through an economic meltdown, the focus being a qualitative analysis 
of the extent to which the response to economic crisis influenced public health policy 
making and short term performance of the health system. The third project was a 
policy analysis carried out in an upper middle income country in Asia and the focus 
was to examine how the long history of health financing reform has influenced the 
performance of the health system.  
All research projects indicate an association between governance and health 
systems and the case studies provide empirical evidence of how health systems are 
affected by governance quality. The African study shows a statistically positive 
relationship between governance indicators and health outcomes, suggesting better 
governed countries to have lower child mortality. The European and the Asian cases 
suggest accountability, responsiveness, transparency and fair partnership to be 
important governance qualities for successful policy making and reforms. This 
evidence could be of use to current and future policy makers and others with the 
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authority to configure and implement new public health policies. It indicates the 
importance of comprehensive analytical work prior to policy making with easy access 
to documents and fair participation with all stakeholders to increase the probability of 
reaching consensus oriented policy proposals followed by successful 
implementations. 
The main contribution of this thesis is to provide evidence through robust 
statistical/qualitative analysis around the association between governance and 
health systems in countries at all income levels. The originality is located in the 
breadth (three different settings) as well as depth (three distinct, robust methods) of 
this kind of research. The congruence of findings regardless of study locations, the 
outcome measures used or types of methods applied have added to the growing 
evidence that there is a strong correlation between governance and health systems 
performance. This increased knowledge provides policy makers with additional 
evidence which can be applied to develop and improve governance with the aim of 
allocating public resources more efficiently and equitably. However, further research 
is required on governance and its link to health systems, inter alia how health equity 
is affected by selective partnership in the decision making processes and how 
political ideologies influence governance practices. 
P a g e  | 4 
 
Contents 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. 7 
Preface ...................................................................................................................... 8 
Acronyms and initials ............................................................................................ 12 
Glossary of key terms used in the thesis ............................................................. 14 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ 16 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................... 18 
Chapter 1:  Introduction ......................................................................................... 19 
Chapter 2: Literature review, governance and health systems .......................... 23 
2.1 Governance ............................................................................................................... 24 
2.2 Health systems .......................................................................................................... 28 
2.3 A review of the literature - the link between governance and health systems ............. 31 
2.4 Governance and political ideologies .......................................................................... 34 
2.5 Summary ................................................................................................................... 35 
Chapter 3: The conceptual framework of the thesis ........................................... 36 
Chapter 4: Governance and Health Systems I: the association between 
governance and health systems performance – the case of Africa 2006 .......... 40 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 40 
4.2 Methods .................................................................................................................... 42 
4.3 Results ...................................................................................................................... 47 
4.4 Discussion ................................................................................................................. 58 
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 61 
Chapter 5: Governance and Health Systems II: analysis of the initial response 
towards the health system in a high income country going through an 
economic crisis - the case of Iceland 2008 - 2009 ............................................... 62 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 62 
P a g e  | 5 
 
5.2 Background to Iceland ............................................................................................... 64 
5.3 The Icelandic health system ...................................................................................... 67 
5.4 Method ...................................................................................................................... 75 
5.5 Results ...................................................................................................................... 82 
5.6 Discussion ............................................................................................................... 101 
5.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 106 
Chapter 6: Governance and Health Systems III: understanding the impact of 
governance on health system financing reforms in an upper-middle income 
setting – the case of Malaysia 1995 - 2010 ......................................................... 107 
6.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 107 
6.2 Background to Malaysia .......................................................................................... 109 
6.3 Method .................................................................................................................... 118 
6.4 Results .................................................................................................................... 126 
6.5 Discussion ............................................................................................................... 143 
6.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 147 
Chapter 7: Discussion of the thesis ................................................................... 148 
Chapter 8: Conclusions of the thesis ................................................................. 153 
Appendices ........................................................................................................... 155 
Appendix 1: Indicators related to governance, financing and education used in the AFRO 
project. .......................................................................................................................... 155 
Appendix 2: Indicators related to health outcome, health care and infrastructures used in 
the AFRO project. .......................................................................................................... 156 
Appendix 3: An interview protocol used in the Icelandic case. ....................................... 157 
Appendix 4: An e-mail sent to key informants requesting their participation ................... 159 
Appendix 5: Participant’s information sheet in the Icelandic case. ................................. 161 
Appendix 6: Ethics approval from Brunel University for the Icelandic case. ................... 162 
Appendix 7: An e-mail from the director of the National Bioethics Committee Office in 
Iceland........................................................................................................................... 163 
Appendix 8: The course of events in the Icelandic case in chronological order. ............. 164 
P a g e  | 6 
 
Appendix 9: The situation in Iceland in February 2011 .................................................. 165 
Appendix 10: Health system financing ........................................................................... 170 
Appendix 11: Participants’ information sheet in the Malaysian case. ............................. 174 
Appendix 12: Ethics approval from Brunel University for the Malaysian case. ............... 176 
Appendix 13: Monash supporting letter. ......................................................................... 177 
Appendix 14: Price list and deposit requirements at Kuala Lumpur hospital. ................. 178 
Appendix 15: Full analysis of the Malaysia Plans. ......................................................... 179 
Appendix 16: An overview of the analysis of the problems, politics, policies and actors in 
the Malaysian case. ....................................................................................................... 183 
Appendix 17: Health systems performance in sub-Saharan Africa: governance, outcome 
and equity ...................................................................................................................... 184 
References ............................................................................................................ 193 
 
P a g e  | 7 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank all those who made it possible for me to explore the link 
between governance and health systems. Special thanks are given to all the people 
who participated in my research and provided me with valuable information, thus 
helping me to understand the link between governance and health systems. My 
gratitude is given to my colleagues and the professionals and staff at Brunel 
University, with special thanks to Tim Milewa in the Health Economics Research 
Group at Brunel, professor Christina Victor, the DrPH programme director, Joann 
Alexander, the DrPH programme manager and Jennifer Woodhead, the former DrPH 
programme manager. I also want to thank the staff at the Language Centre for 
reading through some of my work.  
Thanks also go to my fellow citizens in Iceland, Professor Runar Vilhjalmsson at the 
University of Iceland and Professor Sigurdur Gudmundsson, the former Director of 
The Directorate of Health, for reading through and giving me advice on my earlier 
versions of the Icelandic case. I also want to thank my brother, Professor Sverrir 
Olafsson, for his valuable advice. 
Special thanks to all my supervisors, Professor Pascale Allotey, Professor Daniel 
Reidpath and Dr Subhash Pokhrel for their constructive criticism and continuous 
motivation. I sincerely thank Professor Allotey, who has been my main contact 
throughout my studies, for always being there for me and for her inspiration. Last but 
not least, I would like to thank my husband, Vidar Vidarsson, for his unconditional 
support and patience, for reading my work many times and for giving me good 
advice. 
 
Conflict of interest 
I declare that there is not a conflict of interest and that no funding was received for 
the studies of this thesis. 
P a g e  | 8 
 
Preface 
I embarked on the Doctor of Public Health Programme (DrPH) at Brunel University in 
West-London in September 2007 after working for several years as a practitioner 
and senior manager in public health, both within the private and the public sector. As 
the general director for the National Public Health Institute of Iceland, I had the 
opportunity to work with policymakers and actively participate in policy development, 
decision making and the implementation of policies. This professional experience 
and the increased appearance of governance as an important determinant for health 
systems performance and population health in the literature inspired me to 
investigate the link between governance and health systems. My interest was to 
explore the issue of governance and its impact on health systems from a broad 
perspective, exploring the real life nexus between research, policy and practice 
(Brunel University 2007), exactly as the DrPH programme was presented1. The 
programme emphasised a multidisciplinary approach to complex problem solving 
and encouraged DrPH-trainees to gain experience under diverse public health 
settings. The three projects, required for the DrPH programme, were therefore 
planned and organised to fulfil my research interests; however, at the same time I 
was also able to gain experience in working under different settings, applying various 
research methods. 
When I entered the DrPH programme, it was a new course at Brunel University. The 
initial coursework, which spanned the first year of training, was based on multi-
sectoral disciplines related to public health which gave a thorough and broad 
overview of public health and the complexity of the concept. However, limited effort 
was put into encouraging students to start planning what kind of research they 
should pursue after the coursework. Available internships were scarce and the 
network with potential cooperative organisations offered less than I expected. 
Additionally, the programme emphasised that all internships were unpaid and related 
costs were not refundable, which made them less attractive to me as a trainee with a 
good educational background and more than 10 years of professional experience. 
                                            
1 The DrPH programme is based on three projects focusing on research, policy and practice. 
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My projects were therefore undertaken in cooperation with academic professionals 
and based solely on my personal research interests and the technical feasibility of 
those potential projects. 
Based on the nature of the DrPH programme, the three projects were executed one 
after another, delivering stand alone research reports. Hence, when the first project 
was defined, the second and third projects were still undefined and when the second 
research project had been decided upon, the last was still unformed. Nevertheless, it 
was always clear that the projects were to be connected through a theme that tied 
the research together to form a DrPH thesis (Brunel University 2007). In my thesis, it 
is governance and its association with health systems that is the common element in 
all the projects and thus provides the red thread.  
It took an unexpected amount of effort and time to form the first project (meant to be 
a research placement). The reason might be that the taught element, although 
generally very good, did not include guidance on how to prepare a research proposal 
at a doctoral level. The research question of the first project dealt with governance, 
equity2 and health systems performance measures and required quantitative 
research. As I started the analysis, it became clear that the dataset was small, thus 
causing fluctuations in the outcomes and difficulties in interpretations. Despite all 
obstacles, the project was successful, with meaningful results which were published 
in BMC Public Health in April 2011 (Olafsdottir et al. 2011). The paper, which is to be 
found in Appendix 17, has been highly accessed with 1,301 views in the first 6 
months of its publication.  
During preparations for the second project, an unprecedented economic crisis broke 
out in my home country, Iceland, including the collapse of practically the entire 
banking system. This situation, although tragic, presented a unique opportunity to 
observe and analyse the government’s initial response towards a health system in a 
                                            
2 The concept of inequity embraces the moral or the ethical dimension of health inequalities by 
referring to health disparities that are unnecessary and avoidable and are therefore considered to be 
unfair and unjust in the context of what is generally accepted as a norm within the society under 
consideration (Whitehead 1991). 
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high income country going through an economic crisis (meant to be a practice 
placement); a subject that has been scarcely explored.  Real time research provides 
an opportunity to observe events while unfolding, still with unknown outcomes. 
Analysis could be started while collecting data, which provided more flexibility for 
adjustments than in retrospective studies. It was in many ways convenient for me as 
an Icelandic citizen who speaks the language to undertake a case study in a country 
I know well. However, the task was also challenging as I was directly affected by the 
crisis just like other citizens of the country. Furthermore Iceland is a small country 
where people know a great deal about each other, which makes it easy for them to 
categorize their fellow citizens based on the family they belong to, their academic 
background, profession and known or anticipated political believes. This historical 
and cultural custom of this categorization might have affected how interviewees 
responded to my questions in the interviews by telling me more or less than they 
would have told another insider or outsider conducting the interviews. However, it 
must be emphasised that all interviewees are respectable professionals, anxious to 
make a positive contribution. Therefore, me being an insider should not have altered 
significantly any conclusions derived from this research, compared to an outsider 
doing the same analysis.The Grounded Theory provided systematic, but also 
flexible, working procedures and helped me to overcome the challenges, as did my 
supervisor, Professor Pascale Allotey, who continuously reminded me to stay 
focused on objectivity and professionalism. 
Throughout my DrPH training, I had become increasingly interested in health system 
financing, especially in relation to the equal access of citizens to health system 
services. I was also keen to execute my third project in a different setting from the 
previous studies. Malaysia was deemed to be suitable for an analysis of the 
association between health system financing reforms and governance (meant to be 
a policy placement). The country has demonstrated improved health outcomes for 
decades, has had a relatively stable political situation and, at the same time, the 
private health care sector has grown considerably. Malaysia was also a good 
candidate for the research due to practical reasons, as my supervisors were moving 
from Brunel University in England to Monash University in Malaysia. This gave me 
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the great opportunity to undertake my last project in Asia.  However, during the 
execution of the study some unexpected problems had to be resolved. Firstly, I had 
to obtain a visiting scholar visa from Monash University that took several months to 
arrive, despite the intensive work my supervisors put into speeding up the process. 
Secondly, I had never been to Malaysia before and was therefore not familiar with its 
history and culture. To overcome this, I spent considerable time and effort 
familiarising myself with Malaysian history and culture, which meant I was thoroughly 
prepared when I finally arrived there to conduct my research.  
The final phase of the doctoral study was to combine the three projects into an 
integrated thesis. This phase was both complex and extensive and took much longer 
than could be anticipated according to the programme description. I realise that the 
DrPH programme is a relatively new educational offering and is under continuous 
development. However, I cannot help feeling that when I entered the programme it 
was not yet fully mature, with adverse consequences for me in terms of the time, 
effort and money required. In my opinion, several issues could be improved in order 
to benefit future DrPH trainees. Firstly the programme should extend its network of 
friendly organisations working within the public health sphere and offer interesting 
projects to DrPH trainees. Secondly, organisations that offer DrPH trainees work on 
their in-house projects should at least cover the costs of the students as a minimum. 
Thirdly, more emphasis should be put on the programme’s aim to cultivate future 
leaders in public health (Brunel University 2007). One way to support this could be a 
forum for trainees to present their current research on a regular basis, as well as 
studies executed by others, thus making them stronger in defending or criticising 
public health research in a professional manner. 
Now that I have completed my DrPH thesis and reflect back, I cannot help but be 
proud of my work and grateful to all those who supported me throughout these 
years. I wish Brunel University all the best in developing and offering a solid DrPH 
programme to future DrPH trainees. 
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Glossary of key terms used in the thesis 
Decision making process: A phrase used for the development and implementation 
of policies, including the problem identification and formulation and analytical work 
prior to policy formulation. 
Economic crisis: A term used when a country experiences a sudden economic 
downturn due to financial crisis, causing a loss of values and decreased level of 
investments, leading to diminishing GDP, devaluation of the local currency, 
increased unemployment and inflation. 
Government: A term used for a group of people who are responsible for controlling 
a country and for an efficient use of the country’s resources and public funds. 
Governments have a leading role in public decision making processes and are one 
of the principal actors in protecting and promoting population’s health and well-being 
and other human rights. 
Governance: No single universally accepted definition exists for the term, which is 
commonly referred to as the way a country is governed. This includes the process by 
which governments are selected, monitored and replaced. Furthermore the term 
includes the capacity of governments to effectively formulate and implement policies, 
the way they organise public institutions, how they provide information regarding 
their decisions and actions and how they interact with citizens. The United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) define 
governance as "the process of decision making and the process by which decisions 
are implemented (or not implemented)” (Sheng 2011), which is the definition adopted 
in this thesis.  
Health equity/equity in health: The phrase does not have a universally accepted 
definition but the term in-equity is commonly used to describe disparities in health 
between social groups, both in terms of health outcomes and the usage of health 
care services. The term embraces the ethical dimension of health inequalities by 
referring to the health disparities as unnecessary and avoidable and therefore unfair.   
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Health system: The phrase is used for a highly complex system that includes all 
participants whose primary purpose is to improve populations’ health by protecting 
people against ill health, treating the sick and protecting people from the costs of ill-
health (World Health Organization 2005). 
Health system performance: No single universally accepted measure exists to 
assess health system performance; however, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
has suggested that health systems perform well if they achieve the goals for which 
they should be held accountable. Health outcomes, like life expectancy and child 
mortality are commonly used to evaluate health systems performance. Other 
measures also exist such as health systems’ responsiveness, meaning how well a 
health system meets the legitimate expectations of their populations and how fairly 
the system is financed. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
More than fifty years ago, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (United Nations 1948). The Declaration embraces human rights 
concerns, which are presented in 30 articles. The first article lays the universal 
foundation of human rights with the message that every human being is born free 
and equal in terms of dignity and rights. The other articles cover issues related to 
political, economic, social and cultural rights and the 25th article says that “everyone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and of his family, including ... medical care and necessary social services” (United 
Nations 1948). The declaration did not, however, encompass how these rights were 
to be fulfilled and who was responsible for their fulfilment. In 1993, during the World 
Conference on Human Rights, the United Nations adopted the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, which identified governments as one of the principal 
actors in the protection and promotion of human rights, including nations’ health and 
well-being (United Nations 1993). 
Amartya Sen, a Nobel Laureate in Economics, claimed that the types of institutions 
existing in societies and how they function and interact are vital for people’s 
opportunities. He further stated that the provision of sufficient facilities for both 
education and health care, which he declared are the governments’ responsibilities, 
are essential to fulfil human rights for well-being and good health (Sen 1999). Kofi 
Annan, former Secretary of the United Nations, pushed a very strong agenda to 
highlight the importance of governance as fundamental for every society and 
asserted that governance is “perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating 
poverty and promoting development” (Annan 2007, p12). 
Increasing empirical evidence indicates that better governed countries tend to have 
healthier populations, suggesting diverse and complicated associations between 
governance and health systems (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido 1999; Gupta, Davoodi & 
Tiongson 2000; Wagstaff, Claeson 2004; Rajkumar, Swaroop 2008; Reidpath, 
Allotey 2006; Klomp, de Haan 2008; Abed, Gupta 2002; Mitchell, Bossert 2010; 
Lazarova, Mosca 2008; Lewis 2006; Sheaff 2005; Tarin et al. 2009; Ruger 2007). 
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Governance scores in the Nordic countries are above 90% of maximum available 
scores given by the World Bank and life expectancy at birth in these countries is over 
80 years. Countries in Southern Asia score below 50% of maximum available scores 
and life expectancy in this area is lower than 60 years (World Bank 2010c; World 
Health Organization 2010). 
Good governance is associated with accountability and responsiveness, as 
authorities are expected to act in the best interests of their populations. They are 
also supposed to use public resources efficiently and to distribute them in an 
equitable manner while employing transparent and consensus oriented working 
procedures, allowing for public participation in policy making and implementation 
(Sheng 2011; World Bank 2010c). Although politics are not usually included in the 
definition of governance, they clearly play a role in public health policy making. 
Countries following social democratic philosophies tend to suffer fewer inequalities 
and better health outcomes than countries in which liberal ideologies have been 
followed (Navarro et al. 2003; Navarro, Shi 2001; Safaei 2006; Mooney 2007;  
Maynard 2007; Wilkinson, Pickett 2009; Navarro 2007; Meier 2010; Thomas, Weber 
2004). It is therefore difficult to fully distinguish political ideologies from governance 
and therefore political ideologies are taken into consideration in the analytical work of 
this thesis (Walt 2006; Buse, Mays & Walt 2005). 
The concepts of “governance” and “health systems” are both somewhat abstract and 
definitions are not consistent. The World Bank, which annually aggregates data to 
create an index that ranks countries according to governance quality, refers to 
governance as the traditional way of managing countries and institutions, involving 
the process by which policies are executed (World Bank 2010c; Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Mastruzzi 2009). The United Nations refer to governance as formal and informal 
arrangements that determine how public decisions are made (United Nations, 
Department of Economics and Social Affairs 2007), and the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) simply define 
governance as  "the process of decision making and the process by which decisions 
are implemented (or not implemented)” (Sheng 2011), which is the definition adopted 
in this thesis.   
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No universal definition exists for health systems, but the World Health Organization 
refers to the term as a system that includes all participants whose primary purpose is 
to improve health and a system that delivers quality services to all people, when and 
where they need them  (World Health Organization 2005). A health system therefore 
requires a robust financing mechanism, well maintained facilities, a well trained 
workforce and reliable information. How well health systems perform depends on a 
wide variety of factors, but the World Health Organization has suggested that they 
should be evaluated on the basis of how well they achieve the goals for which they 
should be held accountable (World Health Organization 2011). 
The appearance of new evidence suggesting governance to be an important 
determinant for health systems performance and population health has stimulated 
this thesis to examine how governance practices at the national level affect health 
outcomes, decision making and the implementation of decisions within the health 
sector. The aim sat for this thesis was to make a contribution by increasing the 
knowledge related to the link between governance and health systems in countries 
at different income levels by applying various research methods. No such study 
exists in which the relationship between governance and health systems 
performance is coherently explored both in terms of breadth (different settings) and 
depth (application of mixed but robust method of analysis). By incrementally 
increasing the knowledge of this link, this thesis provides additional evidence around 
the relationship between governance quality and health outcomes, health equity and 
decision making within health systems. All these research areas have been scarcely 
studied. The potential benefit is that policy makers are provided with improved 
evidence based knowledge which they can apply to develop and improve their 
working procedures with the aim of allocating public resources more efficiently and 
equitably. 
A concept map of the thesis is shown in Figure 1. The first part of the study is an 
analysis undertaken in a low income setting, investigating the association between 
governance indices and health outcomes, measured through child mortality and the 
ratio between child mortality in the lowest versus the highest wealth quintiles. 
Secondly, it explores how governance practices, in relation to decision making, 
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affect the initial response towards an advanced health system as a high income 
country goes through an abrupt economic crisis. Thirdly, the thesis examines how 
health system financing reforms are influenced by governance practices, in relation 
to implementation of policies, in a middle income setting (see Figure 1). 
Governance
Health outcomes 
in a low income 
setting
A response to an 
economic crisis in 
a high income 
setting
Financing reforms 
in an upper-middle 
income setting
Health Systems
Association Decision making Implementation
.
.
..
 
Figure 1: A concept map of the thesis 
In the subsequent chapter, the terms governance and health systems will be 
discussed in more detail and the results from the literature review on the association 
between governance and health systems will be presented. Chapter 3 provides a 
more thorough description of the conceptual framework for the thesis, which is then 
followed by the results from the individual studies. Chapter 4 presents the results of 
the quantitative analysis in Africa, Chapter 5 the results from the qualitative analysis 
exploring the response to an economic crisis in a high income setting and Chapter 6 
demonstrates the results of the association between health system financing reforms 
and governance in a middle income setting. The Discussion of the thesis will be 
presented in Chapter 7, followed by the Conclusion in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review, governance and health 
systems 
The aim of the literature review was to identify and evaluate the broader nature of 
the relationship between governance and health systems and how governance 
practices might impact on health systems performance. As per the nature of the 
DrPH programme, some research had already been identified in relation to the 
individual projects of this thesis and therefore a systematic appraisal was not an 
appropriate method for this literature review (Centre for Reviews and Dissemination 
2009). The additional search was carried out to update study-specific review and 
consider wider literature on the links between governance and health systems. The 
Scopus database and the advanced scholar search at Google were employed. 
Scopus was selected as it is one of the largest databases presenting peer reviewed 
literature from the sciences, medicine and the social sciences. Google scholar was 
used to increase the probability of finding working papers and discussion papers 
from professional associations and international organisations that have studied the 
relationship, but not necessarily published their results in peer reviewed journals. 
The search was restricted to papers written in English and the search criteria were 
limited to the word “governance” and the exact phrase “health system”. These 
search criteria might have missed some specific articles related to the link between 
governance and health systems, but as this literature review was to establish the 
broader link it is not seen as a problem for this thesis. However, to compensate for 
that issue, reference lists of identified papers were studied in order to discover 
additional studies. The search on Scopus delivered 182 articles and the Google 
search showed 32 links. They were scrutinised to ascertain papers focusing on 
governance at the national level in relation to health systems. 
Before discussing the existing literature on the broad relationship between 
governance and health systems, it is important to appraise the terms “governance” 
and “health system”. The next section will give an overview of the conceptualisation 
of “governance” and “health systems,” which will be followed by the presentation of 
the results from the literature review. As political ideologies were identified in the 
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literature as an important factor in public health policy making, the issue of political 
ideologies will be addressed in a sub-section in relation to governance. 
2.1 Governance 
One universal definition of the term “governance” does not exist and international 
organizations apply different explanations to interpret the concept of “governance”. 
The World Bank defines governance as “…the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments 
are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (World 
Bank 2010c). In order to evaluate the quality of governance, the World Bank has 
developed a methodology used to rank countries of the world according to their 
governance quality. As illustrated in Table 1, the Bank employs six categories of 
variables as an input into their evaluation of governance quality: (i) Voice and 
Accountability; (ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence; (iii) Government 
Effectiveness; (iv) Regulatory Quality; (v) Rule of Law; and (vi) Control of Corruption 
(Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2003; Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2009). Every 
category has a wide variety of subordinate variables or indicators based on data 
gathered from a number of survey institutions, think tanks, non-governmental 
organisations and international organisations (World Bank 2010c).  
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Table 1: Six categories used by the World Bank to evaluate governance quality 
Category Inclusion 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Captures, inter alia, the extent to which citizens are able to participate in 
elections, freedom of expression and liberty to form free association and to 
run free media. 
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence 
Involves the likelihood of governments being overthrown or destabilised, as 
well as including political violence and terrorism. 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Includes the perception of the quality of public services and their 
independence from political pressure.  Also captures the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation and the credibility of governments’ 
commitment to policy making. 
Regulatory Quality 
Involves the perception of the ability of governments to formulate and 
implement policies and regulations and the promotion of private sector 
development. 
Rule of Law 
Includes the extent to which agents can abide by the rules of society, 
particularly property rights, the police and the courts and the likelihood of 
violence and crime. 
Control of 
Corruption 
Captures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain and 
the influence on states by elites and private interests. 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2009). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) describes 
governance as: “...the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority 
necessary to manage a nation’s affairs” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2007). The OECD is one of the few organisations that include 
politics in its definition of governance. They further describe good governance as “... 
characterised by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, 
effectiveness, equity, etc.” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2007).   
These two definitions demonstrate the complexity of the governance concept and 
despite the effort made by the World Bank and several other organisations, there 
does not exist any simple way to measure its quality. The underlying terms most 
commonly used to describe and define governance are policy formulation, 
accountability, transparency and partnership. Other terms also frequently applied, 
are rule of law, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and stewardship. Neither the 
World Bank nor the OECD include stewardship as a stand-alone term in their 
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definitions and evaluations, however, the World Health Organization has described 
stewardship as the essence of good governance (World Health Organization 2000).  
Stewardship is yet another concept which is hard to define and therefore difficult to 
measure. The World Health Organization identifies several elements of stewardship, 
inter alia; having the broad strategic vision for improving populations´ health, 
formulating health policy, exerting influence, building partnership and ensuring 
accountability and transparency. Despite the absence of the word “stewardship” in 
many of the definitions of governance, stewardship is recognised as one of the 
fundamental factors affecting governments´ accountability and responsibility in 
securing the welfare of nations, exercised through trust and legitimacy (Saltman, 
Ferroussier-Davis 2000), (World Health Organization 2007b). 
It should also be noted that intelligence and information, despite their importance for 
governance at all levels, are terms that are rarely included in governance definitions. 
Intelligence and information is essential for informed decision making within health 
systems. Therefore relevant data must be available, analysed and applied to 
generate meaningful information for the decision making process (Siddiqi et al. 
2009). 
In 2009, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP) presented a short and simple definition of governance which will 
be referred to in this thesis, namely "the process of decision making and the process 
by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)” (Sheng 2011). Although 
short, this definition is quite precise and the phrase “process of decision making” 
embraces, in my view, a successful, corruption-free managerial execution of the 
authority showing respect to citizens by including them in the policy process. 
UNESCAP recognises governments as one of the most important actors in decision-
making and the implementation of decisions, although they also identify the media, 
international organisations, donors and others as important players in the process 
(Sheng 2011). UNESCAP applies similar categories as the World Bank to prescribe 
governance quality, although it uses eight categories in comparison to the six 
outlined by the World Bank: (i) Accountable; (ii) Responsive; (iii) Transparent; (iv) 
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Participation; (v) Equitable and Inclusive; (vi) Follows the rule of law; (vii) Effective 
and Efficient; and (viii) Consensus oriented. Figure 2 illustrates these categories and 
they will subsequently be discussed in more detail. 
Good 
governance
Accountable
Responsive
Transparent
Participation
Equitable 
and inclusive
Follows the 
rule of law
Effective and 
efficient
Consensus 
oriented
Adapted from Seng (2011)  
Figure 2: UNESCAP’s eight categories for good governance. 
It can be argued that accountability and responsiveness are two of the 
fundamental requirements of good governance. Accountability and 
responsiveness ensure that decisions are made by authorities that have the 
responsibility to respond to the needs of the population and to keep promises, often 
made through an election process. It includes the obligation of governments to 
provide information regarding their decisions and actions and to justify them to the 
public (World Bank 2007a). This implies that decisions and consequent actions must 
be enforced transparently with easy access to understandable information and 
imposed in accordance with established and accepted rules and regulations 
(Sheng 2011). Good governance includes fair participation in the decision making 
process, permitting stakeholders to freely express their opinions. Given scarce 
resources, good governance also requires an effective and efficient use of 
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resources, where an effort is made to reach a consensus around major decisions. 
Good governance also requires that the end result of all major decisions are 
equitable and in the best interests of the whole community (Sheng 2011). 
The categories of good governance, presented by the UNESCAP and the World 
Bank, apply to all levels of governance; global, national, regional, organisational and 
even to households. The categories are also inter-related as it is for example unlikely 
that anyone in power can be responsive if not accountable at the same time. And if 
someone in power does not allow for fair partnership while dealing with social affairs 
s/he is not working transparently. Furthermore, there is an interaction between the 
governance of different sectors within a society. The Ministry of Health is the 
principal governing body of the health system; however other factors affect public 
health and health outcomes that fall under other ministries. Infrastructure, such as 
roads, is an example of something that can have significant impact on access to 
health care centre, especially in rural areas in less developed countries and roads do 
not fall under the Ministry of Health. Other broader social and economic politics and 
legislative functions also play a role such as the preparation of new bills in ministries 
or parliaments regarding issues affecting nations´ welfare (Siddiqi et al. 2009). Even 
global governance can affect governance within national health systems such as in 
countries heavily depending on aid and are therefore capable of having an impact on 
the sustainability and performance of health systems and ultimately health outcomes 
(Siddiqi et al. 2009). However, as central governments are the main body 
responsible for nations’ welfare, governance on national level plays the most 
important role for health outcomes in every society (United Nations 1993). This 
applies to all countries irrespective of their type of health systems providing public 
and/or private health care, as the national government makes the regulatory 
framework both for the public and the private sectors. This applies to health system 
financing mechanism and incentives (World Bank 2012), allocation of resources and 
accessability of health care services. Furthermore, national governments formulate 
the general vision for national health, generate health policies, implement the 
policies and allow for partnership in the overall process.  
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Governance within health systems also plays an important role for health outcomes. 
As resources are limited, governance within health systems plays and important role 
for the utilisation and distibution of the scarce resources. Therefore, governance 
within health systems is an important determinant for the overall efficiency and equity 
of the health sector (Brinkerhoff, Bossert 2008).  
2.2 Health systems 
A health system is a highly complex phenomenon. It is a system whereby the 
primary purpose is to improve populations’ health and well-being, embracing all 
participants who are active in protecting people against ill health, treating the sick 
and protecting people from the costs of ill-health (World Health Organization 2005; 
McIntyre, Mooney 2007). Health systems are subject to nations’ economic strength 
and political stability, but they are also shaped by interaction with other sectors of a 
society, neighbouring countries and international organisations, as well as a range of 
national characteristics such as cultural inheritance, religion, norms and dominant 
political ideologies, behaviour and social capital3 (Morgan, Swann 2004; Roemer 
1991). 
A framework of a health system and its main associate sectors is illustrated in Figure 
3.  
                                            
3 Social capital includes social networks and connections and how people perceive their belonging to 
a community (Putnam 2000). 
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Figure 3: A framework of a health system. 
No single universally accepted measure exists to assess health system 
performance, but in 2000 the World Health Organization made an attempt to 
establish an index for health systems performance, suggesting three intrinsic factors 
to be used as measures: health outcomes, responsiveness and fair financing (World 
Health Organization 2000).  Health outcome measures were based on disability-
adjusted life expectancy and health equality in terms of child survival. 
Responsiveness was a new concept established to measure how well a health 
system met the legitimate expectations of the population regarding the non-health 
enhancing aspects of the system (Darby et al. 2000). The third factor, fair financing 
and financial risk protection, measured how health systems assure that households 
do not become impoverished with regard to obtaining necessary health care. The 
World Health Organization report from 2000 provoked a strong debate, especially in 
relation to its methodology and data availability and reliability (Almeida et al. 2001; 
Williams 2000; Navarro 2000; Smith 2002). However, a revision of the report, ten 
years later, suggests that it marked the onset of new discussions on health system 
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performance, especially with regard to health system financing (Frenk 2010; 
McIntyre 2010).  
Child mortality and health equality in terms of child mortality in different socio-
economic groups was used to operationalise health system performance in the 
African setting of this thesis, while decision making and implementation in relation to 
governance quality were used to evaluate health system performance in relation to 
economic crisis and financing reforms. 
2.3 A review of the literature - the link between governance 
and health systems 
New empirical evidence, suggesting an association between governance and health 
system performance, has grown in recent years (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido 1999; 
Gupta, Davoodi & Tiongson 2000; Wagstaff, Claeson 2004; Rajkumar, Swaroop 
2008; Sheaff 2005; Tarin et al. 2009; Marks, Cave & Hunter 2010; Mitchell, Bossert 
2010; Plochg et al. 2006; Victora et al. 2000; Eichler 2001). At the beginning of this 
century, both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund published 
Working Papers demonstrating a negative association between governance quality 
and infant and child mortality (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido 1999; Gupta, Davoodi & 
Tiongson 2000). Kaufmann et al. (1999) performed cross-sectional regressions of 
150 countries, applying, then relatively new, governance indices from the World 
Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido 1999). They found a strong negative association 
between infant mortality and each of the six aggregate governance indicators, 
suggesting better governance might improve development outcomes. Gupta and 
colleagues also based their study on a cross-sectional analysis, but used the 
corruption perception indices presented by the Political Risk Services Group4 as a 
measure of governance quality (International Country Risk Guide 2011; Gupta, 
                                            
4 The Political Risk Services Group publishes the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which has 
evaluated and forecasted international risks based on the level of perceived corruption, bureaucratic 
quality and law and order since the early 1980s. The methodology was developed by Professors 
William D. Coplin and Michael K. O’Leary at the Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs 
(International Country Risk Guide 2011). 
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Davoodi & Tiongson 2000). Despite the different proxies for governance, both 
studies found a positive association between child survival and governance quality. 
Numerical proxies for complicated subjects like governance are not flawless and do 
not necessarily cover all aspects of good governance practices. Nevertheless, these 
studies indicate that low governance quality might reduce social gains like improved 
health. 
A few years later, Wagstaff and Claeson (2004) addressed the adverse impact of 
governance quality on child mortality in a comprehensive report from the World 
Bank, “Rising to the Challenges”, suggesting that increased public spending on 
health would only reduce child mortality if governance indices were above certain 
minimum levels (Wagstaff, Claeson 2004). This suggestion is consistent with a 
newer finding from Rajikumar and Swaroop (2008), who examined the links between 
public spending, governance and health outcomes (Rajkumar, Swaroop 2008). They, 
like Gupta and colleagues, measured governance by applying indices from the 
International Country Risk Guide (International Country Risk Guide 2011). Their 
results indicate that governance quality had a significant impact on how efficiently 
increased public health spending improved health outcomes and suggest that public 
spending had virtually no impact on health outcomes in poorly governed countries 
(Rajkumar, Swaroop 2008). 
Cross country data, although good for searching for associations, do not inform 
about causal relationships. Case studies can serve that purpose well, as they can 
inform through establishing the kind of pathways through which governance affects 
health system performance. A few case studies have been undertaken to evaluate 
the impact of governance on health systems, applying some of the criteria used by 
the UNESCAP and the World Bank, as presented in Table 1 and Figure 2. These 
studies have suggested health systems performance to be negatively affected if 
authorities fail to meet good governance criteria (Sheaff 2005; Tarin et al. 2009; 
Marks, Cave & Hunter 2010; Mitchell, Bossert 2010; Plochg et al. 2006; Victora et al. 
2000; Eichler 2001). 
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Governance failures, related to a lack of partnership and inefficiency, were 
recognised as impediments for successful health system reforms in case studies 
from Russia and Pakistan (Sheaff 2005; Tarin et al. 2009). Following the economic 
crisis in Russia in the 1990s, changes in hospital funding were introduced (Sheaff 
2005). After the alterations, hospitals were funded by local authorities and through 
insurance. The new funding mechanism was overlapping due to incompatible 
incentives. If hospital management reduced the number of day-beds, they were 
penalised by the local authorities with fewer payments. If, on the other hand, they 
increased day-beds they received fewer insurance payments. The case suggested 
that the reforms failed, due to a lack of partnership, coordination and insufficient 
preparedness when evaluating causes and consequences, leading to negative 
impacts on the health systems performance, with unfortunate consequences for 
patients and health professionals (Sheaff 2005). Similar governance failures were 
revealed in the case study from Pakistan, exploring policy processes of different 
health sector reforms in Punjab in the 1990s (Tarin et al. 2009). The results suggest 
failures in health system reforms caused by immature policy processes related to 
deficiency in analysis prior to the policy formulation and a shortage of supporting 
background materials, as well as limited partnerships (Tarin et al. 2009). Both these 
cases demonstrate the importance of good governance practices in the planning and 
implementation phases of new policies. 
Other studies have recognised governance failures related to accountability and 
responsiveness (Marks, Cave & Hunter 2010; Mitchell, Bossert 2010; Plochg et al. 
2006; Victora et al. 2000; Eichler 2001).  Marks et al. (2010) studied public health 
governance in Britain and interviewed key stakeholders, as well as discussing the 
issue with focus groups who expressed their concerns over limited coordination 
between organisations, reflected in vague boundaries of responsibilities between 
individual institutions (Marks, Cave & Hunter 2010).  The lack of partnership and 
coordination caused the accountability mechanisms to be ill defined, making it 
unclear who was accountable for what, thus negatively affecting the efficiency of the 
health system. Interviewees also recognised an absence of accountability in 
monitoring and managing health risks and were concerned about limited responses 
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to addressing public health hazards such as the obesity epidemic and misuse of 
alcohol (Marks, Cave & Hunter 2010). This result is consistent with results from 
Mitchell and Bossert (2010), who investigated health system reforms in six countries 
in relation to decentralisation within the health system. The aim of the 
decentralisation was to improve local participation in decision making, empowering 
local governments and making them more accountable and responsive to local 
preferences. Their results indicated that, if health systems were to achieve their 
objectives in a decentralised system, improved mechanisms of accountability were 
imperative (Mitchell, Bossert 2010). Additional studies support these findings and 
have shown improvements in health system performance if institutions, health 
professionals and supervisors are given clear tasks with explicit responsibilities 
(Victora et al. 2000; Eichler 2001; Plochg et al. 2006). 
2.4 Governance and political ideologies 
Politics are not commonly part of the definition of governance. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to distinguish governance from the concept of politics, a term that is related 
to decision making enforced by a group of people usually sharing similar ideas and 
often belonging to the same political party (Walt 1994; Buse, Mays & Walt 2005). 
These groups are constantly striving for power to attain authority to influence and 
manipulate societies according to their ideologies; an effort that makes politics a 
continuous battle between political rivals. Political ideologies of ruling parties, at any 
given time, therefore have an impact on policy making5. Dominant political 
ideologies, which voters usually elect, play a significant role in designing national 
health systems and deciding how they are managed and funded, which further 
affects both average health outcomes and health equity (Navarro et al. 2003). 
Hence, the political scenery must be kept in mind when evaluating health systems 
performance, especially when the evaluation is based on variables that might be 
influenced by dominant political ideologies. 
                                            
5 As an example, the policy of applying taxation and subsidisation to influence the consumption of 
healthy and unhealthy food or alcohol depends to a great extent on political beliefs and ideologies.  
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Societies and associated political systems are dynamic and no two systems are 
exactly the same. However, countries that follow a social democratic philosophy tend 
to have less inequalities and better health outcomes than countries in which liberal 
ideologies have been followed (Navarro et al. 2003; Navarro, Shi 2001; Safaei 
2006). Some have argued that countries following a neo-liberalistic philosophy 
favour “individualism” and promote privatisation and minimisation of government 
interventions, which not only “breeds inequality but needs inequality” and is therefore 
deemed to be an “anti-equity” ideology (Mooney 2007; Maynard 2007; Wilkinson, 
Pickett 2009; Navarro 2007). 
2.5 Summary  
Cross country data reveal a relationship between health outcomes and governance 
indices, suggesting that improved governance quality enhances positive health 
outcomes. Indices from the World Bank and the International Country Risk Guide 
have primarily been used, while no literature was found applying the relatively new 
Mo Ibrahim Index, appraising governance in Africa. Cross country studies do neither 
disclose the causality nor enlighten possible pathways through which the association 
exists. A few case studies have detected accountability and responsiveness to be 
critical governance qualities for health system performance, suggesting that unclear 
boundaries between institutions cause delays in acting on public health problems. 
Other studies have identified lack of cooperation with stakeholders and limited 
analytical work, prior to policy formulation, to have a negative impact on health 
systems performance. Limited research exists on how governance quality affects the 
decision making process within the health sector; how stakeholders are selected to 
participate in the process (partnership); how accessible information is to 
stakeholders (transparency); and whether  stakeholders have equal opportunities to 
influence the process (fair participation). 
According to the literature review more research is required on exploring and 
possibly explaining the association between health outcomes and governance by 
applying specifically the Mo Ibrahim Index of governance and also to study how 
public health policy making is affected by the quality of governance. 
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Chapter 3: The conceptual framework of the thesis 
The literature suggests that there is a link between governance and health systems 
and that the relationship is universally apparent. This doctoral thesis was intended to 
add knowledge to the evidence base regarding the association between national 
governance and health systems and to explore this association in settings that are 
different in terms of both the level of income and quality of national governance. The 
foucs of the thesis was to examine possible pathways through which national 
governance might affect health systems performance and health outcomes. The 
objective was to explore how governance quality on a national level affects decision 
making and implementation of decisions within health systems and whether some 
categories of the UNESCAP´s definition for good governance might be more 
influential than others. 
There are several limitations related to this conceptual framework. Firstly, as no 
universially accepted way exists to measure neither quality of governance nor health 
systems performance, interpretations of the association between these two complex 
concepts, as set up in this conceptual framework, might be affected. Secondly, the 
perception of governance quality differs depending on the context within which 
health systems operate, which could cause some important governance qualities 
affecting health systems performance to be overseen. Thirdly, as the focus of the 
thesis is on national governance, important governance factors within the health 
sector, having an influence on health systems performance and health outcomes, 
might be neglected.  
The concept of the DrPH program to compile the doctoral thesis from three individual 
research projects, opened up for opportunities and flexibility to explore the link under 
different geographical, cultural and economic settings. Furthermore, the existing 
empirical evidence, indicating a diverse and complicated association between 
governance and health systems, was a motivation to apply different research 
methods in the different settings. 
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The main research questions, which the thesis was intended to provide an answer 
to, are the following: 
1. Is there an association between governance and health system performance 
in a low and middle income setting when applying the Mo Ibrahim Index as a 
measure for governance? 
2. How does governance affect decision making and implementation of 
decisions within health systems in an upper-middle and high income setting? 
The first research project was intended to address the first question. It was 
undertaken in the African region of the World Health Organization (AFRO) where 
83% of the nations are categorised as low income or lower-middle income countries 
(World Bank 2010b). The specific research question raised was the following: 
• Is there a relationship between governance and health outcomes in low and 
lower-middle income countries, evaluated through governance indices, child 
mortality and health equity measured as the ratio between child mortality in 
the poorest versus the richest wealth quintiles?  
The methodology used was a quantitative analysis using publicly available data to 
investigate the association between governance and health outcomes. In order to 
measure health outcomes, under-five mortality rate and the ratio between under-five 
mortality rate in the poorest income quintile versus under-five mortality rate in the 
wealthiest income quintile where applied. As a governance measure the Mo Ibrahim 
Index was used, which is specific for the African region (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
2010). The method used was Ordinary Least Square regressions of cross sectional 
data using the statistical software STATA. 
The second and the third research project were intended to give answers to the 
second main question of the thesis.  
The second project of the thesis was a case study conducted in a high income 
setting, investigating the responsiveness of the Icelandic health authorities in an 
abrupt economic meltdown. The specific research question raised was the following: 
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• How does governance affect decision making within a health system going 
through an abrupt economic meltdown? 
• Did the decision making comply with good governance practices? 
• Were stakeholders involved in the decision making process and who were 
the key influential actors? 
• Was health equity affected in the decision making process?  
The economic crisis gave exceptional opportunity to examine the initial governance 
response to an advanced health system as it became clear that health care spending 
had to be reduced; a subject that has rarely been studied. The method used was 
qualitative analysis, applying the Grounded Theory approach, thus allowing a theory 
to emerge from the data (Glaser, Strauss 1967). Primary data was collected from 
interviews with key stakeholders and secondary data was collected from 
parliamentary documents and Icelandic newspapers. 
The third project was a case study carried out in an upper-middle income setting, 
where health system financing reforms were explored in relation to governance 
practices. The specific research question raised was the following: 
• How does governance affect implementation of decisions with regard to 
health system financing reforms? 
• Have various requests of different ethnic or socio-economic groups been 
taken into consideration? 
• Have stakeholders been involved and who have been the key influential 
actors? 
The study was performed in Malaysia, a country which has demonstrated improved 
health outcomes over the last few decades. This study was a policy analysis 
applying the Multiple Stream theory (Kingdon 1995) and the Policy Triangle 
framework (Walt, Gilson 1994) using multiple data sources to investigate content, 
context, process and actors. Primary data was collected from interviews with key 
stakeholders and secondary data was collected from various sources.  
The conceptual framework of the thesis is illustrated in Table 2. 
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Table 2: A conceptual framework of the thesis 
The main 
research 
questions: 
 
1. Is there an association between governance and health systems performance in a 
low and middle income setting when applying the Mo Ibrahim Index as a measure 
for governance? 
2. How does governance affect decision making and implementation of decisions 
within health systems in an upper-middle and high income setting? 
 
Research 
projects: 
 
AFRICA 
The association between 
governance and health 
systems performance – 
the case of Africa 2006 
ICELAND 
Analysis of the initial 
response towards the 
health system in a high 
income country going 
through an economic 
crisis - the case of Iceland 
2008 – 2009 
 
MALAYSIA 
Understanding the impact 
of governance on health 
system financing reforms in 
an upper-middle income 
setting – the case of 
Malaysia 1995-2010 
Specific 
research 
questions: 
Is there a relationship 
between governance 
and health outcomes in 
low and lower-middle 
income countries, 
evaluated through 
governance indices, 
child mortality and health 
equity measured as the 
ratio between child 
mortality in the poorest 
versus the richest wealth 
quintiles? 
How does governance 
affect decision making 
within  a health system 
going through an abrupt 
economic meltdown: 
• Did the decision 
making comply with 
good governance 
practices? 
• Were stakeholders 
involved in the 
decision making 
process and who 
were the key 
influential actors? 
• Was health equity 
affected in the 
decision making 
process? 
 
How does governance 
affect implementation of 
decisions with regard to 
health system financing 
reforms: 
• Have various requests 
of different ethnic or 
socio-economic groups 
been taken into 
consideration? 
• Have stakeholders 
been involved and who 
have been the key 
influential actors? 
Research  
Setting: 
 
Low and lower-middle 
income setting. 
High income setting going 
through economic 
meltdown 
 
Upper-middle income 
setting. 
Method: Quantitative analysis of 
secondary data - 
applying Ordinary Least 
Square regression. 
Case study approach with 
qualitative techniques 
applying the Grounded 
Theory. 
 
Policy analysis applying the 
Multiple Stream and Policy 
Triangle frameworks. 
 
Data 
sources: 
 
Child mortality from the 
World Health 
Organization and the 
Demographic Health 
Surveys. Governance 
indices from the Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation. 
Parliamentary documents, 
newspapers and 
interviews with key 
stakeholders. 
Multiple data sources 
including publications of the 
health system, national 
strategic plans, World 
Bank, World Health 
Organization, local surveys, 
newspapers and a few 
interviews with key 
stakeholders. 
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Chapter 4: Governance and Health Systems I: the 
association between governance and health 
systems performance – the case of Africa 2006 
4.1 Introduction 
In the World Health Report 2000, a health system is discussed in terms of “all the 
organizations, institutions and resources that are devoted to producing health 
actions” (World Health Organization 2000, p.xi). Notwithstanding this very broad 
description of a health system, the operational approaches have tended to be narrow 
with regard to the analysis of health systems performance, focusing on those 
aspects of the system that relate directly to the delivery of health care. This is 
particularly apparent in the analyses of health systems performance in high income 
countries (Lakhani et al. 2005; Westert et al. 2008; Schoen et al. 2006) and does not 
appear to have been materially influenced by the development of wider frameworks 
of analysis (Arah et al. 2006). 
In high income countries the lack of distinction between a health system and a health 
care system may be appropriate. With few exceptions, the OECD countries and the 
high income non-OECD countries have stable governments and well-developed 
national infrastructures, including functioning commercial and financial systems, 
embedded utility grids delivering clean water and energy, systems that facilitate 
communication and transportation, liveable national housing, a functioning judicial 
and educational system, etc. In these settings, population health gains are part of a 
marginal game often based on incremental improvements to an existing health care 
system that operates within the established context of a high quality national 
infrastructure (Nolte, McKee 2004; McKee et al. 2009). It is surprising, therefore, that 
the analysis of health systems performance in low income countries is also based 
largely on an analysis of systems that deliver care, despite the absence of the wider 
infrastructure required to support functioning health care systems (Hanson et al. 
2008; Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 2008; Kristiansson et al. 2009; Travis et al. 
2004). 
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Some would explain the focus by arguing the inappropriateness of looking at non-
health care factors, because an analysis of non-health care factors effectively holds 
the health sector to ransom, making it accountable for those determinants of health 
that do not fall under its direct control (Murray, Frenk 2000). The difficulty with this 
position is the overwhelming body of evidence that demonstrates the critical role of 
socio-economic, environmental, and other structural determinants of health 
(Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008). Furthermore, ignoring broader 
structural factors assumes that a health system can be “strengthened” without regard 
to the economic, social, and physical context within which the delivery of health care 
is supposed to occur. If the health system is not held accountable for these larger 
determinants, argues Murray and Frenk, there will be no advocate in a country for 
addressing them (Murray, Frenk 2000); if not us, then who?   
For high income countries, the question of the appropriateness of using the health 
care system as a proxy for a broader health system is moot (McKee et al. 2009).  In 
low income countries with poor infrastructure and often weak political, commercial, 
financial and regulatory systems, however, the exclusion of non-health care system 
artefacts from the analysis of health systems performance is based on a much more 
tenuous foundation. It is thus unlikely that health systems performance in low income 
countries can be reduced to an analysis of the incremental health gains associated 
with improvements to the health care system. This point is clearly demonstrated 
again by ongoing challenges to universal access to health care (Carrin, Xu & Evans 
2008; World Health Organization 2008a). 
The aim of this study was to investigate the link between governance quality and 
health outcomes of health systems in a low income setting, with the main research 
question being:  
• Is there a relationship between governance and health outcomes in low and 
lower-middle income countries, evaluated through governance indices, child 
mortality and health equity measured as the ratio between child mortality in 
the poorest versus the richest wealth quintiles?  
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Other structural factors such as finance and the economy (World Bank 1993b), the 
education system (Singh-Manoux et al. 2008; McAlister, Baskett 2006) and physical 
infrastructure (Ako, Nkeng & Takem G.E.E. 2009), have all been shown to be related 
to health systems performance. Governance, however, has emerged relatively 
recently as a measurable, structural artefact of countries that could be related to 
performance in a number of domains (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2009; 
Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido 1999), including health (Reidpath, Allotey 2006); however, 
a relatively small amount of research has explored this. 
4.2 Methods 
An ecological analysis6 of cross sectional data was performed to look at the 
association between governance and health systems performance, measured as 
health outcomes, in the African region of the World Health Organization (AFRO), 
independent of other known health care and non-health care measures. The analysis 
was carried out using the most up to date publicly available country level data from 
the Statistical Information System of the World Health Organization (WHOSIS) 
(World Health Organization 2008b) and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF) (Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation 2010). Data were available from 46 countries that, together with 
all indicators used in this analysis, are listed in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. 
Additionally, the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) in different socio-economic groups 
was examined in a few selected countries in the AFRO region, applying data from 
the Demographic Health Surveys (Demographic and Health Surveys 2008).  
4.2.1 Variables 
Outcomes: Health outcomes were operationalised in terms of two separate 
dimensions: health outcomes and health equity. The variable chosen for health 
outcomes was a country's under-five mortality rate (U5MR); the probability of a 
child’s death before the age of five. Other variables exist that can be applied as a 
                                            
6 Ecological analysis is a statistical analysis commonly using aggregate data to investigate 
relationships between an outcome (dependent variable) and one or more predictors (independent 
variables). Ecological analysis does not, however, inform about causal relationship. 
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proxy for health outcomes such as life expectancy. However, U5MR has been 
successfully used as a general indicator of population health, as it is sensitive to both 
structural changes and to rising epidemics that affect the wider population (Blaxter 
1981; Reidpath, Allotey 2003; Reidpath et al. 2009; Gwatkin et al. 2007). A selection 
of other outcome variables might be differently associated with governance and the 
covariates used in this analysis. 
A fair or equitable health system would be one that produces equivalent health 
outcomes for rich and poor (Braveman, Gruskin 2003; Reidpath, Allotey 2007). 
Using U5MR as the health outcomes measure, health equity was operationalised as 
the ratio of the U5MR in the poorest social quintile to that of the U5MR in the 
wealthiest social quintile (quintile ratio). Data on the quintile ratio of the U5MR were 
available for 30 of the 46 countries. Combining the two dimensions of health 
outcomes and equity, a health system that was performing well would have a low 
U5MR and a U5MR quintile ratio approaching 1. 
Governance: At least two relevant sources of governance measures for Africa are 
available: the World Bank governance index (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2009) 
and the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2010). The 
latter index was selected because of its greater contextual relevance to the AFRO 
region and as it had never been applied in analysis of this kind. The index was 
developed in cooperation with the Harvard Kennedy School, but the Mo Ibrahim 
index aggregates third party (inter alia from the World Bank) and original data to 
create an index that ranks every country in Africa according to governance quality 
(Rotberg, Gisselquist 2007; Barry 2010). The index assesses nations against 57 
different measures and has been used as a quality indicator for investors in Africa 
(The Africa Report 2009). As the total Ibrahim index included child mortality, two sub-
indicators from the 2006 Ibrahim Index that did not include child mortality in the 
measure were used to operationalise governance, namely (i) “Rule of Law, 
Transparency and Corruption” (RLTC); and (ii) “Sustainable Economic Opportunity” 
(SEO). The RLTC index highlights democracy and human rights in a country. The 
rating is based on indicators such as public sector corruption, efficiency of the courts 
and the strength of judicial processes and national security such as domestic armed 
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conflict. The SEO index measures how governments manage to provide essential 
goods for their citizens including reliability of electricity supply and computer usage. 
The index is based on economic management such as the government’s budget 
deficits or surpluses, the quality of public administration, the reliability of financial 
institutions and the overall business environment (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2010). The 
Index as a whole and the sub-scale were recently independently analysed and found 
to be both reliable (i.e., the scales could be independently reproduced) and valid (i.e. 
they captured, and reflected the position of the countries on the specific “pillars” of 
governance) (Saisana, Annoni & Nardo 2009). 
Covariates: Four additional factors were included in the analysis, reflecting health 
care, financing/economy, education and physical infrastructure. For each factor, a 
number of indicators were used. The indicators’ selection was based on what has 
been identified in the literature (Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008; 
Kabir 2008; Anyanwu, Erhijakpor 2007; Kiros, Hogan 2001; Fotso et al. 2007) and 
the availability of data. Unless otherwise stated, all country data are from 2006 and 
onwards. 
For health care (Kabir 2008), there were three different indicators: (i) the percentage 
of births attended by skilled health personnel; (ii) the percentage of one year olds 
immunised with three doses of diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis (DTP3); and 
(iii) the number of hospital beds per 10,000 population. Although two of these 
indicators are related to child health, they can nevertheless be used as indicators of 
the wider health care system. Information from Cape Verde regarding birth 
attendance by skilled health workers was from 1998.  
For the second group, financing/economy (Anyanwu, Erhijakpor 2007), two factors 
were considered, namely (i) per capita total expenditure on health; and (ii) gross 
national income (GNI) per capita. Both financing indicators were measured in 
international dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity (ppp int.$). 
The third group, education (Kiros, Hogan 2001), was measured in terms of: (i) adult 
literacy; (ii)  the percentage of net primary school male enrolment ratio; and (iii) the 
percentage of net primary school female enrolment ratio. Net primary school 
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enrolment ratio is the ratio of the number of children of official school age enrolled in 
school to the total number of children of official school age in the population. 
Education data for Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra 
Leone were from 1991.  
The fourth group was water and sanitation (Fotso et al. 2007), which was 
measured in terms of: (i) the percentage of population with sustainable access to 
improved drinking water sources; and (ii) the percentage of population with 
sustainable access to improved sanitation. An overview of the indicators within the 
classified factors, as well as the outcome measures, is given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Sources of the variables used in the AFRO analysis. 
Variables Sources Year 
Outcomes:  
• Under-five mortality rate 
• Ratio between the poorest and the richest U5MR1 quintiles 
WHOSIS 2006 
Health care:  
• Births attended by skilled health personnel (%) 
• One year olds immunised with DTP32 (%) 
• Number of hospital beds (per 10,000 population) 
WHOSIS 1998 - 2007 
Finance/Economy: 
• Per capita total expenditure on health (ppp int. $)3 
• Gross national income (ppp int.$) 
WHOSIS 2006 
Education: 
• Net primary school enrolment ratio for females (%) 
• Net primary school enrolment ratio for males (%) 
• Adult literacy (%) 
WHOSIS 1991 - 
2006 
Water and Sanitation: 
• Population with sustainable access to improved drinking 
water sources (%) 
• Population with sustainable access to improved sanitation (%) 
WHOSIS 2006 
Governance: 
• Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption-index (RLTC) 
• Sustainable Economic Opportunity-index (SEO) 
Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation 2006 
1 U5MR:  Under-five mortality rate 
2 DTP3:  Three doses of diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis 
3 ppp int.$:  Purchasing Power Parity International Dollars 
 
Gross national income (GNI) was used as a log-transformed variable, since the 
logarithm of GNI gave a better fit in the regression. 
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The results of this analysis are restricted to the choice of indicators made here, but a 
wide variety of indicators could have been selected based on their association to 
U5MR, giving different results. 
4.2.2 Other data 
The analytical work of this study is limited to the poorest and the richest wealth 
quintiles. However, as it has been suggested that the U5MR in sub-Saharan Africa 
might be highest in the second poorest wealth quintile (World Bank 2007b), I decided 
to explore additional data providing information concerning U5MR in all wealth 
quintiles. The Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) were selected for this purpose as 
the World Health Organization only provided the ratio or the difference between the 
U5MR in the richest and the poorest wealth quintiles (Demographic and Health 
Surveys 2008). As the U5MR variation is highest among the poorest countries it was 
decided to focus the exploration on countries spending less than USD$100 on health 
per capita. It was further decided to limit the exploration to countries with available 
English written reports with data from the year 2000 onwards.  
DHS are household surveys that provide data for a wide range of indicators in the 
areas of population, health and nutrition in low and middle income countries 
(Demographic and Health Surveys 2008). U5MRs are based on retrospective birth 
histories from the women’s questionnaire. They have, with their present sampling 
design, been able to recognise changes in U5MRs equal to or bigger than 15% 
(Korenromp et al. 2004). 
4.2.3 Analysis 
The statistical program Stata IC 10, from StateCorp USA, was used to analyse the 
data. Prior to analysis of the association between governance and health outcomes, 
the inter-relationships between all variables were investigated. This was done in 
order to identify possible confounding effects. The analysis consisted of fitting six 
linear models, three to the U5MR and three to the U5MR quintile ratio. The first 
model measured the strength of the unadjusted bivariate association between the 
U5MR, governance and the covariates. The second model measured the strength of 
the adjusted association between the U5MR and the covariates in the absence of the 
governance measures. This model was included so that a comparison could be 
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made between it and an extended model including the governance measures. This 
was done in order to illuminate the strength of the relationship between U5MR and 
governance. The third model measured the strength of the association between the 
U5MR and governance in the presence of the covariates. The estimated 
standardised coefficients (β’s) from the regression analysis are reported, because 
they simplify the comparison of the relative contribution of the independent variables 
and covariates. The same modelling was applied to the U5MR quintile ratio, referred 
to as models four to six. The relationship was considered to be statistically significant 
if the probability of an association (p) was less than 0.05. Model diagnostics were 
undertaken to test if the data fit the models. 
Missing data was an issue for U5MR and the U5MR quintile-ratio because of the 
small size of the dataset and the percentage of countries that did not have complete 
data for all covariates. A sensitivity analysis was conducted to look at the change in 
the estimates when covariates that reduced the sample size (due to missing data) 
were removed, and the relationship between U5MR and the U5MR quintile ratio with 
missing data in the covariates. 
As model three to six revealed a statistically positive association between per capita 
total expenditure on health and the health outcomes, indicating worse outcome with 
increased expenditure on health, this relationship was explored in more details. 
4.3 Results 
The results are presented in five sections. The first section reveals how the variables 
are related to each other. The second section demonstrates how U5MR is correlated 
to governance and the third section displays the association between the U5MR 
quintile ratio and the governance indicators. The fourth section discusses the 
relationship between the outcome variables and per capita health expenditure while 
the final section presents the U5MR numbers in all wealth quintiles from selected 
countries in the AFRO region. 
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4.3.1 Variables and inter-relationships 
Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the U5MR, the U5MR quintile ratio and the predictor variables 
used in the AFRO analysis. 
Health systems performance n Mean SD Min Max 
U5MR1 46 138.5 62.5 13 269 
U5MR quintile ratio 30 1.8 0.66 0.9 4 
Health care      
Births attended by skilled health personnel % 45 55.5 22.2 6 99 
One year olds immunised with DTP32 % 46 77.5 18.7 20 99 
Number of hospital beds/10,000 population 44 13.7 11.2 1 57 
Finance/Economy      
GNI per capita (untransformed) $ 45 2,923 3,995 260 16,620 
Health expenditure per capita $ 46 153 200 15 869 
Education      
Female school enrolment ratio % 45 69.7 20 36 100 
Male school enrolment ratio % 45 74.1 15.8 40 99 
Adult literacy % 42 62.2 20.6 23.6 91.8 
Physical Infrastructure      
Population with sustainable access to improved drinking water 
sources % 46 67.7 16.2 42 100 
Population with sustainable access to improved sanitation % 45 34.5 19.7 5 94 
Governance      
Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption-index (RLTC) 46 54.2 14.4 24.3 86.1 
Sustainable Economic Opportunity-index (SEO) 46 41.8 10.9 23.3 71.4 
1 U5MR:  Under-five mortality rate 
2 DTP3:  Three doses of diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis 
 
Most of the variables span a broad range; the countries’ wealth and therefore the 
ability to spend on health differed vastly. GNI per capita ranged from USD$260 to 
USD$16,620 and per capita health expenditure from USD$15 to USD$869. The 
U5MR ranged from 13 to 269 deaths per 1,000 live births; Seychelles had the lowest 
U5MR and Sierra Lone the highest. The U5MR quintile ratio ranged from 0.9 (slightly 
better outcome for the poorest than the wealthiest quintile) up to 4, where the lowest 
level (least inequality) was found in Chad and the highest value (highest inequality) 
was found in South Africa.  
The inter-relationship between the two selected dimensions of health outcomes 
(U5MR and the U5MR quintile ratio) was examined. There was no discernible 
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relationship between the two measures, and the correlation was low (r=-0.15; 
p=0.42), suggesting that U5MR and the U5MR quintile ratio are independent 
measures of health systems performance, at least in the case of the AFRO data. 
This reinforced the need for separate models of their relationship with governance. 
The inter-relationships between the other variables were tested as per Table 5. The 
strongest relationship was found between the net primary school enrolment ratio 
among boys and the net primary school enrolment ratio among girls (r=0.95). The 
net primary school male enrolment ratio was therefore excluded from further 
analysis.  
 
Table 5: A correlation matrix showing the inter-relationships between the governance 
indicators and the covariates. Numbers above show the correlation coefficient (r) and numbers 
beneath display the p-value. 
 Health care Finance Education Water & 
sanitation 
Governance 
 
Birth 
attended DTP3
1
 
Hospital 
beds 
Health 
expendit. logGNI
2
 
Female 
edu. 
Male 
edu. Literacy Water Sanit. RLTC
3
 SEO
4
 
H
ea
lth
ca
re
 
Birth 
attended 
1            
DTP3 0.35 
0.02 
1           
Hospital 
beds 
0.68 
.<001 
0.33 
0.03 1          
Fi
na
nc
e Health 
expend. 
0.64 
.<001 
0.32 
0.03 
0.75 
.<001 
1         
logGNI 
0.68 
.<001 
0.08 
0.62 
0.60 
.<001 
0.77 
.<001 
1        
E
du
ca
tio
n 
Female 
edu. 
0.46 
.<001 
0.30 
0.04 
0.54 
.<001 
0.50 
.<001 
0.53 
.<001 
1       
Male 
edu. 
0.41 
0.01 
0.14 
0.36 
0.48 
.<001 
0.46 
.<001 
0.51 
.<001 
0.95 
.<001 1      
Literacy 0.62 
.<001 
0.28 
0.07 
0.71 
.<001 
0.54 
.<001 
0.59 
.<001 
0.62 
.<001 
0.48 
.<001 
1     
W
at
er
 &
 
sa
ni
ta
tio
n Water 
0.72 
.<001 
0.47 
.<001 
0.60 
.<001 
0.57 
.<001 
0.58 
.<001 
0.38 
0.01 
0.28 
0.06 
0.46 
.<001 1    
Sanit. 0.59 
0.000 
0.23 
0.13 
0.45 
.<001 
0.51 
.<001 
0.54 
.<001 
0.47 
.<001 
0.41 
0.01 
0.51 
.<001 
0.45 
.<001 
1   
G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
RLTC 0.46 
.<001 
0.41 
0.01 
0.55 
.<001 
0.65 
.<001 
0.58 
.<001 
0.64 
.<001 
0.55 
.<001 
0.38 
0.02 
0.61 
.<001 
0.33 
0.03 
1  
SEO 0.70 
.<001 
0.33 
0.03 
0.71 
.<001 
0.80 
.<001 
0.80 
.<001 
0.67 
.<001 
0.58 
.<001 
0.71 
.<001 
0.64 
.<001 
0.56 
.<001 
0.70 
.<001 
1 
1 DTP3:  Three doses of diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis 
2 GNI: Gross National Income 
3 RLTC:  Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption 
4 SEO:  Sustainable Economic Opportunity 
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4.3.2 Health outcomes (U5MR) 
The next step in the analysis was to apply the dataset to three different models in 
order to investigate the association between U5MR, governance and the covariates 
under different settings (see Table 6). Model 1 shows the bivariate relationship 
between U5MR and the nine covariates, and the two measures of governance using 
the parameter estimate (β coefficient). Model 2 represents the multivariate model of 
the linear relationship between U5MR and the covariates in the absence of the 
measures of governance. Due to missing data in the covariates, only 37 of the 46 
countries that had U5MR data were available for this analysis. The model accounted 
for around 59% of the available variance (Adjusted R2=0.59). After adjustment, only 
two of the covariates retained a significant association with U5MR: sustainable 
access to safe drinking water (β=-0.41, p=0.03) and the percentage of female 
children enrolled in school (β=-0.57, p<0.001).  
Model 3 replicated Model 2, with the addition of the two governance measures 
(n=37). The model accounted for 76% of the available variance (Adjusted R2=0.76), 
and identified a significant association between one of the governance indicators 
(sustainable economic opportunities; β=-0.90, p<0.001) and U5MR, after adjustment 
for the other governance indicator (rule of law, transparency and corruption; β=-0.12, 
p=0.42) and the other covariates. The governance indicator for sustainable economic 
opportunities (SEO) had the largest standardised coefficient of any of the variables 
included in the analysis. Female enrolments remained significant (β=-0.32, p=0.02), 
while sustainable access to safe drinking water was no longer significant in the fully 
adjusted model (β=-0.10, p=0.52). GNI per capita, however, became significant in 
the fully adjusted model (β=0.40, p=0.04) and showed, counter intuitively, that 
increases in GNI per capita were associated with increases in U5MR. This kind of 
instability in parameters is sometimes seen when there are large numbers of 
covariates in relation to the sample size, but could also indicate multicolliniarity 
between the independent variables. Potential multicolliniarity was tested for with a 
post-regression analysis in which each independent variable was regressed on all of 
the other independent variables, indicating minor multicolliniarity. Leverage 
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analysis7, following the regression of Model 3, identified eight countries with the 
largest influence on the regression’s outcome. These were, listed from the largest to 
the lowest impact: South Africa, Sao Tome and Principe, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Gabon, Algeria and Chad. No action was 
taken to exclude any countries, as the sample size was already small and the 
countries with the greatest influences were heterogeneous in most indicators. 
However, the instability raised concerns about the precision of the estimated 
relationship between governance and U5MR.  
 
Table 6:  Three models estimating the relationship between U5MR, governance and nine 
covariates. 
U5MR 
 Model 1 (42≤n≤46) 
Model 2 
(n=37) 
Model 3 
(n=37) 
 β p β p β p 
Health care       
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%) -.56 .<001  -.27 .20  -.31 .06 
One year olds immunised with DTP3 (%) -.44 .<001  .00 .98   .01 .93 
Number of hospital beds (per 10,000 populations) -.63 .<001  .03 .90   .02 .90 
Finance       
LogGNI -.47 .<001   .09 .68   .40 .04 
Per capita total expenditure on health ($) -.50 .<001   .03 .87   .18 .27 
Education       
Female net primary school enrolment ratio (%) -.64 .<001 -.57 .<001 -.32 .02 
Adult Literacy % -.55 .<001   .03 .86  .20 .19 
Physical Infrastructure       
Population with sustainable access to improved 
drinking water sources (%) -.67 .<001 -.41 .03 -.10 .52 
Population with sustainable access to improved 
sanitation (%) -.35 .02  .10 .47  .15 .20 
Governance       
Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption-index 
(RLTC) -.70 .<001    -.12 .42 
Sustainable Economic Opportunity-index (SEO) -.72 .<001    -.90 .<001 
Adjusted R-squared   .59 .76 
                                            
7 Leverage analysis detects the leverage of each observation on the regression outcome. 
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4.3.3 Health equity (U5MR quintile ratio) 
The pattern of results was distinctly different for the models of the U5MR quintile 
ratio data (see Table 7). Model 4 shows the bivariate relationship between the U5MR 
equity ratio, the two measures of governance and the nine covariates. No indicators 
of health care, education or physical infrastructure were significantly correlated with 
the U5MR quintile ratio data (p<0.05). SEO was significantly correlated with the 
U5MR equity ratio (β=0.42, p=0.02), as was health expenditure (β=0.53, p=0.<001). 
A number of the indicators “approached significance” (p<0.1), including births 
attended (health care) (β=0.32, p=0.09), GNI per capita (finance) (β=0.35, p=0.06), 
sanitation (physical infrastructure) (β=0.33, p=0.08), and RLTC (governance) 
(β=0.32, p=0.09). 
Model 5 represents the multivariate model of the linear relationship between the 
U5MR quintile ratio and the covariates in the absence of the measures of 
governance (n=25), and it accounted for 30% of the variance (Adjusted R2=0.30). 
Only two of the covariates were, independently, significantly associated with the 
U5MR quintile ratio. The first of these was the availability of hospital beds per 10,000 
population (β=-0.73, p=0.04), as the number of hospital beds per 10,000 increased, 
so there was an associated improvement in health equity. The second independently 
significant covariate associated with the U5MR equity ratio was per capita total 
expenditure on health (β=0.88, p=0.01); increases in per capita health spending 
were associated with deteriorating equity. 
Model 6 replicated Model 5, with the addition of the two governance measures 
(n=25). The addition of the governance indicators results in a poorer fit to the data 
(Adjusted R2=0.21), and neither SEO (β=0.19, p=0.71) nor RLTC (β=0.1, p=0.77) 
were significantly associated with the U5MR quintile ratio. In the fully adjusted 
model, the only covariate that remained significantly associated with the U5MR 
quintile ratio was per capita total expenditure on health (β=0.85, p=0.02). 
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Table 7: Three models estimating the relationship between the U5MR quintile ratio, 
governance and nine covariates. 
U5MR Quintile Ratio 
 Model 4 
(28≤n≤30) 
Model 5 
(n=25) 
Model 6 
(n=25) 
 β p β p β p 
Health care       
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%) .32 .09  .31 .30  .32 .34 
One year olds immunised with DTP3 (%) .24 .19  .15 .55  .10 .72 
Number of hospital beds (per 10,000 populations) .07 .73 -.73 .04  -.73 .06 
Finance       
LogGNI .35 .06  -.04 .92  -.14 .77 
Per capita total expenditure on health ($) .53 .<001   .88 .01   .85 .02 
Education       
Female net primary school enrolment ratio (%) .25 .20 -.18 .44 -.24 .40 
Adult Literacy % .23 .24   .42 .18  .36 .35 
Physical Infrastructure       
Population with sustainable access to improved drinking 
water sources (%) .15 .43 -.42 .21 -.47 .25 
Population with sustainable access to improved sanitation 
(%) .33 .08  .27 .23   .27 .25 
Governance       
Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption-index (RLTC) .32 .09    .10 .77 
Sustainable Economic Opportunity-index (SEO) .42 .02    .19 .71 
Adjusted R-squared   .30 .21 
 
4.3.4 Expenditure on health in relation to the health outcomes 
There is a positive association between life expectancy and expenditures on health 
although the variance is high, especially among countries with the lowest health 
spending (Poullier et al. 2002).Counter intuitively, this study showed a positive 
relationship between spending on health and the U5MR and the U5MR quintile ratio 
in multivariate regressions. These results stimulated further exploration of the per 
capita health expenditures in relation to the U5MR and the U5MR quintile ratio as 
presented in the next two sections.   
 (i) In relation to U5MR quintile ratio 
Per capita total expenditure was positively related to the U5MR quintile ratio in all 
models and was statistically significant in all cases. However, the variance was high 
P a g e  | 54 
 
with leverage analysis indicating a substantial impact from South Africa, as revealed 
in the two way scatter graph shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: A two-way scatter graph of the U5MR quintile ratio and per capita total expenditure 
on health. 
When South Africa was excluded in a bivariate regression between the U5MR 
quintile ration and per capita total expenditure on health the association turned from 
positive to negative, however, was not statistically significant (β=-0.06, p=0.75). 
Model 6 was also run again, without South Africa, causing the association between 
the U5MR quintile ratio and health expenditure to become non-significant but still 
positive (β=0.55, p=0.32). The small size of the sample and the high variation makes 
interpretation of these results difficult.  
(ii) In relation to U5MR 
Per capita total expenditure on health was either positively or negatively associated 
with the U5MR, depending on whether it was run in a single regression or 
multivariate regressions. The small sample size, especially in relation to the number 
of covariates, might cause instability in the results, although negative confounding is 
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also likely to have caused the sign to change. Health expenditures and the SEO 
index are positively related (r=0.8, p<0.001); at the same time, the SEO index has a 
stronger negative association with the U5MR than per capita total expenditure does. 
This could cause the SEO index to act as a negative confounding factor, which 
changes the expenditure variable from negative to positive when run in a multivariate 
regression (Mehio-Sibai et al. 2005).  
A two-way scatter graph in Figure 5 illustrates the negative bivariate association 
between the U5MR and per capita total expenditure on health in the AFRO area.  
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Figure 5: Two-way scatter graph for the U5MR and per capita total expenditure on health. 
The bivariate association is statistically significant (r=-0.2, p<0.001), but the variance 
is high (Adjusted R2=.23). For countries that spend below USD$100 on health per 
capita, the probability of dying before the age of five varies from 68 deaths per 1,000 
live births to 269 deaths. This is a substantial variation, given the low level of health 
expenditure. The negative association does not remain for the countries that spend 
less than USD$100 on health, as shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: A two-way scatter graph for the U5MR and per capita total expenditure on health in 
countries that spend less than USD$100 on health per capita. Source: WHOSIS 
Studies on the association between health expenditures and health outcomes have 
been controversial; some have shown no association between child mortality and 
health expenditure, especially in the poorer countries (Musgrove 1996). The findings 
range from no impact to limited impact or impacts in the case of specific 
interventions (Dollar, Burnside 1998; Filmer, Pritchett 1999; Anyanwu, Erhijakpor 
2007; Abed, Gupta 2002). The results shown in Figure 6 raise a number of 
questions. Why does Eritrea have a much lower U5MR than Niger, even though they 
spend similar amounts on health per capita? There is no simple explanation and this 
finding needs to be investigated further. 
4.3.5 U5MR in all wealth quintiles 
Under-five mortality rate was explored in all wealth quintiles in countries spending 
less than USD$100 on health per capita (Figure 6). Data from the Demographic 
Health Surveys (DHS) was used for this purpose, as the World Health Organization 
only provided information on U5MR in the highest and the lowest wealth quintiles. 
Data was available for five countries: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria and 
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Tanzania. The World Health Organization’s statistics from 2006 presented in Figure 
6 differ from the DHS numbers, which are from 2002 to 2005. The difference is up to 
20% for these five countries with the biggest difference in numbers from Eritrea; the 
WHO presents 74 deaths per 1,000 live births while the comparable number is 93 in 
the DHS report.  
The U5MR varies depending on wealth quintiles in all countries with the trend of 
lower U5MR with increased wealth; however, the lowest wealth quintile does not 
always have the highest U5MR number as might be expected. The highest U5MR is 
registered in the second lowest wealth quintile in four out of the five countries as 
illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: The U5MR in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania in all wealth quintiles. 
Source: DHS. 
Data in Figure 7 suggests that merely looking at the ratio between the lowest and the 
highest wealth quintiles in the AFRO region might be too restrictive. Data from the 
Wold Bank indicates that the U5MR in sub-Saharan Africa is on average higher in 
the second wealth quintile than in the lowest (World Bank 2007b). The second 
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wealth quintile had a higher U5MR in 13 countries out of 29 in sub-Saharan Africa in 
the World Bank’s report “Socio-Economic Differences in Health, Nutrition, and 
Population Within Developing Countries” (Gwatkin et al. 2007). In nine countries out 
of 29, the U5MR was higher in the third wealth quintile than in the poorest. 
4.4 Discussion 
The discussion starts with quantitative analysis related to the U5MR, then the U5MR 
quintile ratio and finishes with a short discussion of the U5MR in different wealth 
quintiles.  
The primary interest in the quantitative analysis regarded the association between 
health systems performance (health outcomes and health equity) and the non-health 
care factor, governance. It is notable that there was no apparent relationship 
between the health outcomes dimension of health systems performance (U5MR) and 
the health equity dimension (U5MR quintile ratio). This is important for two reasons. 
Firstly, and purely from an analytic perspective, the lack of a relationship reinforces 
the need to independently model the two dimensions of health systems performance. 
Secondly, and with a policy perspective in mind, the independence of the dimensions 
reinforces the need to take them both seriously and not assume that addressing one 
will necessarily address the other. 
The quantitative analysis unveiled a statistically significant bivariate association 
between U5MR and governance, measured through two separate governance 
indices, the “sustainable economic opportunity” (SEO index) and the “rule of law and 
transparency” (RLTC index). After controlling for nine covariates representing health 
care, finance/economy, education, and physical infrastructure, only the SEO index 
remained significantly related to U5MR. The relationship was negative, indicating 
that the higher the SEO index (improved governance), the lower the U5MR. Although 
a causal relationship cannot be established in an ecological, cross sectional analysis 
of this kind, the results leave open the possibility that good governance helps to 
create an environment in which a health system can perform well and certainly 
invites further research to examine the issue of causation. These results are 
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restricted to the dataset chosen and the method applied, but are consistent with 
other studies and reports that have suggested that good governance is a 
prerequisite for improved health outcomes (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido 1999; Gupta, 
Davoodi & Tiongson 2000; Wagstaff, Claeson 2004; Rajkumar, Swaroop 2008; 
Abed, Gupta 2002; Lazarova, Mosca 2008; Reidpath, Allotey 2006; Global Water 
Intelligence 2007; Transparency International 2008). 
Child mortality and life expectancy are outcomes commonly used as indicators of 
health systems performance. However, average numbers do not inform about the 
distribution of the performance. The U5MR ratio between the poorest and the richest 
wealth quintiles was employed to evaluate the association between governance and 
the distribution of health system performance. Notwithstanding a significant bivariate 
association between governance (SEO index) and health equity, there was no 
significant association in the multivariate analysis. Given the apparent independence 
of health outcomes and health equity, this may not be entirely surprising. 
Nevertheless, it raises important questions about which non-health care factors 
should be future targets for investigation, and no clear answer presents itself. The 
unanticipated relationship between finance and health equity certainly warrants 
further consideration. Earlier findings indicate that increased spending on health 
could reduce the U5MR if governance scores are above certain “minimum levels” 
(Wagstaff, Claeson 2004). More research looking at causal relationships, especially 
in countries spending little on health per capita, would help to improve our 
understanding of the association between under-five mortality rate and health 
system financing. 
The results from the quantitative analysis should be regarded as preliminary, due to 
limitations in the amount, the quality and the type of data used. The Ibrahim Index 
has not been used much in studies on health system performance and use of other 
governance indices might have given different results. The number of countries 
contributing data was small relative to the number of variables included in the 
analyses, both for the analysis of equity and for the analysis of average health 
outcomes. The weakness in the quality of the data is best illustrated by the 
difference explored in databases from different international organisations. The 
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difference between information provided on under-five mortality rate in Nigeria for 
2008 was 23% between the World Health Organization database and the World 
Bank database; the World Health Organization presented 186 deaths per 1,000 live 
births while the World Bank presented 143 deaths per 1,000 live births (World Health 
Organization 2010; World Bank 2010a). This difference needs clarification, but it has 
been pointed out that the sum of deaths claimed by data supplied by the World 
Health Organization exceeds the total number of deaths in the world (Murray, Lopez 
& Wibulpolprasert 2004).  Limitations in the interpretation of the results lie also in the 
type of data used in this research. Longitudinal data, allowing for the inclusion of 
time-lag, would strengthen the analysis considerably and reduce the danger of the 
ecological fallacy. Changes in child mortality rates are a consequence of several 
actions taken over a period of time and looking at governance and under-five 
mortality rate at one single point in time is limiting.  Nonetheless, governance and 
other non-health care factors appear to be significantly associated with health 
outcomes. If the association is causal, and it might be anticipated that it is 
(Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008), then it would be unwise to 
ignore that possibility because of data quality issues.  
The observation of U5MRs in all wealth quintiles disclosed an unexpected U5MR 
profile, showing that the highest U5MR rate was not associated with the lowest 
income quintile. There might be several reasons for this distortion, one being the 
influence of a pro-poor approach to reduce health inequities within health systems 
(Gwatkin, Bhuiya & Victora 2004; Kruk et al. 2010). Studies that focus only on the 
poorest wealth quintiles compared to the richest wealth quintiles run the risk of 
missing out essential information, at least in the AFRO region. According to the 
World Bank, the second wealth quintile has a higher under-five mortality rate than 
the lowest wealth quintile in 45% of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which indicates 
that the higher under-five mortality rate of the second poorest quintile is an issue, not 
only restricted to the five countries explored in this study (Gwatkin et al. 2007). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This study suggests a strong association between health outcomes, measured as 
under-five mortality rate and governance, calculated through Ibrahim indices, in the 
African context. An association was also detected between governance and health 
equity, measured as the under-five mortality ratio between the poorest and the 
richest wealth quintiles, in a bivariate regression which did not remain after 
controlling for confounding factors. However, interpretations are limited because of 
the small dataset and limited data quality. The inconsistency in databases from 
supposedly reliable international organisations like the World Health Organization 
and the World Bank must be clarified and synchronised to improve the reliability of 
future research. Nevertheless, this research indicates that there are a range of 
largely under-utilised indicators such as governance that could play an important role 
when planning future interventions. This complies with recent data from large scale 
studies such as the Commission on Social Determinants of Health, which provides 
important and alternative ways of conceptualising the factors that should be within 
the purview of the health sector. Analyses such as that presented here provide an 
argument for inter-sectoral approaches to population health improvement, 
notwithstanding weaknesses in the data. It also points out that it might be limiting to 
restrict equity research to the ratio between the richest and the poorest wealth 
quintiles. This needs to be addressed in future research on equity, in health as well 
as in policy making, in relation to the pro-poor approach in reducing inequity in 
health. The assessment of health care systems alone as a proxy for health systems 
performance is restrictive, both in terms of making progress and assessing 
improvements, especially in countries where broader determinants such as 
governance and infrastructure remain inadequate. 
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Chapter 5: Governance and Health Systems II: 
analysis of the initial response towards the health 
system in a high income country going through an 
economic crisis - the case of Iceland 2008 - 2009 
5.1 Introduction 
The recent global economic crisis created significant challenges for governments, 
including those with stable economies and political structures, as economic 
contractions have the potential to affect societies’ capability to provide social 
services. However, earlier economic crises have affected countries differently, 
depending on their economic strength, political stability and social security systems 
prior to the crises, amongst other factors (Stuckler et al. 2009; Parry, Humphreys 
2009). A decrease in mortality rate has been reported in countries with strong 
economies during economic downturns, which has been related to less smoking, 
reduced alcohol intake, increased physical activity, reduced height-adjusted weight 
and fewer road traffic accidents (Granados, Roux 2009; Gerdtham, Ruhm 2006; 
Khang, Lynch & Kaplan 2005). On the other hand, research from middle and low 
income countries has shown a rise in mortality along with some health-specific 
deaths or morbidities related to economic crises (Hopkins 2006; Cutler et al. 2002; 
Waters, Saadah & Pradhan 2003; Paxson, Schady 2005; Falagas et al. 2009). The 
main reason has been diminished governmental ability to provide social services 
and, hence, the reduced ability to protect national welfare, especially among the 
poor, who are most vulnerable during times of crises (Cutler et al. 2002; Waters, 
Saadah & Pradhan 2003). In Peru, for example, infant mortality rose during the crisis 
in the late 1980s. The reason suggested was a collapse in public and private 
expenditure on health (Paxson, Schady 2005).   
In the case of a political crisis on top of an economic crisis, such as in Indonesia 
during the East-Asian crisis in 1997, negative health impacts increased (Hopkins 
2006). A substantial increase in distress indicators at all ages and among both 
genders was reported in Indonesia and they took longer to recover than the 
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economy (Friedman, Thomas 2008).  During Indonesian crisis, household 
expenditure on health decreased and so did health service utilisation. This stands in 
stark contrast to Thailand, where health service utilisation increased during the East-
Asian crisis, corresponding with expansion in their social security and health system 
(Waters, Saadah & Pradhan 2003). 
When societies experience severe shocks, an increase in psychological stress 
among the population can be expected, with unfortunate consequences for 
population health. This was the case in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the subsequent abrupt and severe economic transition in 1992-94. Life 
expectancy dropped among both men and women in Russia during this time, which 
has been related to psychological stress and socio-economic shock (Shkolnikov et 
al. 1998). 
In order to mitigate turmoil such as an economic crisis, a multi-sectoral approach and 
cooperation is needed, in which both social and economic determinants of health are 
addressed (World Health Organization 2009a). Nevertheless, it is governments’ 
responsibility, as one of the principle actors in protecting nations’ health and well-
being, to lead the initial response to such crises and to provide a strong stewardship8 
for policy making and reforms (United Nations 1993; Sen 1999; World Health 
Organization 2000). In the current economic crisis, the World Health Organization 
encouraged governments to consolidate their leadership and to monitor early 
warning signs, related to the economic crisis, to help them to respond appropriately 
with the aim of mitigating the negative impacts of the crisis (World Health 
Organization 2009a). Member states were urged to protect health spending and to 
focus on the poor, as well as taking longer-term perspectives in order to make health 
systems more resilient in the future.   
                                            
8 Stewardship has been defined in different ways, although most of the definitions imply that it is 
greatly related to governance, whereby governments have the sole responsibility for population 
welfare, lead public health policy making, set priorities and safeguard patients’ rights (Saltman, 
Ferroussier-Davis 2000). 
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Post hoc analyses of health outcomes following economic crises have been 
undertaken, but there has been a lack of systematic inquiry into how authorities at 
national level respond during times of crises, how well these responses comply with 
“good” governance and, ultimately, how these responses influence and affect the 
health systems. The recent economic meltdown (an economic, currency and political 
crisis) that hit Iceland in late 2008 provided an ideal opportunity for this analysis to 
be undertaken, using a case study research approach. The aim of this study was to 
describe and analyse the response of the Icelandic government and health system 
authorities9  towards the health system in the first months of the economic crisis in 
2008 and how well the decision making process complied with good governance 
practices based on the UNESCAP definition of good governance (Sheng 2011). The 
main research questions were: 
• How does governance affect decision making within a health system going 
through an abrupt economic meltdown? 
• Did the decision making comply with good governance practices? 
• Were stakeholders involved in the decision making process and who were 
the key influential actors? 
• Was health equity affected in the decision making process?  
The approach to the case study research was predominantly qualitative, using 
parliamentary documents, news and health discussions in two of the biggest 
newspapers in Iceland, and interviewing key stakeholders in the health sector. 
5.2 Background to Iceland 
Iceland is an island in the North Atlantic Ocean. It is 103,000 square kilometres and 
has a population of 317,000 inhabitants (Statistics Iceland 2009a). More than half of 
the population lives in the capital, Reykjavik, and its surrounding areas. The rest of 
the population is distributed around the country, mainly along the coastline.  
                                            
9 Health system authorities are the Minister of Health, the Ministry of Health and its institutions. 
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Iceland is a democratic republic with a parliament whose members are elected in 
general elections, every four years or less.  Most commonly, a parliamentary majority 
forms the government under the leadership of a prime minister. Iceland has a 
president, who is elected by direct popular vote for a term of four years, with no term 
limit. Legislative power lies with the parliament and the president, who has to sign off 
all new laws passed by the parliament before they become valid. Should the 
president refuse consent to new legislation, the parliament can either withdraw the 
bill or settle the issue by referendum. There are four major political parties: The 
Independence Party and the Progressive Party, both conservative parties that have 
ruled for the past two decades, and the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-
Green Movement, both liberal democratic parties that are currently in power. 
5.2.1 Governance in Iceland 
Iceland has been given high scores when evaluated in terms of governance quality. 
According to the World Bank, Iceland commonly scores above 90% of the maximum 
score given, as illustrated in Table 8 (World Bank 2010c). However, scores for 
“Regulatory quality” have declined after the economic crisis which commenced in 
2008.     
Table 8: The World Bank's governance indicators for Iceland. Source: World Bank (2010c) 
Year Voice and accountability 
Political 
stability 
Government 
effectiveness 
Regulatory 
quality 
Rule 
of law 
Control of 
corruption 
1996 92.3 88.5 89.3 57.1 90.0 92.7 
1998 94.7 97.1 98.1 88.8 94.3 94.2 
2000 95.7 98.6 97.6 93.2 98.6 99.5 
2002 97.6 98.6 98.1 91.7 100 97.6 
2003 98.6 99.0 99.5 94.6 100 98.1 
2004 96.2 97.1 98.5 95.1 100 98.1 
2005 97.1 99.0 99.0 96.6 100 100 
2006 96.6 100 97.6 94.1 99.0 98.5 
2007 96.2 100 95.2 92.2 98.1 98.6 
2008 96.2 93.3 92.8 81.6 96.2 98.1 
2009 96.2 92.0 93.3 79.0 94.8 97.1 
 
Green means: 90th to 100th percentile of maximum score 
Light green means: 75th to 90th percentile of maximum score 
Yellow means: 50th to 75th percentile of maximum score 
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Despite high scores in “Control of corruption,” many Icelanders perceive a 
substantial level of dishonesty among politicians and a jumble of interests with the 
business sector (Gylfason 2009; Visir 2009b; Eyjan 2009). Although corruption has 
traditionally been related to the poorer countries of the world, it has been pointed out 
that several rich countries also have problems with ethics and corruption, which 
might be difficult to capture in governance indices; for example, the magnitude of 
cliquishness in the appointments of individuals to high public positions and 
committees that lead policy making (Kaufmann 2004; Gylfason 1993). Icelandic 
politics have functioned as a “buddy-system” for decades and one of the 
consequences is that people with the best qualifications are not always appointed to 
positions where their knowledge and experience are needed. Instead, political allies 
and even personal friends are selected, people who are not necessarily familiar with 
the subject in question. The risk of inequitable policy making increases under such 
circumstances as those with authority are inspired by policy “elites” or strong interest 
groups, commonly working in the ministers’ closest circles (Gudjonsson et al. 2005). 
5.2.2 The economic crisis in Iceland 
The Icelandic banking sector was fully privatised in 2003 after all the state owned 
banks were sold that same year. Although the banks were put out to tender, the 
whole process received extensive criticism, indicating an inappropriate connection 
between the politicians and the investors (Arnarson 2009). The global economy was 
favourable for expansion after the privatisation and soon the Icelandic banking sector 
became an active player in the global financial market. The Icelandic banks were 
new on the global market, with limited experience and with management that 
showed a willingness to take risks, driven by financial incentives. Compared to local 
wages, the bankers’ remuneration was extremely high, further increasing the gap 
between the rich and the poor.  
The danger of bankruptcy was real, as the government neglected to strengthen the 
institutions intended to monitor the newly privatised banks. When the recent global 
financial crisis commenced, the Icelandic banks turned out to be vulnerable and, in 
2008, the Icelandic government had to nationalise the banks again, then 10 times 
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the Icelandic gross domestic product and heavily indebted (Danielsson 2009; 
Arnarson 2009; Evans-Pritchard 2006; BBC 2009). 
5.3 The Icelandic health system 
The Icelandic health system is a comprehensive health system providing universal 
coverage. It is centrally governed and, to a great extent, financed through general 
taxation (Halldorsson 2003; Vilhjalmsson 2007). The health system is regulated by 
the Health Services Act, the Health Insurance Act and other related acts, which are 
intended to ensure the population has a right to the best possible health services at 
any given time (Icelandic Parliament 2007b; Icelandic Parliament 2008a). The health 
system is primarily publicly owned, although some institutions such as rehabilitation 
services and institutions for the elderly are outsourced to the private sector. Certain 
organisations working in prevention and health promotion are also privately owned, 
including the Cancer Society and the Icelandic Heart Association.  
Primary health care services are generally the entry point for patients. There is, 
however, no referral system between doctors in Iceland, and patients can seek 
health services directly from specialists if they prefer. A referral system exists for 
certain other types of treatments such as physiotherapy. An overview of the Icelandic 
health system is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: An overview of the Icelandic health system. 
Health professionals working in primary health care and in hospitals are civil 
servants, as are the staff working in public geriatric institutions. Allied health 
professionals are privately hired, but provide health care services that are subsidised 
through the social security system.  
The Icelandic health system is regarded as advanced and easily accessible, and 
people are generally happy with it (Thorarinsson et al. 2000). There are thirty 
different health care institutions nationwide, split up between seven regions as 
shown in Figure 9 (Icelandic Parliament 2007b; Ministry of Health 2007b). In the 
figure, the health regions are separated by colours and include population numbers 
as well. They differ not only in geographical and population sizes, but also in 
institutional collaboration within each region. The aim is to unite the institutions in the 
regions, or at least persuade them to cooperate more than they have done in the 
past.  
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Figure 9: Health regions in Iceland and their population size. Source: Directorate of Health 
2008a. 
In 2008, the total expenditure on health was 137.5 billion Icelandic Kronur (USD$ 1.1 
billion)10, which corresponds to 9.4% of the country’s GDP. The government covered 
83% of the cost, while the rest was paid by domestic households (17%) as out-of-
pocket payments (Statistics Iceland 2009b). These numbers are illustrated in Figure 
10.  
                                            
10 The exchange rate used in this study is 1 USD$ to 125 ISK. The rate has been unstable during the 
economic crisis. 
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Figure 10: Health expenditure as percentages of the nation’s GDP and as a percentage of 
household participation. Source: Statistics Iceland (2009b) 
In 2008, the most expensive parts of the health system covered by the government 
were: hospital services, including geriatric institutions, which received 68% of 
governmental expenditure on health care. Outpatient care represented 19% of the 
cost, medical products and equipment outside the hospital 10% and other health 
services less than 3% of total governmental expenditure (Statistics Iceland 2008). 
These numbers are summarised in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Governmental expenditure on the health system in 2008. Source: Statistics Iceland 
(2008) 
Compared to the OECD, Iceland spent 3,319 USD$ ppp on health per capita in 
2007, while the average expenditure in OECD countries was 2,964 USD$ ppp 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2009). According to an 
OECD report, the comparison is unfavourable for Iceland when it comes to 
measuring efficiency, as several OECD countries have achieved similar or higher 
levels of health adjusted life expectancy (HALE) than Iceland with less public health 
care spending per capita (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development 2008).  The OECD suggested that Iceland could reduce its health care 
spending by one-third without compromising health outcomes. The Directorate of 
Health objected to this statement and claimed there were failures in the report 
(Directorate of Health 2009). 
In 2008 Iceland was the highest performing country in the world in the United 
Nations Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme 
2008). The general health status was assessed as well above the average of OECD 
countries. Life expectancy at birth in 2007 was 81.2 years, compared to 78.9 years in 
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OECD countries on average. The infant mortality rate was 2.0 per 1,000 live births in 
2007 and was the lowest rate among OECD countries, which was on average 4.9 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2009). 
5.3.1 Equity in health 
Limited data is available regarding health in different socio-economic groups in 
Iceland. No such information was found on the Ministry of Health’s website, the 
Directorate of Health’s website or on the website of National Statistics. That is 
surprising, as one of the goals in the National Health Plan to 2010 was to reduce the 
difference in life expectancy between socio-economic groups by 25% (Ministry of 
Health 2001); if it is not monitored, then how can such goals be set and measured? 
No systematic monitoring or public research is ongoing to examine inequalities in 
health in Iceland, even though general funding for public health research was said to 
be doubled in the National Health Plan 2000-2010. However, the studies that have 
been undertaken in relation to equity indicate different health status among 
Icelanders, depending on socio-economic groups (Thorarinsson et al. 2000; 
Gunnarsdottir 2005; Halldorsson et al. 2000; Halldorsson et al. 1999). It is well 
known that access to health services is not the only factor that affects inequity in 
health; it also depends on environmental and behavioural factors, which usually vary 
between socio-economic groups (Marmot, Wilkinson 2006). Results from studies on 
inequity in health indicate that those who are more educated and have a higher 
income live longer than those with a lower income and are less educated 
(Gunnarsdottir 2005). Differences in eating and smoking habits have been observed 
between the socio-economic groups in Iceland, whereby higher education has been 
associated with healthier eating habits (Steingrimsdottir, Thorgeirsdottir & Olafsdottir 
2003) and less smoking (National Public Health Institute of Iceland 2005). 
5.3.1.1 Inequity in the out-of-pocket payment mechanism 
All Icelandic residents who have lived in Iceland for at least six months have health 
insurance that provides access to the health system (Icelandic Parliament 2008a). 
Health care users pay, on average, 17% of the total health care cost as out-of-pocket 
fees. Children under 18 years, the elderly over 67 years, and disabled citizens all 
pay lower fees than insured adults in general.  There is an annual “safety net” cap of 
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25,000 Icelandic kronur (USD$202) on out-of-pocket health expenditure, after which 
the patient is eligible for a discount card from the Institute of Health Insurance that 
secures lower out-of-pocket fees for health care services. The “safety net” ceiling is 
considerably lower for children under 18 years (the sum is for all children under 18 
years in a family) the elderly and disabled; 8,100 Icelandic kronur (USD$65) for 
children and 6,100 Icelandic kronur (USD$49) for the elderly and disabled. 
Hospitalisation is free of charge, but co-payments are requested for outpatient visits 
and visits to the Accident and Emergency (A&E) department. A co-payment for a 
onetime visit to A&E is 4,600 Icelandic kronur (USD$37) and for a visit to a general 
practitioner (GP) it is 1,000 Icelandic kronur (USD$8) for an insured adult. Fees for 
specialists differ depending on how the specialists have negotiated with the Ministry 
of Health or the Institute of Health Insurance. An initial fee for visiting a specialist is 
around 3,600 Icelandic kronur (USD$29), plus a fee for some additional services 
needed for treatment (Icelandic Health Insurance 2009). Costs related to treatment 
received from other health care professionals, such as physiotherapists or 
occupational therapists, are not included in the discount card, although subsidised. A 
referral from a GP is needed to access these services. Certain services such as 
nutritional counselling and psychotherapy are not subsidised at all. 
Mental health care is not, except in extreme cases11, subsidised if it is received from 
a (clinical) psychologist (Ministry of Health 2007a). Their service rate is between 
7,000 – 10,000 kronur (USD$56 - $80) for an hour’s consultation and is a 100% out-
of-pocket payment. Treatment from psychiatrists is, on the other hand, subsidised. 
The total price for one appointment with a psychiatrist is 17,000 kronur (USD$136) 
but the patient pays around 38% or 6,500 kronur (USD$52). The fee is further 
reduced if the patient possesses a discount card. The subsidisation in Iceland 
therefore not only discriminates against the type of health care services needed, but 
also exists on the grounds of health care specialisation. To further complicate 
matters, some primary health care institutions have hired psychologists, paid by the 
institutions. Patients living in that particular area can receive a free service from that 
                                            
11 The government has currently a contract with three psychologists for the whole country. 
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psychologist if they obtain a referral from their local GPs. This is an additional 
example of inequity, this time depending on where patients’ homes are located. 
Dental care is not included in the discount card scheme, although some patient 
groups do receive subsidisation which is listed in a special regulation (Social 
Insurance Administration of Iceland 2008; Ministry of Health 2005). Those that are 
entitled to reimbursement gain subsidies based on rates decided by the Ministry of 
Health. The minister’s rates are much lower than those of the dentists themselves, 
who can freely decide their own rates (Ministry of Health 2005).  
Pharmaceuticals are not included in the general discount card, depending on the 
type of medicine as to whether it is subsidised and to what extent. There is a special 
committee, The Committee of Medical Payments, which decides how medical costs 
are divided between the patient and the Institute of Health Insurance (Icelandic 
Parliament 2009b). The decisions made by the Committee of Medical Payments are 
not transparent, as there are no accessible rules governing its decision making 
process. If conditions are life-threatening, patients are issued a medication certificate 
which gives discounts and in some cases full coverage (Icelandic Health Insurance 
2009; Icelandic Parliament 2008d; Ministry of Health 2009a). 
Despite these guidelines, the Icelandic health insurance system has been described 
as inconsistent, patchy, inequitable and discriminatory. Bjartmarz et al. (2006) state 
that the out-of-pocket payment system is neither transparent nor logical (Bjartmarz et 
al. 2006). Research has shown restrictions in access for those with a low income 
and for those who live in rural areas, mainly because of long transport times and 
related costs (Vilhjalmsson et al. 2001). Individuals with a low income were more 
likely to postpone or cancel a visit to a health care professional due to cost concerns. 
Possession of a discount card decreased the possibility of postponing or cancelling a 
visit, but surprisingly the research also revealed that only 46% of those who had the 
right to a discount card possessed one (Vilhjalmsson, Sigurdardottir 2003). There 
are probably several reasons for this; the system is complicated and people may not 
be aware of their rights to a discount card, or they may simply forget to keep their 
invoices, which must be attached when applying for the card. Nevertheless, it should 
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be noted that, despite the flaws in the system, it is uncommon for people to be 
unable to afford health services in Iceland. 
5.4 Method 
5.4.1 Study design 
Case studies are based on empirical inquiry, using multiple sources of evidence 
while investigating a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin 
2003). A case study was therefore suitable to investigate the initial responses 
towards a health system in real time while Iceland went through an economic 
meltdown. Various analytical tools can be applied to case studies, depending on the 
phenomenon under scrutiny and the research questions raised (Denzin, Lincoln 
2000). The Icelandic case was an exploration of an unprecedented evolving 
phenomenon still with unknown outcomes. The Grounded Theory, which is 
applicable to form a theory based on data collection with concurrent data analysis, 
was therefore ideally suitable for this case study (Glaser, Strauss 1967). The 
Grounded Theory provides systematic working procedures allowing for use of 
multiple data sources. The analytical working procedures minimise bias at the same 
time as they are flexible when observing actions/interactions (detailed information in 
chapter 5.4.8. Data analysis). A theory emerges from the data collection and 
analysis that can help uncover and understand what lies behind the phenomenon, 
which is further illustrated by characteristic examples from the data (Glaser, Strauss 
1967; Strauss, Corbin 1990). In qualitative analysis, the role of the researcher is 
always significant as it is her/him who studies the phenomenon under observation, 
collects data and interprets the findings to establish meaning which could guide 
policy making and stimulate further research.  
5.4.2 The researcher 
At the time the study was conducted, I was a doctoral trainee in public health at 
Brunel University in West London. I am an Icelandic citizen and have been a senior 
official in the Icelandic health system. I was the general director of the National 
Institute for Public Health, one of the Ministry of Health's institutions, prior to 
commencement of the doctoral training. I am therefore familiar with the Icelandic 
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health system, as well as the Icelandic culture and am acquainted with some of the 
individuals who participated in the research. Knowledge of the system facilitated 
access to documents that others might have found difficult to obtain. I was resident 
in Iceland for the duration of data collection and during the acute phases of the 
economic crisis and was therefore able to follow the developments 
contemporaneously. When I was outside the country, I followed the discussions and 
the ongoing developments through the Internet, mass media and personal 
communications with Icelandic residents. 
Although I was brought up in Iceland with a good understanding of the local culture 
and how things happen in the society, these factors should have minimal 
implications for the study, as I followed the grounded theory research framework and 
was under tight and frequent supervision by my supervisors. 
5.4.3 Sampling and data collection 
The Icelandic Parliament, Althingi, opens on October 1st every year. The economic 
meltdown started one week after its commencement in 2008, when almost the entire 
banking sector collapsed and was nationalised. Three sources of data were used in 
this research: two sources of secondary data and one source of primary data, in 
addition to the researcher’s observation.  The secondary data was collected from the 
parliament, including all discussions related to health. This data was well suited to 
the purpose of this study, as the Icelandic health system operates in accordance with 
laws approved by the parliament, usually prepared by the Ministry of Health, and is 
funded through general taxation; the parliament decides how much of the state 
budget is allocated to the health system. Secondary data was also collected from 
two of the biggest newspapers in Iceland, as they closely follow ongoing issues in 
society and are open to receiving articles from citizens who want to stimulate 
discussions on issues about which they are concerned. 
The primary data was collected from interviews with stakeholders held six months 
after the economic crisis commenced in order to gain a more in-depth understanding 
of actions and interactions in relation to the decision making process and what/who 
might have influenced the process. An interview protocol was followed, as detailed in 
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Appendix 3. This was done to minimise errors and biases in the study. The data will 
be discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections, but Figure 12 below gives an 
overview of the timing of the data collection. 
 
Figure 12: The timeframe of the data collection in Iceland. 
 
5.4.4 Parliamentary documents and newspapers 
The official documentation of parliamentary discussions about health took place 
between the 1st of October 2008 and the 17th of April 2009. This is the timeframe 
from the opening session of the parliament until the final assembly before 
parliamentary election, held on the 25th of April 2009. The parliamentary discussions 
were accessed through the parliament’s website, where they are available with open 
access (www.althingi.is). During this time period, there were 135 parliamentary 
sessions. The second source was news and articles about the health system in two 
of the most frequently read newspapers in Iceland, Morgunbladid and Frettabladid, 
from 1st of January until 17th of April 2009. Data collection started in January 1st as 
the minister of health presented major changes in the health sector due to the 
financial crisis in a press conference on January 7th 2009, which caused reactions 
which were discussed in the media. The newspapers were observed on a daily 
basis, but additionally a search was conducted in the newspapers via the Internet 
using the keyword “heilbrigðiskerfi”, which means “health system”. In Morgunbladid, 
there were 447 articles/news, of which 94 were about the Icelandic health system in 
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relation to the economic crisis, while there were 52 in Frettabladid, of which 27 were 
relevant to this research. 
5.4.5 Key informants’ interviews 
Primary data was from interviews with a purposive sample of key informants held in 
March and April 2009, or as soon as the ethics approval was received. Key 
informants were those who participated directly in the decision making process or 
those who governed health care institutions that were directly affected in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis. These were health professionals at the Ministry of 
Health and at the Directorate of Health, managers at health care institutions and 
health system specialists participating in or observing the policy process. Analysis of 
the data was made concurrently with the data collection to improve interview 
techniques and to ensure that emerging themes would be tested and further 
developed (Strauss, Corbin 1990). The data collection was continued until 
saturation, when interviews did not provide new additional information. 
The purpose of the primary data sampling was to gather first-hand information from 
key informants on how they experienced the first response towards the health 
system in the economic crisis, how stakeholders were involved and what/who were 
the main influential bodies in the decision making process and whether they saw the 
actions as a threat to equity in health. The precise role played by the individuals is 
not described in order to ensure their privacy and confidentiality, which is especially 
important in a small country in which people belonging to the health system 
authorities12 are few in number and move in intimate circles. Firstly, an e-mail was 
sent to senior individuals inside the Ministry of Health and the Directorate of Health, 
in which the research was introduced and their participation requested, see 
Appendix 4. In the same e-mail, a letter was attached that explained what would be 
discussed in the interview, as shown in Appendix 5. Based on the analysis of these 
first interviews, health care managers and health professionals in affected institutions 
were similarly approached. Health care specialists who were involved in the decision 
making process were also sent an e-mail requesting their participation. Altogether, 
                                            
12 Health system authorities are the minister of health, the Ministry of Health and its institutions. 
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ten individuals were sent an e-mail. Nine of the ten replied within a few days and 
agreed to participate; meetings were arranged through e-mails. One individual, who 
did not reply to the e-mail, was telephoned and then agreed to participate. Two 
individuals requested the inclusion of colleagues from their institute in discussions, 
although I restricted these group interviews to a maximum of three participants to 
ensure personal interaction and confidentiality. Altogether, the interviews consisted 
of two groups with three participants each and eight interviews with individuals, 
adding up to a total number of fourteen individuals of whom eight were professionally 
acquainted with me. The interviews took from 45 minutes to an hour and were 
largely unstructured, but were conducted according to an interview guide and the 
information sheet given to participants (Appendices 3 and 5). In cases where the 
interviewees knew the researcher, the personal introduction in the protocol was 
dropped. All interviews were held in the informants’ work places and were recorded.  
5.4.6 Ethics 
Ethics approval was applied for from both the Graduate School Ethics Committee at 
Brunel University and from the National Bioethics Committee Office in Iceland. The 
research was approved by Brunel University, but approval from The National 
Bioethics Committee Office in Iceland was deemed unnecessary, since the research 
did not involve personal questions (Appendix 6 and 7). 
Precautions were taken to maintain the confidentiality of participants; interviews were 
recorded and the audio files stored on my personal computer with a password. The 
names of the audio files did not utilise the name of the participants and their names 
were never mentioned in the records. It was therefore not possible to connect an 
audio file with a name. The same method was applied to transcripts made from the 
interviews, they were kept on the same computer and were not connected to the 
participants’ names. A backup was kept on a disk stored in a safe only accessible by 
me. As soon as this thesis has been approved by Brunel University, all primary data 
will be destroyed. 
5.4.7 An overview of data used in the research 
An overview of data sources, types of data and its purpose is given in Table 9.  
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Table 9: Data used in the Icelandic case study 
Data Sources Type of data Purpose 
The Icelandic 
Parliament. 
Transcripts from parliamentary meetings 
involving discussions on the national 
health system in association with the 
economic crisis. 
To explore what the MPs and 
ministers were concerned about in 
relation to the economic crisis and 
what were the initial governmental 
responses towards the national 
health system. 
The newspapers: 
Morgunbladid and 
Frettabladid  
Articles and news about the Icelandic 
health system in relation to the economic 
crisis. Hard copies and printed out news 
and articles through the newspapers 
websites. 
To investigate the press and 
public’s view of the initial actions 
taken after the economic crisis and 
how stakeholders were involved. 
Interviews with 
key informants.  
 
Audio records from interviews with key 
informants, who were managers, 
professionals and specialists within the 
health system, about their views on the 
first responses towards the health system 
and partnership with stakeholders. 
To examine professionals’ opinions 
in relation to the decision making 
process and how stakeholders were 
involved. 
 
 
5.4.8 Data analysis 
ATLAS.ti 5.2 qualitative data analysis software was used to analyse the data. 
Original data, both textual and interviews, were in Icelandic. Audio recordings of 
interviews were played back to check for quality and to improve interview 
techniques, as they were collected concurrently with the analysis. Transcripts from 
the parliament, newspapers and audio recordings were imported into ATLAS and 
open coding undertaken using conceptual labels relevant to the research questions 
(forming different categories). Further analysis was conducted using axial coding, in 
which categories (formed in the open coded process) were compared and 
connections made between them, leading to the formation of new core categories; a 
process of grouping concepts that pertained to the same phenomena (Corbin, 
Strauss 1990; Strauss, Corbin 1990). The final step was selective coding, whereby 
core categories were selected and systematically related to each other to reveal the 
grounded theory of the research. Quotations were translated into English. An 
overview of the Grounded Theory approach is illustrated in Figure 13 and an 
example of the analytical process of the case study, based on the selection of two 
transcripts, is shown in Figure 14.  
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Figure 13: Data analysis using the Grounded Theory approach. 
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Figure 14: The analytical process of two selected transcripts to show how categories were 
formed, compared and used to establish core categories which were applied to develop the 
grounded theory.  
 
5.5 Results 
As will be presented in subsequent chapters, the data revealed several themes. The 
concept of “information” appeared as one of the core themes in relation to how 
information was sourced, analysed, deployed and made available to stakeholders. 
The analysis indicates that the quality of information was poor, scarcely used and 
kept within a narrow group of people, leading to the formation of an “elite” having the 
most impact on the decision making process and actions taken. The “information” 
theme was strongly related to two other themes identified in the data, namely 
“transparency” and “selective partnership”. The analysis reveals that those with 
access to information disseminated it to selected interest groups while keeping it 
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from - and even actively concealing it from - other stakeholders, causing opacity in 
the decision making process. Another important theme emerging from the data was 
lack of “accountability“, which also was highly linked to lack of “information” as 
those expected to be accountable did not have necessary information in order to 
“respond” timely to the unfolding crisis. Yet another theme identified was 
“stewardship” as interviewees described weak leadership as one of the 
fundamental issues missing in the policy making process during the time under 
observation. 
“Rule of law”, as per definition by the World Bank, is one of the governance 
indicators that was not referred to directly in the data collected, however, the “power 
exercise” appeared quite frequently in the data, mentioned in relation to “politics” 
and different “political ideologies”.  
All these themes will be further discussed as the results will be presented in 
chronological order in the following sub-chapters. Furthermore, a flowchart in 
Appendix 8 gives an overview of the course of events.  
5.5.1 An abrupt crisis causes a shock 
Traditionally, the parliament, “Althingi” opens on October 1st every year and adjourns 
at the end of May. Two days before the opening in autumn 2008, the prime minister 
announced that the government would take over 75% of the shares in the country’s 
third largest bank, which faced liquidity problems (Prime Minister's Office 2008). The 
decision was never discussed in the parliament or with the minister of commerce and 
the whole working procedure, in the preceding months, indicates a lack of trust 
between those with authority, opacity and selective participation in the decision 
making process (also observed by the Investigation Committee13) (Hreinsson, 
Benediktsdottir & Gunnarsson 2010; Arnarson 2009; Bjarnason, Kristjansson & 
Stefansson 2008). The Governor14 of the Central Bank was involved, which has 
                                            
13 The Icelandic parliament passed a law in December 2008 assigning a new Investigation Committee 
to execute a comprehensive and detailed investigation of the events leading up to fall of the banking 
sector and the  economic crisis in Iceland. The committee submitted a comprehensive report in nine 
volumes on 12th April 2010 (Hreinsson, Benediktsdottir & Gunnarsson 2010).  
14 The governor of the Central Bank has been active in Icelandic politics for decades. He is the former 
leader of the Independence Party, the same party as the prime minister when the economic crisis 
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been questioned inter alia because of his acquaintance with the prime minister, and 
since it is not the role of the Central Bank and its governor to be involved in political 
decisions (Arnarson 2009; Visir 2008a; Frettabladid 2008b; Central Bank of Iceland 
2008).  
The first few days in parliament in autumn 2008 can be described as disorientated, 
reflecting increasing unease. Concerns were growing that the global “credit crunch” 
might have serious negative impacts on the Icelandic banking sector, which had 
been growing fast and had, in the space of a few years, grown to tenfold the size of 
domestic production (Zoega 2008). On the 6th of October, “Althingi” passed a new 
law, often called the Emergency Act (Act No. 125/2008), enabling the government to 
intervene extensively in Iceland’s banking and financial sector15 (Icelandic 
Parliament 2010b). A day later, the second and third largest banks of Iceland were 
nationalised. Neighbouring countries, especially Great Britain and The Netherlands, 
were worried as their citizens and organisations had placed deposits in Icelandic 
banks (BBC 2009). The British government decided to invoke anti-terrorism 
legislation and freeze the Icelandic banks’ assets located in Britain (HM Treasury 
2008; HM Treasury, Financial Sanctions Notice 2008). The biggest bank of Iceland 
subsequently collapsed and was also nationalised. Within two days, the Icelandic 
government had nationalised almost the entire banking sector in Iceland. 
Despite the critical implications of the financial collapse, both nationally and globally, 
discussions addressing the government’s response were initially not included on the 
parliament´s agenda. The agenda in parliament for 9th of October 2008, the day after 
the nationalisation of the banking sector, shows that the bank crisis only appears as 
a subheading under a general purpose agenda called “unprepared questions-time” 
which allows 1-2 minutes’ questions from the MPs followed by short answers from 
the ministers. The opposition leaders criticised the prime minister: 
                                                                                                                                       
started. The governor was the prime minister of Iceland for 13 years, minister of foreign affairs for a 
year and the mayor of Reykjavik, the capital, for nine years. 
15 This “emergency law” was necessary for the government to nationalise private financial institutions. 
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 “...the prime minister has time, despite a heavy workload, to host long press 
conferences with foreign reporters. ...he must be able to give the parliament and 
the Icelandic nation some of his time so we can exchange information and 
opinions about the current situation.” 
MP from the Left-Green Movement 
From parliament transcripts (emphasis added) 
 
“Today is not a normal day. I expected the prime minister to show us some 
respect and to address the parliament in this situation when everything in our 
banking sector has collapsed in the worst possible way. ...we do not have any 
data, no information ...” 
 
MP from the Progressive Party 
From parliament transcripts (emphasis added) 
 
These accusations from the opposition members of the parliament support the 
suggestions made by the Investigation Committee that the parliament was not 
involved or informed about the actions taken by the prime minister in the name of 
the state. The prime minister was defensive, although his words also support the 
indication of opacity in the political arena: 
 “I will of course report to the parliament as soon as we have all relevant 
information, which is appropriate to publish. ...things are happening very fast. 
We are experiencing drastic changes in our society in a very short time, 
unfortunately serious changes. We need to discuss it, and we hopefully will, 
on a confidential basis, and I will try to arrange a meeting later today.” 
The prime minister from the Independence Party 
From parliament transcripts (emphasis added). 
 
The key informants interviewed for this study were asked to comment on how the 
MPs and ministers had handled the situation as the private banks collapsed. Those 
who responded all thought that the MPs had not realised how serious the situation 
was and that “surprisingly little action” was taken towards solving the expected 
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backlash and minimising the damage. What “little action” taken was “fumbling”, as 
one of the informants described it.  
The atmosphere in parliament was gloomy in these early days of October 2008, as 
MPs were shocked and left without information and excluded from major decision 
making processes16. The crisis was the main subject of all news and was the main 
topic of discussions at work places, club meetings and on street corners where 
individuals and representatives of different organisations expressed their worries and 
anger, especially towards the management of the banks, rich businesspeople as well 
as politicians. This course of events, in which a nation has had to take over almost 
the entire domestic banking sector worth more than ten times the nation’s GDP, has 
few global precedents (Zoega 2008).  
The observation indicates a government in a state of shock and a subset of ministers 
and their political allies having exclusive access to vital information. The decisions 
taken in relation to the nationalisation of the banking sector seem to have been kept 
within a narrow circle of people, suggesting lack of transparency, selective 
partnership and even corruption (Gylfason 2009).  
5.5.2 Actions to minimise society’s distress 
The financial crisis caused great distress among the people of Iceland. Many were 
worried that they would lose savings kept in the Icelandic banks (National 
Broadcasting service November 2008). People who had kept their money in bonds 
and those who kept their savings on the stock market lost significant amounts as the 
value of bonds and equity in companies fell17. The nation was worried about the 
future and as anger grew, so did rioting in the streets. 
The minister of health sent a letter to health care managers and requested them to 
prepare health care services for increased psychosomatic disorders caused by the 
crisis. The primary health care services of the capital area reacted fast and two 
hours after they received the minister’s request, they had sent out an e-mail to all 
                                            
16 The MPs agreed to approve the “Emergency law” that was prepared in three days and 
subsequently required more information on the situation and future prospects. 
17 The stock market fell more than 80% in two days when the banks were nationalised. 
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their institutions informing health professionals. A few days later, the management 
had prepared an action plan for the primary health care to follow under the 
circumstances. The minister of health also entrusted the manager of Landspitali (the 
main national hospital) to strengthen the mental health department so it could meet a 
projected increase in psychosomatic disorders (Sigurdsson 2009). On the 10th of 
October 2008, a new psychiatric reception was opened, free of charge. At first 1-4 
individuals used the service per day, but that number soon decreased. 
Approximately 50 individuals used the service during the six months it was open, 
less than two individuals per week on average (Sigurdsson 2009). 
Many key informants held the view that the minister of health wanted to show 
compassion, but some also believed he had used the opportunity to demonstrate to 
the nation that he was a strong politician who “took responsibility” and “acted swiftly” 
in difficult situations, as evidenced by the ample publicity for the opening of the new 
psychiatric reception. This view was opposed by an individual who participated in the 
process of opening the psychiatric reception, although he conceded that politicians 
often do expect some reward for their efforts. Although key informants all believed 
this action had been well-meant, they said it was not what the nation needed at that 
time. They, as well as the former Chief Medical Officer, claimed that to overcome 
disasters, which this undoubtedly was, people needed information (Frettabladid 
2008a). One of the key informants said: 
“[The psychiatric reception] was opened with some pomp and circumstance... 
Many people have pointed out that this was not the right reaction and among 
them are psychiatrists. ... [A psychiatrist] said that this was absolutely the wrong 
reaction as a new psychiatric reception is not what people need at this stage. 
When the nation is experiencing disaster, like this, people need information, 
not psychiatric-nonsense. ... People did not know what was happening to 
their country and what the consequences for its inhabitants would be.” 
Health care manager (emphasis added) 
P a g e  | 88 
 
The observation indicates that the first action, which was meant to meet an upturn in 
trauma among the nation, turned out to have limited utility and was viewed as an 
example of the “fumbling” actions taken in the early days of the economic crisis. The 
citizens demanded information on the government’s accountability and 
responsiveness and MPs requested information to which they should have access. 
This strengthens the indication of lack of transparency.  
5.5.3 The health system’s first adaptations 
In November 2008, the minister of finance sent a letter to all ministries requesting 
them to reduce costs by 10%. The minister of health made no attempt to defend the 
health system and sent a letter to health institutions that, according to key 
informants, was interpreted in different ways by the recipients. Some understood the 
letter as an order to cut costs by 10% at their institution, while others believed it to be 
a request for suggestions on how best to decrease costs by 10%. The content of the 
letter therefore caused controversy, as it was generally accepted by health 
professionals and health care managers that a 10% levelled cost reduction for all 
institutions was unfair and would have negative consequences for health equity. The 
minister of health was criticised for weak stewardship and for not taking the lead in 
prioritising where to reduce costs within the health system, which was meant to be 
his responsibility. The minister claimed he was asking for suggestions and said it 
was reasonable to make the institutions themselves responsible for deciding how to 
prioritise within their institutions. 
Landspitali University Hospital, connected to the University of Iceland, is the main 
hospital. It is a state-owned hospital with three main roles: to serve patients, teach 
and train clinical staff and participate in scientific research (Landspitali University 
Hospital 2009). Landspitali had been running at a deficit for some years and from 1st 
of October 2008 a new director was appointed18. She immediately prepared the staff 
for changes and announced that the organisation chart would be changed with the 
aim of diminishing overhead costs. These changes were, according to the manager, 
not connected to the financial crisis and would have been enacted regardless. As a 
                                            
18 The new appointment was not connected to the economic crisis. 
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response to the financial crisis, divisions were merged, which led to fewer hospital 
beds (Morgunbladid 2009a). Overtime payments to staff were reduced and wards 
that had been open seven days per week were now operated as five-day wards 
(Morgunbladid 2009c; Morgunbladid 2009e).  
The District General Hospital in Akureyri, the second biggest hospital in Iceland, 
closed down one of its units for the elderly. The plan was to move the patients and 
part of the staff to another location, outside the main hospital. This action resulted in 
staff redundancies (District General Hospital in Akureyri 2009; Frettabladid 2008c). 
In addition, the hospital closed down a day clinic in the psychiatric unit, although the 
intention was to reopen it later in another location. Funding expected for various 
other projects was withdrawn (District General Hospital in Akureyri 2009).  
The minister of health implemented a new regulation, introducing new out-of-pocket 
payments for hospitalisation, which allowed for charges every time people had to be 
hospitalised, with the exception of births (Icelandic Parliament 2008c). This was new 
in Icelandic health care history and caused a great deal of anger among some 
citizens and health professionals.  
The management at the primary health care service in the capital area decided to cut 
administration costs and make some structural changes, in addition to cutting staff 
payments, especially to general practitioners (Morgunbladid 2009f). These are a few 
examples, but all health care institutions in Iceland immediately started to prepare for 
reduced budgets. 
5.5.4 Opportunity for reforms – the decision making process 
A new state budget for 2009 was approved in parliament on December 22nd 2008. 
Allocations to the health system were reduced by 6.7 billion Icelandic kronur 
(USD$54 million) from what had been presented in the original state budget, 
reducing it from 119.4 billion kronur (USD$955 million) to 112.7 billion kronur 
(USD$902 million). The reduction corresponded to 6% of actual governmental health 
expenditure in 2008, which was then 112.2 billion kronur (USD$898 million) (Ministry 
of Health 2009f). The state budget had been discussed and revised under difficult 
circumstances and the members of the opposition parties, sitting in the Budget 
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Committee, were dissatisfied with the working procedure. They wrote a special 
committee report signed by the opposition members only (Bjarnason, Kristjansson & 
Stefansson 2008). Their main criticism was lack of information from the government, 
information that was related to losses and over-commitments that would affect the 
nation for many years to come. They claimed that the agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund19 (IMF) had been treated like a “military secret” and that 
MPs had first seen the agreement after a reporter obtained and published a copy of 
it in the press (Bjarnason, Kristjansson & Stefansson 2008).  
Even though people recognised that there were many difficult decisions ahead, all 
key informants, politicians and others saw the crisis as an opportunity for health care 
reform and claimed that this was the right time for a comprehensive reconstruction of 
the whole health system.  
The Ministry of Health started preparing for cost reductions with two main objectives: 
(i) to act quickly on the basis of the proposals from the health care institutions; and 
(ii) to speed up the feasibility study on basic structural changes of the Icelandic 
health system20. Little time was given for both of these tasks, and the Ministry’s staff 
were under pressure to act swiftly. Consultants chosen by the minister were hired to 
take part in the process and, in some cases, to lead the work. One interviewee said: 
“[The minister] used external consultants extensively. Later it became clear that 
they were more or less closely related to him, some were even his personal 
friends.” 
Health care manager 
Another interviewee found it surprising that expertise and professional knowledge in 
the Ministry was not used more for this process: 
                                            
19 Iceland asked formally for assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on October 24th, 
which the IMF approved on November 19th 2008. 
20 Some of the ideas in the feasibility study had been under discussion before, but were never 
approved due to political resistance, mainly from rural areas. 
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“..it was surprising to see how little [the minister] used the professional 
knowledge inside the Ministry. ... ..at these meetings were consultants who I 
had met in another context ... ..these consultants, who might be good in finance 
and economic questions, had very limited knowledge of the health system..” 
Health care specialist 
Some health personnel and politicians were worried that the economic difficulties 
would cause irreparable damage to a welfare system that had taken many decades 
to build. The minister was encouraged to work openly by keeping all documents and 
discussions transparent to increase the likelihood of consensus among the 
population (Directorate of Health 2008b). The chief medical officer emphasised the 
importance of maintaining a strong primary health care service and reminded the 
minister of the importance of equity in health (Directorate of Health 2008b). It is 
interesting to note that, even though this advice was given, documents were not 
easily accessible and memos about important conversations or minutes of meetings 
were either non-existent or unavailable.  
On the 7th of January 2009, the minister of health held a press conference in which 
he explained how his Ministry intended to meet the 6.7 billion kronur (USD$54 
million) reduction in 2009 (Ministry of Health 2009e).  
The changes proposed by the minister of health were twofold: 
1. Merging of health care institutions in rural areas. 
2. Cooperation between hospitals in the capital area. 
The minister of health asserted that the ideas presented were prepared in 
partnership with health care managers and that the main objectives had been 
presented to the staff in affected institutions, which was not confirmed by all key 
informants and not reflected in the newspapers. After the meeting, on January 7th, 
the minister appointed four committees and gave them 12 days to prepare 
recommendations on how to implement the decisions presented. The committees 
delivered a memo a few days before the government resigned on the 26th of January 
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200921. The implementation was therefore put on hold, but its fundamental ideas will 
be discussed in the next two subsections. 
5.5.4.1 Merging of health care institutions in the rural areas 
The country had, from 2007, been divided into seven health regions, as shown in 
Figure 9. The structural changes, presented by the minister of health proposed a 
merger between all health care institutions within each region, led by the biggest 
institution in the area. The capital area, having the densest population, was still to 
operate with multiple health care institutions (Morgunbladid 2009d). As an example, 
eight health care centres in west Iceland were to be merged with their headquarters 
in Akranes, home town of the only hospital in the region. In north Iceland, nine 
districts were to be merged into one region under the leadership of the District 
General Hospital in Akureyri. The minister stated that no institutions were to be 
closed down; these changes primarily meant reduced overhead costs (Ministry of 
Health 2009c). 
Many municipalities opposed this proposal. Only one health care centre welcomed it 
publicly (Ministry of Health 2009d; Visir 2009a). In a local newspaper in south-west 
Iceland one citizen wrote:  
“It is good that the minister wants to change out-of-date organisations, but it is 
sad if he rushes forward and does not think of patients or employees. Such 
methods are not likely to be successful, even for good ideas.”  
(Thoroddsen 2009). 
Although the minister of health stated that decisions were made in partnership with 
stakeholders, only a few informants confirmed this statement. The interviews 
revealed that selected staff from the main hospital, Landspitali, played a prominent 
role in the preparation work. Key informants were unanimous in the view that some 
of the minister’s ideas were sensible, but because of selective partnership (i.e. 
                                            
21 After thousands of protesters called for the government to step down in January 2009, the prime 
minister decided to resign and call an early election. See also McLaughlin’s report (McLaughlin 2009). 
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disregarding important stakeholders), lack of transparency and few documents to 
support the ideas, the minister failed to establish a consensus on them.  
“... Part of the minister’s problem was lack of cooperation. ... Some of his ideas 
were good but the problem was that he did not cooperate with the stakeholders 
... even though good advice was given, it was not accepted”. 
Health care specialist 
Before the press conference on the 7th of January, work had been on going at the 
Ministry of Health and meetings were held with certain stakeholders, Ministry staff 
and consultants. One key informant said that these meetings were not held to 
exchange information or for participation, and stated that all decisions were in fact 
made “behind closed doors”: 
“... it was made quite clear to us [in a meeting at the beginning of December] 
that the ideas on the structural changes should be treated confidentially and 
that we could not talk about them with others. I immediately had the feeling that 
the ideas presented were much more than just ideas. This had already been 
decided. Now they only had to prepare the text and figures to justify the ideas. 
... As the minister presented his decisions one month later, at the press 
conference on January the 7th, they were exactly the same as the ideas 
presented at the meeting in December.” 
Health care manager 
MPs from the opposition criticised the minister of health for “hasty” actions with 
limited partnership and lack of documentation and expressed their concerns over the 
lack of information on how the minister intended to adapt the health system to the 
budgetary reduction. One of the opposition MPs said: 
 “The actions that the ... minister was going to introduce were hasty and not 
based on good governance. Blind merging of primary health care in every 
country’s quarter, where no notice is taken of their geographic position or 
special needs nor what the local knowledge is ... does not automatically mean 
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increased efficiency. ...We still have not made the policy of how we want to 
streamline our health system in the current financial crisis ...Such policy-making 
must be executed in cooperation between the government, health 
professionals, educational institutions and the citizens.” 
Progressive Party MP 
From parliament transcripts 
 
By law, all parts of the country are represented in parliament and politicians from the 
rural area are faithful to their home areas, lobbying actively for the welfare of their 
people. To merge many small health care units, distributed around an area of more 
than 100,000 square kilometres serving 317,000 people, is a sensitive issue and 
requires strong leadership with active participation from all stakeholders in a search 
for consensus oriented solutions, backed up by sound documents22.  
5.5.4.2 Cooperation between hospitals in the capital area 
The second set of decisions, presented at the press conference on 7th of January, 
were changes regarding hospitals in the capital area and Keflavik23, in the south-
west corner of Iceland (see Figure 15).  
                                            
22 In this context, it is important to keep in mind that Iceland is located in the North Atlantic Ocean 
between the 63rd and the 67th degrees North latitude. The average temperature is around 4 degrees, 
ranging from approximately -3 to +13 throughout the year, although greater extremes are often seen. 
The weather can change fast and become so bad that it is not possible to travel, sometimes for a 
couple of days. 
23 The name of the city, Keflavik, has now been changed to Sudurnes.  
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The capital area
 
Figure 15: A map of the south west corner of Iceland. Source: googlemap.com 
The main alteration was a closure of St. Josefsspitali, a hospital in Hafnarfjordur 
(inside the capital area) in order to change its usage into a geriatric institution24. 
There is an operating theatre at the hospital, which is also used by “visiting” 
specialists for orthopaedic surgery, for example. The minister’s plan was to split up 
the operating theatre at St. Josefsspitali, move one part to Keflavik and merge it with 
the theatres there, and the other half to Landspitali in Reykjavik (Thordarson 2009).  
The operating theatres at Keflavik were to be run as a new (private) organisation led 
by the health professionals from St. Josefsspitali (Thordarson 2009). Other 
specialised services that were to be moved to Landspitali were introduced as 
potential subjects for tenders (Thordarson 2009). According to a memo written by 
one of the minister’s consultants, these changes were supposed to save 160 million 
Icelandic kronur (USD$1.3 million). The memo did not specify whether this saving 
was to occur at once or whether it was to be accumulated over a longer period of 
time. No background information for the calculations was shown (Gudgeirsson 
2009).  
The minister’s decision to change the hospital in Hafnarfjordur into a geriatric 
institution caused anger, both among the staff at St. Josefsspitali and generally in the 
municipality of Hafnarfjordur, amongst its citizens. Even some of the minister’s 
                                            
24 St. Josefsspitali runs one general ward and one ward for internal medicine, besides having 
specialists in subjects such as ophthalmology and gastroenterology. 
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political partners (in the same political party) were dissatisfied and one said that he 
had, unsuccessfully, tried to change the minister’s mind, claiming that he had not 
seen any convincing arguments to support the decision. He said he could not deny 
that such working procedures caused one to think there might be some other 
underlying political issues behind the minister’s decision (Frettabladid 2009).  
Key informants stated that there was little consultation with St. Josefsspitali, the 
municipalities and other citizens prior to this conclusion and that the decision was not 
supported by adequate documents: 
 “There was a serious lack of cooperation and under such conditions people 
start to imagine that there must be some other underlying issues behind the 
decision... ...it was [the minister’s] style not to cooperate. He probably thought 
that he would not be able to make such drastic changes in the health system in 
such a short time with too much cooperation with stakeholders.” 
Health care manager (emphasis added) 
The “underlying (political) issues” indicated by interviewees and those opposing 
the minister’s proposals regarding St. Josefsspitali were not clarified. However, in 
light of earlier discussions in the news about an investor interested in launching 
and running private operating theatres in Keflavik, it is possible that this was part 
of the “underlying (political) issues”.  
The protests on the streets amplified every month and in January 2009 the prime 
minister resigned and the cabinet stepped aside for a new government, which took 
control on February 1st 2009. 
5.5.5 New temporary government 
The two politicians who exchanged keys to the Ministry of Health on February 1st 
2009 favoured extremely different political ideologies. It is therefore not an 
overstatement to say that the Ministry of Health went from one political extreme to 
another. The first action, taken by the new minister of health from the Left-Green 
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Movement25, was to withdraw the new regulation that permitted hospitalisation 
charges (Morgunbladid 2009b; Ministry of Health 2009b). He also withdrew the 
decision to change St. Josefsspitali to an institute for the elderly, and appointed a 
new committee to develop revised proposals on how St. Josefsspitali hospital could 
be better linked to the main national hospital, Landspitali. Mergers of health care 
institutions in rural areas ceased, except where they voluntarily merged; for example, 
in west Iceland and partly in north Iceland (Baejarins Besta 2009). The opposition 
parties said that the new minister only “dared to” take popular decisions which he 
refuted and said he needed time to consult with stakeholders.  
All key informants said that political views had a much stronger influence on actions 
and decisions than the opinions of health professionals: 
“The political advisors that ministers of health have in their closest circle have 
had much more influence on policy making than health professionals have ... 
The policy making process runs down the wrong paths, delivering disputable 
results.” 
Health care specialist 
The key informants also shared the general view that the extreme political ideologies 
of the ministers in charge had a disruptive effect on the work done within the Ministry 
and was a waste of resources, changing directions without a clear vision or a basis 
of good, consensus oriented background material: 
“Then we got a yet another minister [February 1st 2009, from the Left-Green 
Movement] and the first thing he does is to stop or reverse most of the 
decisions made by the previous minister. Not necessarily because they were 
bad but just because [the former minister] made them ... equally irrational as 
the decision making by the previous minister appeared to have been. This is 
                                            
25 This minister lasted only for eight months in office before he resigned because of political collision 
with the cooperative party and yet another person, also from the Left-Green Movement, took over. 
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terrible governance, not to mention the waste of money involved ... and the poor 
staff ... these are ridiculous working conditions.” 
Health care specialist 
 
5.5.6 Equity in health 
Economic crises and how governments respond to them could affect equity in health 
if they are not mitigated and health specialists claimed that the consequences of the 
Icelandic crisis were visible among vulnerable groups soon after the trouble 
commenced. Decreasing family income caused by increased unemployment, 
together with rising prices (caused by the depreciation of the currency) made it more 
difficult for disabled, unemployed and low income families to pay for their 
pharmaceuticals, and eventually more individuals had to ask, for example, the 
Icelandic Church Aid for assistance to pay for their essential medicine (Icelandic 
Church Aid 2009).  
Most informants used dental health as an example of an area where increased 
inequity in health would probably first strike in the economic crisis. Dentists have 
been fighting for increased governmental subsidisation on their services for some 
years. A few months after the financial crisis started, the Icelandic Society of Dentists 
launched a free dental clinic that was open once a week for four weeks (Icelandic 
Society of Dentist 2009). This service was only for children whose families could not 
afford their dental care. Demand exceeded supply and many were turned away. This 
action inspired the discussion about inequity in dental health, but one year after the 
crisis commenced no new regulations had been introduced concerning this issue.  
As indicated in the section about Iceland, out-of-pocket payment arrangements in 
Iceland are inconsistent and discriminatory with regard to illness and place of 
treatment. Politicians are aware of the flaws in the system and the matter has been 
put on the agenda in the parliament. The minister of health, in power when the crisis 
commenced, appointed a committee to scrutinise the out-of-pocket payment system 
in health care services. When the new minister, from the Left-Green Movement, 
came to power (February 1st 2009), he abolished the committee, despite 
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encouragement from many MPs to let it continue its work (Johannesdottir 2009). The 
committee had collected data for over a year and worked “day and night”, according 
to an Independence Party MP. The new minister claimed the committee was on the 
“wrong course” and that he would use part of the committee’s work and bring it to a 
“more acceptable path”. No documents could be found in the parliamentary library 
from this committee, but the Ministry of Health possesses a draft of a report 
(Committee to explore the out-of-pocket payments in the health care service in 
Iceland 2009). The draft report was not easily available and it took effort to gain 
access to it. The data collected by the committee are from the entire population; they 
reveal that out-of-pocket payment varies immensely among Icelandic citizens, 
although only a few people have had to bear considerable costs. In 2007, 97% of 
those who used the health services paid on average 49,630 kronur (USD$400), 
while 51 individuals (0.02% of the health care users) paid on average 490,558 kronur 
(USD$3,956) (Committee to explore the out-of-pocket payments in the health care 
service in Iceland 2009). Income data is not part of the collected statistics and 
therefore it is unknown how costs are spread between socio-economic groups. 
Furthermore, it is unknown what kind of health care services were received and what 
type of services could have accounted for the high costs. These data are 
summarised in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Out-of-pocket payments in the Icelandic health system in the year 2007. Source: 
Committee to explore the out-of-pocket payments in the health care service in Iceland (2009) 
Unemployment increased in Iceland as a consequence of the economic crisis, which 
caused a threat to health as when people are faced with unemployment they have to 
think carefully about how they spend their money. Five months after the 
commencement of the economic crisis, the minister of health made some changes in 
the regulations regarding subsidising the cost of health care services to the 
unemployed. The new regulation added children under 18 and the unemployed to 
the same category as the elderly and disabled, which reduced the medical costs for 
these population groups by half. However, the unemployed had to prove that they 
had been unemployed for more than six months by presenting a certificate from the 
Directorate of Labour (Social Insurance Administration of Iceland 2009). Similar 
arrangements were introduced for pharmaceuticals, whereby the unemployed 
received the same price reductions as the elderly, children and disabled (Ministry of 
Health 2009a). These changes provide some solace in a society where 
unemployment has increased, but in order to secure equity in health the whole 
health system needs to be revised, especially the out-of-pocket payment 
mechanism. 
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5.6 Discussion 
5.6.1 The Grounded Theory 
Iceland was hit by a triple crisis: a banking crisis, a currency crisis and a political 
crisis following the collapse of all the major banks, whose worth was at least tenfold 
the national GPD. As the crisis hit, the authorities were caught unprepared and, 
together with the citizens, entered a state of shock, categorised by limited 
information, time pressure and “fumbling” actions. When reality started to set in, the 
urge to react appropriately emerged and a window of opportunity opened up for 
health system reforms. However, due to the authorities’ lack of preparation, 
transparency and supporting documents, as well as their disregard for fair 
participation, the opportunity for health system reforms in the first months of the 
crisis was not successfully utilised. These failures in good governance practices, 
together with weak stewardship, demonstrated the government’s incapability to 
reach consensus oriented solutions, causing anger and frustration among many 
stakeholders. The emerging grounded theory of this study is presented in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: The grounded theory of the Icelandic case study 
To test the validity of the theory, in relation to this particular case, the collected data 
was explored again to check if the statements from key informants, discussion in 
parliament and newspapers were consistent with the information presented in the 
emerging grounded theory above. 
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The economic meltdown in Iceland has few if any precedents, both in terms of the 
scale of the crisis and the type of country, which makes comparison difficult and 
therefore also the validation of the emerging grounded theory. However, the results 
are consistent with results from a qualitative case study under a similar setting; as 
Russia went through economic turmoil in the 1990s, health system reforms failed 
due to a lack of partnership, coordination and insufficient preparation, negatively 
affecting the system performance (Sheaff 2005). Moreover, the results are in 
harmony with studies suggesting dominant political ideologies to play an important 
role in public health policy making and actions (Wagner, Wollmann 1986; Walt 
2006). 
The government’s conduct of the economic crisis suggests a failure in governance 
practices, according to definitions of good governance by UNESCAP and the World 
Bank (Sheng 2011; World Bank 2010c). The government was not accountable 
because of its lack of preparation and was therefore unable to respond immediately 
to the crisis. It did not work transparently and did not allow for fair participation 
(inequitable inclusion). Hence, it did not manage to reach consensus oriented 
conclusions. These working procedures further affected other aspects of 
governance, namely its effectiveness and efficiency. 
There are several limitations to this study and results could differ if other data 
sources or a mix of other data sources were used or if it were performed by another 
researcher. As an Icelandic citizen and a former participant in the Icelandic health 
system, my presence in the interviews might have affected the key informants; it 
might have inspired them to express their opinions more freely or even caused them 
to be more reluctant to reply to my questions. It must also be kept in mind that, as an 
Icelandic citizen, I was personally affected by the economic crisis which might have 
affected my interpretation of the findings. However, it must also be emphasised that 
as an insider I might also have been able to find and gain access to information that 
an outsider might have found difficult to obtain. 
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5.6.2 The Grounded Theory and the research questions 
The emerging theory was intended to answer how the minister of health and his 
Ministry involved stakeholders in the decision making process initially after the 
economic crisis commenced and who were the main influential actors. 
In the first weeks of the crisis, given the state of shock, the staff at the Ministry of 
Health and its institutions, together with external consultants, were put under 
pressure. They were given limited time, in some cases only a few days, to come up 
with suggestions and plans for how to adapt the health system to the diminishing 
public expenditure on health. Under such time pressure, they did not succeed in 
preparing sound supporting documents, either in accordance with the guidelines 
from the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance 2008) nor consistent with the 
recommendations from the World Health Organization given in relation to the 
economic crisis (World Health Organization 2009a). 
It is generally accepted that a threat can be an opportunity if those with authority are 
accountable and respond to the threat by developing consensus oriented policies 
with participation from stakeholders, including citizens. In the Icelandic case, the 
minister of health did not manage to use the window of opportunity for reform. The 
minister applied selective partnership, as he only consulted with a narrow, 
handpicked group of stakeholders, people with similar opinions and those who 
potentially would benefit from the changes, deliberately or unwittingly forming an 
“elite” with the privilege of having more influence than others. It seems as if those 
negatively affected by the proposed changes were deliberately excluded from the 
decision making process and that, furthermore, ideas were concealed from them. 
This caused widely expressed anger among affected individuals/groups, health 
personnel, institutions and municipalities. 
The decision making process lacked transparency and did not provide documents to 
support the proposals. This caused mistrust among stakeholders, who suspected the 
minister of health of concealing some underlying issues, involving his preference for 
selected organisations. The minister, who was in charge at the beginning of the 
economic crisis (from the Independence Party), used his authority in a top-down 
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attempt to introduce drastic changes to the health system within a short period of 
time. The haste in the decision making process, particularly involving the change of 
St. Josefsspitali hospital to a geriatric institution, therefore moving some of the 
operating theatres to Keflavik, could indicate that the minister of health was 
attempting to privatise the operating theatre without attracting too much public 
attention while the population was busy coping with the economic crisis. It was 
known from earlier discussions, both in the parliament and in the media, that a new 
private company was interested in running the operating theatres in Keflavik (Visir 
2008b; National Broadcasting service 2009). The minister did not emphasise this 
clearly, possibly because privatisation in the health sector is not very popular among 
voters26. 
The Independence party’s manifesto supports the privatisation of the health sector, 
which complies with the neo-liberalist ideology to increase the participation of the 
free market (Navarro 2007a; McIntyre, Mooney 2007).  Since the party was in power 
at this time, and for the first time ever in charge of the Ministry of Health, it can be 
argued that the minister of health was going to use the opportunity of the serious 
national crisis to introduce controversial structural changes. According to liberalists 
like Friedman, national shock is a convenient opportunity for radical societal 
changes, but they must be swiftly introduced before the society reverts to normal 
(Friedman, Friedman 1984; Klein 2008; 2007).  
This study was also intended to explore whether the responses to the economic 
crisis affected health equity. The Icelandic health system is universal, whereby the 
state covers 83% of total health expenditure, while patients bear 17% of expenditure 
as out-of-pocket payments, which makes the system less likely to cause inequity 
based on ability to pay. However, unemployment increased as a consequence of the 
economic crisis, which threatened people’s health and welfare because people have 
to prioritise when they have less capital. During the research period, the minister of 
health increased subsidisation for the unemployed and children under 18 years, 
which was a positive action for the unemployed and their families.  Nevertheless, 
                                            
26 A survey among Icelanders shows that 81% want public hospitals and 76% publicly owned primary 
health care (Vilhjalmsson 2007).  
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with an out-of-pocket payment mechanism that discriminates against the type of 
disease, the probability of inequity in health still exists.   
5.6.3 Governance practices and power dispersion 
The power dispersion between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary of the 
Icelandic political system received increased attention following the economic crisis, 
particularly the party-political aspect of the executives. Ministers, who are the 
political heads of the executives, have to work within the framework of laws passed 
by the legislative part of the system, but they have substantial flexibility to “adapt” the 
acts through regulations. New regulations or amendments to older ones do not 
require approval from the parliament, which is the legislative part of the system.  
The minister of health is generally not committed to consulting with stakeholders 
before making new regulations or changing older ones. Nevertheless, the minister 
does have to consult with relevant local authorities when deciding to merge health 
care facilities within the health region (Icelandic Parliament 2007b). According to the 
findings of this study, there was a lack of partnership in the decision making process 
related to the merging of institutions, as demanded by the Health Service Act.  
It is the minister of health who, through regulations, decides the out-of-pocket 
payments for different health services (Ministry of Health 2009b; Icelandic Parliament 
2007b; Icelandic Parliament 2008a). The only limitation is that governmental 
expenditure must be kept within the annual state budget, as approved by the 
parliament. By using regulations, it was possible for the minister of health, who was 
in charge when the economic crisis commenced, to implement hospitalisation 
charges without any further approval from the parliament. It was equally easy for the 
minister of health who took over after the government resigned to abolish those 
same fees only a few weeks after they were implemented. Both actions were not 
supported by any publicly available background documents such as economic 
evaluations and seemed first and foremost to be based on different political 
ideologies. 
How Iceland will recover from the current economic crisis, and how the crisis will 
affect the nation’s health in the long run, remains to be seen. The Icelandic people 
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have had a good education system and have enjoyed good public services in many 
areas, but at the same time some have been surprised at this state of affairs, 
considering the obvious flaws of the political system (Wade 2009). A short overview 
of the situation in Iceland in February 2011 is given in Appendix 9. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Economic crises are likely to cause distress in affected societies and are a major 
challenge for governments and policy makers. However, to avoid unnecessary 
torment, good governance practices are essential. Transparency, with sufficient 
analytical work, and broad participation with all stakeholders, is fundamental.  
As economic crises occur regularly and do usually have some preceding warning 
signals. Governments should be able to monitor the economic- and financial 
situation and trends and if accountable, be able to respond early to an upcoming 
crisis by preparing public institutions, including the health sector. Nevertheless, even 
though economic crises can be stressful, it is important to give sufficient time to 
undertake necessary analytical work, to make economic evaluations and to allow for 
open and honest discussion about the causes and consequences of policy 
proposals. Good governance practices, together with strong stewardship, increase 
the probability of consensus oriented solutions, which ultimately make the whole 
system more efficient. Economic crises are a critical test on health systems’ 
resilience; how governance practices influence the ability of the health system to 
adapt to changes and re-organise without causing stress, confusion or anger and 
without changing its basic structure and function. 
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Chapter 6: Governance and Health Systems III: 
understanding the impact of governance on health 
system financing reforms in an upper-middle 
income setting – the case of Malaysia 1995 - 2010 
6.1 Introduction 
Health financing reforms have become one of the central issues for governments in 
countries at all income levels. Although health expenditures are associated with 
countries’ economic strengths, other factors also play a role such as nations’ 
background and history, dominant political ideologies, the quality of governance 
practices and the degree of international influences (McIntyre, Mooney 2007; Lee, 
Goodman 2002). 
Although health system financing policy making falls under the purview of 
governments, policies in low and middle income countries have been under the 
influence of the World Bank for decades. One of the World Bank’s reports “Financing 
health services in developing countries: an agenda for reform,” published in 1987, 
had a strong impact on health financing strategies, especially in low and middle 
income countries (World Bank 1989). The report promoted the introduction of user 
fees in low and middle income countries, particularly for individual health care 
services. The recommendation was based on the principle of health care as a 
commodity and users as consumers purchasing private goods and services (World 
Bank 1989). International evidence has now shown that out-of-pocket payments are 
the most regressive form of health system financing, causing increased inequity and 
the impoverishment of households without any significant improvements in efficiency 
(McPake 1993; Gilson, Russell & Buse 1995; Gilson 1998; World Bank 2006; 
McIntyre et al. 2006). 
Another equally influential report from the World Bank was titled “World development 
report 1993: investing in health,” which introduced further perspectives on health 
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system financing reforms (World Bank 1993b)27. This report focused on efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness analysis to allocate resources; it encouraged governments to 
revise their health financing policies, making health system financing sustainable and 
securing universal coverage of health care services. Low and middle income 
countries were urged to focus more on cost-effective public health interventions and 
to provide minimum packages of essential clinical services, leaving other clinical 
services to the private sector with costs to be born through insurance schemes 
(World Bank 1993b). Governments were advised to extend the insurance coverage 
to include the poor and to compensate for problems related to uncertainty and 
market failures with the aim of eliminating inequalities (World Bank 1993b).  
The increase in private-for-profit health service providers, without a simultaneous 
introduction of insurance mechanisms, has placed financial burdens on individuals 
and households in countries of all income levels. This course of events has 
stimulated international organisations to revise health system financing and has 
turned their attention towards sustainable prepayment mechanisms with equitable 
revenue collection, risk pooling and effective purchasing of health care services from 
both public and private providers  (World Bank 2006; Fifty-Eighth World Health 
Assembly 2005; World Health Organization 2000). The World Bank now claims that 
systems funded through general taxation or mandated social insurance mechanisms 
have the potential to be the most equitable form of health care financing, providing 
universal access to health care services (World Bank 2006). Health system financing 
is discussed in more detail in Appendix 10. 
Ultimately, local governments are responsible for the efficient use of public funds and 
other resources. However, it is also their responsibility to stimulate and support 
equity among citizens. These two responsibilities, to establish efficient and equitable 
health systems, present a challenge, as these objectives can be mutually exclusive - 
if equity is an objective, maximising average health outcomes from a given budget 
might be a challenge (Mooney 2003). Equity is a concern in most societies and 
                                            
27 Some scholars believe the World Bank has been under strong influence of dominant ideologies of 
the ruling classes of the world, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom (Banerji 1999; 
Navarro 2007b). 
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ordinary citizens may find it unfair if people are unable to access health care services 
because of social and economic inequalities (Daniels 2008). An appropriate balance 
between equity and efficiency is a major challenge for governments and more 
research is required into the development of equity oriented health system financing 
strategies, especially in low and middle income countries (McIntyre et al. 2006).  
The aim of this study was to explore how health system financing reforms are 
associated with governance quality, as outlined by the United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific UNESCAP (Sheng 2011). The purpose 
was to gain a better understanding of the governance leverage on health system 
financing reforms over time and to establish the identity of the main actors in the 
decision making processes of such reforms. The main research questions were: 
• How does governance affect implementation of decisions with regard to 
health system financing reforms? 
• Have various requests of different ethnic or socio-economic groups been 
taken into consideration? 
• Have stakeholders been involved and who have been the key influential 
actors? 
Reforms, however, may span a considerable period and can be influenced by many 
factors, one of the most notable of which is the dominant political ideology at any 
given time. In this last regard, a country with a stable dominant political ideology was 
appropriate. Malaysia was ideal in this respect - the country has long been under the 
leadership of one major political party (in cooperation with smaller parties). 
Additionally, Malaysia was a low income country when it became independent in 
1957, but has since enjoyed rapid economic growth. It is, however, grappling with 
several of the issues described above with regard to health care funding and 
coverage and has instigated reforms that include elements of privatisation. 
6.2 Background to Malaysia 
Malaysia is a country in South-East Asia comprising Peninsular Malaysia and the 
states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo. Malaysia gained 
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independence from Britain in 1957 and at that time had a similar health and 
development profile to most of the countries in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa that 
gained independence within the same decade. Today the country is a constitutional 
monarchy with a non-elected upper house and an elected lower house, allowing for 
many political parties. The biggest party is the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO), which has ruled the country ever since it became independent. Malaysia is 
composed of 13 states and three federal territories with a total land area of 330,252 
square kilometres. The population of Malaysia in 2006 was just over 26 million 
people, with 68% of the nation living in urban areas (World Health Organization 
2010). The population consists of 65% Bumiputera28, which embraces the 
indigenous people of the Malay Archipelago, 26% Chinese and 8% Indian (Selvaraju 
2006). 
In 1971, after a serious ethnic riot followed by a political crisis that forced the prime 
minister to step down, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. The most 
important stated objective of the NEP was to unite the nation, focus on economic 
growth, reduce absolute poverty irrespective of race and reduce disparities between 
socio-economic groups (Economic Planning Unit 2008a). However, the NEP’s 
intention was to favour Bumiputeras, the majority ethnic group. Indeed, one of the 
policy targets was to help Bumiputeras’ own at least 30% of all enterprises.  
In 1983, the Malaysian government announced its privatisation policy (Economic 
Planning Unit 2008b). The aim of the policy was to facilitate the country’s economic 
growth, reduce the administrative and financial burden of the government and to 
lower public spending (Lit 2008). The government’s general philosophy was to open 
up the free market as a way to “improve efficiency and productivity” (Economic 
Planning Unit 2008b).  
The trend in Malaysia’s Gross National Income (GNI) has been impressive, seen in a 
global context, as summarised in Figure 18. The emphasis on poverty eradication 
has, according to official documents, also been successful - poverty diminished by 
                                            
28 Bumiputera means “the sons of the soil”. The term is used for aboriginal Malaysians and ethnic 
Malays (Ghee, Gomes & Rahman 2009). 
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almost 70% between 1990 and 2002 (Economic Planning Unit 2005). Nevertheless, 
the downside is that, over the same period, income inequality has increased in 
Malaysia.  
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Figure 18: Gross National Income per capita (ppp International $) in Malaysia from 1990 to 
2006. Source: World Health Organization Global Health Observatory. 
 
6.2.1 The health system 
The Malaysian health system is administered through four different ministries. The 
Ministry of Health is the main health care provider, while the Ministry of Higher 
Education, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Rural and Regional 
Development (Hospital Orang Asli29 Gombak) provide health care for specific groups 
(Ghani, Yadav 2008). The Ministry of Higher Education is responsible for medical 
education and provides health care at various teaching hospitals. The Ministry of 
Defence has an Army Medical Corps that provides health care for service personnel 
and their families. The Ministry of Rural and Regional Development provides health 
care services to aboriginal communities (Orang Asli). Malaysian health care 
provision is, however, quite well integrated. The Director General for Health is 
                                            
29 The name of one of the aboriginal tribes in Malaysia. 
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responsible for the overall provision of health care services and the health of the 
nation (Ghani, Yadav 2008). Every state has its own health director, who is 
accountable to the Director General. The states are again divided into districts with 
district health officers. The health districts are further subdivided into rural health 
units that are supported by several community clinics (Ghani, Yadav 2008). The rural 
health services provide primary health care and are interconnected through a referral 
system. Patients are referred from the primary care level to district hospitals and 
further to the state and regional hospitals and finally to the general hospital in Kuala 
Lumpur if necessary (Leng, Barraclough 2007; World Health Organization 2009b). 
After its independence, Malaysia at first kept the health system as a national health 
service, funded through taxation, except for primary care in the urban areas which 
was provided by both the private and public sectors (Leng, Barraclough 2008). After 
the government published its privatisation policy in the 1980s, the number of private 
hospitals started to increase and the Malaysian health system became a two tiered 
health care system. In 1980, private hospital beds comprised 6% of all hospitals 
beds in Malaysia; by 2003 they made up 26% of all hospital beds. The increase in 
private hospital beds, as an absolute number and as a percentage of all hospital 
beds, is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: The increase in private hospital beds from 1980 to 2003, presented as absolute 
numbers and as a percentage of total hospital beds. Source: Leng, Barraclough (2008) 
Although the number of private hospital beds has increased, the public sector is still 
the dominant provider of beds, providing 77% of the total in 2005 (Ramesh 2007). 
Despite its size, the public sector employs only 54% of physicians in Malaysia, while 
the private sector employs 46% (Ramesh 2007). In the two tiered health system, 
migration of health personnel from the public sector to the private sector is a serious 
and an unresolved problem. Specialists and other highly experienced health 
personnel often resign from the public sector in order to work in the more lucrative 
private sector (Economic Planning Unit 1996a; Lit 2006; Quek 2004).  
This privatisation process has been criticised for a lack of transparency and the 
absence of competitive tendering (Barraclough 2000; Chik 2000; Khoon 2000;  Quek 
2004). It has been pointed out that politically well-connected organisations have had 
a great influence over the privatisation process and have benefited from it. Moreover, 
details about the privatisation process have been kept from the public on the 
grounds that they fall under the Official Secrets Act in force in Malaysia30. This 
                                            
30 There is an Official Secrets Act in force in Malaysia, which limits distribution of official information 
and restricts the civil servants’ freedom to give information (Malaysian Parliament 1972) 
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opacity and secrecy is evident in a number of important developments. In 1993, the 
government’s pharmaceutical procurement and distribution centre (The Government 
Medical Store) was privatised (Economic Planning Unit 1996a). The buyers in that 
case also won a contract to manufacture and distribute drugs to all government 
hospitals for 15 years. Similarly, the Government Medical Store was sold to Remedi 
Pharmaceuticals, owned by United Engineers Malaysia, a company linked to the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the ruling party (Gomez, Jomo 1999). 
Two years later, in 1995, hospital support services were also privatised, again with a 
15 year service contract that covered cleansing, linen and laundry, clinical waste 
management, biomedical engineering maintenance and facility engineering 
maintenance for all Ministry of Health hospitals and clinical facilities (Economic 
Planning Unit 1996a). One of the companies that benefitted was, at that time, owned 
by the then prime minister’s son (Leng, Barraclough 2008).  
The stated goal for the privatisation of hospital support services was to improve 
efficiency. According to figures from the Finance Division of the Ministry of Health 
this goal was not met. Expenditure on hospital services increased by 330% from 
1996 to 1997 or from RM143 million (US$54 million31) in 1996 to RM468.5 million 
(US$174 million) in 1997. This increase could not be explained by increased 
services or improvements in quality (Khoon 2000). And in a parliamentary debate it 
was pointed out that the privatisation had caused a 250% increase in management 
costs at one University Hospital (Chik 2000). In another example, the National Heart 
Institute was corporatized with the aim of expanding and providing better services in 
cardiothoracic medicine while attracting and retaining experienced medical 
personnel (Economic Planning Unit 1996a). This stimulated marked disquiet from 
some about inequity in the Malaysian health system (Barraclough 2000). 
6.2.2 Health care financing 
Total expenditure on health was 4.3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008, 
which is low compared to other upper-middle income countries. Some researchers 
have argued that the Malaysian health system is underfunded (Lit 2008). On 
                                            
31 Currency rate RM 1 = $ 0.31 from XE The World’s Favourite Currency Site, accessed in August 
2010 
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average, upper-middle income countries spent 6.4% of their GDPs on health in 2008 
(World Health Organization 2010). As an example, Costa Rica, an upper-middle 
income country that is sometimes cited for its success in improving population 
health, (Sen 1999), spent 8.2% of its GDP on health in 2008. Gross National Income 
(GNI) in Costa Rica at that time was 79% of the Malaysian’s GNI (USD$11,040 vs. 
USD$13,900). Costa Rica’s per capita total expenditure on health was USD$936, 
while Malaysia’s was USD$620. The government covered 77% of total health 
expenditure in Costa Rica, while the Malaysian government covered 44%. Although 
life expectancy has improved considerably in Malaysia (73 years in 2008), a country 
like Costa Rica, which is poorer when measured in GNI, has improved faster and 
has a higher life expectancy (78 years in 2008) (World Health Organization 2010). 
Cost sharing, in terms of government and private expenditure is illustrated in Figure 
20. Although quite static, the governmental part has been declining over the last few 
years, with a 44% governmental share in 2007 and 56% covered through private 
expenditure (World Health Organization 2010). 
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Figure 20: Governmental and private spending on health care as percentages of total health 
expenditure. Source: WHO Global Health Observatory. 
P a g e  | 116 
 
The main source of private expenditure was out-of-pocket payments, which has 
been declining slowly at the same time as private pre-paid plans have increased. 
This aspect of cost sharing is described in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Cost sharing of private health expenditure between out-of-pocket payments and 
prepayment plans from 1995 to 2008. Source: WHO Global Health Observatory. 
 
6.2.3 Equity in health 
Equity in health is often a fundamental objective of health system reforms. Financing 
of health systems can be essential in this regard (Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer 2000). 
The two tiered Malaysian health system has a private health care sector for selve-
paying patients and public health care that is highly subsidised for the worse off (Yu, 
Whynes & Sach 2008). It could thus be argued that the Malaysian health system is 
equitable. Closer examination indicates that the situation is not as simple as that. 
Only 25% of Malaysians use private health care services but the sector employs half 
of all registered doctors in Malaysia. One consequence is that while some private 
urban clinics are under-utilised because there are no waiting times and patients 
receive good treatment, the workload is too heavy for some public health clinics in 
which overworked and underpaid nurses and doctors often struggle (Quek 2004; 
Rajakumar 2007):  
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“Health care is virtually free to anyone willing to wait, and to overlook the 
shabbiness of facilities and shortage of staff”  
Rajakumar (2007, page xvii)  
There are also sub-populations in Malaysia who do not receive the health care 
services they need as a result of financial, geographical or cultural barriers (Lit 
2006). Among them are the Orang Asli and other indigenous Malaysians, the 
mentally ill, HIV/AIDS patients, illegal immigrants and some elderly (poor or socially 
isolated). The Orange Asli population is small, accounting for only 0.6% of the total 
population (147,412 in 2003). They are not commonly consulted in policy making 
and, for a century, have been treated as “children” and often categorised as a 
community “requiring large doses of governmental support in order to assimilate 
them into mainstream society” [emphasis added] (Nicholas, Baer 2006,  p:126). 
Although the poverty rate has reduced in Malaysia, it is still high among the Orang 
Asli (Nicholas, Baer 2006). The Orang Asli are still afflicted with diseases that are not 
often seen in the rest of Malaysia today, such as skin infections, worms, diarrhoea 
and goitre. They are more vulnerable to malaria than other Malaysians and in 2001 
they represented 51.5% of the malaria cases recorded in Peninsular Malaysia 
(Nicholas, Baer 2006). Yet the Orang Asli often live far away from public clinics. And 
although 69% of rural dwellers live within three kilometres of a health care facility, 
many facilities in remote areas do not always have a qualified doctor (World Health 
Organization 2009b; Quek 2004).  
6.2.4 Health outcomes 
Despite relatively low health expenditure, health outcomes in Malaysia have 
improved significantly in recent decades (World Health Organization 2000). From 
1990 to 2008, the infant mortality rate declined from 16 to 6 per 1,000 live births; the 
under-five mortality rate fell from 18 to 6 per 1,000 live births and life expectancy at 
birth improved from 71 years to 73 years (World Health Organization 2010). But 
Malaysia, like other South-East Asian nations, is experiencing an epidemiological 
transition in which the disease pattern is shifting from infectious diseases to non 
communicable diseases and chronic illness, in particular, diabetes, heart disease, 
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strokes and certain types of cancer (World Health Organization 2002). In 2002, non-
communicable diseases were responsible for 71% of deaths, communicable 
diseases caused 20% of all deaths and injuries accounted for 9% (World Health 
Organization 2010). Malaysia has also experienced an increase in lifestyle related 
diseases, such as sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV/AIDS) and asthma, in 
addition to increased risk from environmental pollution (World Health Organization 
2009b).  A number of food poisoning episodes have been reported in Malaysia, 
making food safety a prominent public health issue, especially in schools where the 
majority of outbreaks have occurred (World Health Organization 2009b). 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Study design 
The research question required a qualitative analysis to be undertaken. As limited 
research exists in this area, a case study was considered well suited to contribute to 
an increased knowledge of possible pathways through which governance might 
affect health systems. A case study design is suited to sustained in-depth analysis 
where the aim is to examine and explain complex links, interactions and 
relationships in a real life context (Yin 2009). The approach is based on compiling 
multiple sources of evidence to examine the relationship; a working procedure that 
requires continuous interaction between the research questions and the data being 
collected, as the analysis is not based on routine data collection (Yin 2009). The 
case study method was therefore appropriate to investigating the relationship 
between governance and health system financing reforms in Malaysia. 
To develop and implement policies is a highly complex process, which involves 
several actors and organisations (Walt et al. 2008). Policy analysis, which can be 
used in both retrospective and prospective analysis, can provide a tool to describe 
the interconnections and interactions between actors and organisations. This case 
study is therefore a policy analysis based on frameworks that have been widely used 
for health system policy and reform analysis (Gilson, Raphaely 2008). 
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6.3.2 Data 
Access to information and data is somewhat limited as a result of the Official Secrets 
Act (OSA) in Malaysia that prohibits dissemination of any information that has been 
classified as an official secret (Malaysian Parliament 1972). Consequently, the 
results of several apposite surveys, research projects and consultancies in Malaysia 
have not been released due to the Official Secrets Act (Karol Consulting 2006). 
As the researcher, and an outsider, I faced two major hurdles. The first was access 
to the range of data sources to undertake the policy analysis and the second was the 
ability to interpret the information through a contextually relevant and culturally 
appropriate lens. The first limitation was apparent in the lack of balance between 
contemporary, historical and political texts available in English and Bahasa Melayu 
(BM), with a much heavier weighting in favour of BM. Although English is widely 
spoken, BM is the official administrative language and the language of government. 
Notwithstanding, there is a significant body of literature in English and the national 
media uses both languages as a means of ensuring Malaysia’s place on the regional 
and international stage. The second hurdle was related to interpretation of the 
information collected. This was overcome with the use of key informant interviews. 
These not only provided primary data but also supplied the contextual explanations 
for various policy decisions. Key informants also gave advice and direction regarding 
the choice of relevant documents. Finally, a preliminary draft of the analysis and 
report was reviewed by a Malaysian health system expert who provided detailed 
feedback, again to ensure that content was accurately interpreted.  
6.3.2.1 Secondary data 
Laws and regulations affecting issues related to health system financing were 
examined. The database CLJ Law32, a network that provides access to data 
covering the Malaysian legal system, was used to search for relevant laws and 
regulations. With access to the CLJ-Law database, provided by Monash University, 
there were no restrictions in identifying relevant laws.    
                                            
32 It is unknown what CLJ stands for. The information was not available on the company’s website 
and an e-mail sent to the contact given on the website asking what CLJ stands for did not receive a 
reply. 
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Policies related to health system financing, are not dealt with in any single 
government publication (at least not in publicly available documents). The subject is 
however an integral part of the “Malaysia Plans" - five year national strategies - that 
are publicly available (and were thus included in the analysis). The plans are 
comprehensive, embracing all subjects deemed to be important to society including 
health, but from the beginning they have had a considerably economic focus. 
Governance indices, provided with open access by the World Bank, were used to 
assess the quality of Malaysian governance. 
Health statistics were obtained from the World Health Organization’s database and 
from the results of the National Health and Morbidity Survey conducted in 2006 by 
the Ministry of Health in Malaysia. The results are presented in two volumes that 
were available at the Global Public Health office at Monash University, Sunway 
Campus. 
An understanding of contemporary debates about health system financing was 
informed through examination of newspapers in English and websites run by diverse 
associations active in health system financing discussions and controversies. Two 
newspapers were available; the New Strait Times and The Sun. They were 
examined on a daily basis in April and May in 2010. Three associations with 
websites that are involved in health system financing discussions were identified and 
included in the analysis: (i) the Coalition Against Healthcare Privatisation; (ii) the 
Malaysian Medical Association; and (iii) the Association of Private Hospitals of 
Malaysia. 
Political and economic information (for a better understanding of contextual issues) 
related to health system financing policy making was gathered from the Malaysian 
Parliament’s website, the Ministry’s of Health website and The Economic Planning 
Unit website under the direction of the Prime Minister’s Office. 
This secondary data was mutually triangulated with primary data from interviews with 
key informants involved in policy issues.  
P a g e  | 121 
 
6.3.2.2 Key informant interviews 
The sampling was purposive, starting with key informants who had been involved in 
health financing decision making processes and who had been identified through 
official documents, reports and referral by research participants (snowball sampling). 
Ten individuals were approached via e-mail with an attachment, “Participation 
Information Sheet” (Appendix 11), requesting their participation in the research. 
Seven individuals replied and agreed to participate and meetings were arranged via 
e-mail. Three individuals did not reply and were not contacted again. In order to 
protect the identity of the key informants, who emphasised the importance of 
anonymity, no information will be given about their identity except the fact that they 
all worked within the public sector and/or within higher education institutions. In this 
context, it is important to note again that there is an Official Secrets Act in force in 
Malaysia, which limits civil servants’ freedom to give information (Malaysian 
Parliament 1972). An overview of the data used in this study is given in Table 10.  
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Table 10: An overview of data used for the policy analysis. 
Data Sources Type of data Purpose* 
English publications 
from the Malaysian 
health system and 
Malaysia in a 
historical context. 
Two main books were consulted: (i) Health Care in 
Malaysia (Ghani, Yadav 2008) and (ii) Health Care 
in Malaysia: the dynamics of provision, financing 
and access (Leng, Barraclough 2007). In addition to 
these books, Sickness and the State: Health and 
Illness in Colonial Malaya, 1870-1940 (Manderson 
1996) and Multiethnic Malaysia, Past, Present and 
Future (Ghee, Gomes & Rahman 2009) were read 
to gain a better understanding of the (medical) 
history of Malaysia. 
Data for the background 
information as well as for 
the policy analysis. 
The 7th, 8th, and 9th 
Malaysia Plans, 
1996 – 2010. 
Policy papers available from the Official Portal of 
the Economic Planning Unit under the Prime 
Minister's Department. 
Data for content and 
context analysis of 
policies related to the 
financing of the health 
system. 
Approved acts 
related to the 
financing of the 
health system. 
Acts approached through the CLJ Law database - a 
network that provides access to data covering the 
Malaysian legal system. 
Data for content analysis 
of policies related to 
health system financing. 
The World Bank. Governance indicators available on the World Bank’s website. 
Data used to evaluate 
the governance quality. 
World Health 
Organization. 
Health statistics and other information on the 
Malaysian health system found on the World Health 
Organization’s website. 
Data for the process 
analysis as part of the 
problem stream. 
National Health and 
Morbidity Survey 
2006. 
Results from the National Health and Morbidity 
Survey in 2006 were available in two volumes of 
hard copies. 
Data for the process 
analysis as part of the 
problem stream. 
Daily local 
newspapers. 
Newspapers in English: New Strait Times and The 
Sun, published in April and May 2010. 
Data for the process 
analysis as part of the 
politics stream. 
Open access 
websites in 
Malaysia. 
Online information on the political and economic 
system in Malaysia, the governmental turnover and 
the ideologies of the political parties. Gained from 
the Malaysian Parliament’s website, the Ministry of 
Health’s website and The Economic Planning Unit 
website under the Prime Minister’s Office. 
Data to improve the 
understanding of the 
political situation and 
political ideologies used 
for process analysis as 
part of the policy stream. 
Open access 
websites from free 
associations. 
Associations participating in discussions around 
health system financing: (i) the Coalition Against 
Health Care Privatisation; (ii) the Malaysian Medical 
Association and (iii) Association of Private Hospitals 
of Malaysia 
Data for the process and 
actor analysis. 
Key informants 
Interviews held at the individuals’ offices. They 
were not recorded, but memos were written after 
the meetings. 
Data for the process and 
actor analysis. 
*See also section 6.3.4 Analytical framework 
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6.3.3 Ethics 
Ethics approval was obtained from the School of Health Sciences and Social Care 
Research Ethics Committee at Brunel University (Appendix 12). The internship was 
hosted by Global Public Health at the Monash University Sunway Campus. This role 
did not require ethics approval (Appendix 13).   
Precautions were taken to maintain the confidentiality of participants. E-mails to and 
from the participants were deleted after the meetings and interviews were not 
recorded according to all participants’ request. Detailed notes were written after each 
meeting and stored on my personal computer with a password. A backup was kept 
on a disk stored in a safe only accessible to me. As soon as this thesis has been 
approved by Brunel University, all such material will be destroyed. 
6.3.4 Analytical framework    
At a broad level of analysis the “Policy Triangle” framework appeared to be 
applicable (Walt, Gilson 1994) as this framework encapsulates the content, context, 
processes and actors involved in the formulation of a policy (Walt et al. 2008). The 
framework was developed for health related policy making and can be applied to 
low, middle, and high income countries (Gilson, Raphaely 2008; Walt et al. 2008; 
Buse, Mays & Walt 2005). Figure 22 gives an overview of the policy triangle and the 
context within which it was used in the analysis for this case study. 
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Context: 
political, economic, equity
Process:
A juxtaposed analysis of process and actors
employing the Multiple Stream theory
Content:
Content related to financing of the
health system analysed in conjunction
with the context 
Actors
.
.
.
.
 
Figure 22: The policy triangle framework. Adapted from Walt, Gilson (1994). 
 
However, the policy triangle framework does not provide a systematic analytical tool 
to analyse processes. Therefore a more dynamic framework was required. Policy 
processes are extremely complex phenomena that may involve diverse actors and 
encompass multiple levels of interacting institutions and interests. Accordingly, to 
analyse data systematically, minimise bias and to deepen the understanding of 
possible causality between governance and health system financing reforms, I 
examined bodies of work on approaches to analyse policy processes (Sabatier 2007; 
Walt et al. 2008). These included the established “stages” heuristic approach. This 
approach has though been criticised for focusing too closely on the individual stages 
in the policy process (agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation and 
policy evaluation) without identifying the causal drivers across stages (Sabatier 
2007). Other analytical paradigms considered included the Punctuated-Equilibrium 
framework; originally developed to explain changes in legislation in terms of 
incremental change punctuated by brief periods of change when appropriate 
junctures arose (Baumgartner, Jones 1993). Thought was also given to the 
Advocacy Coalition theory which focuses on coalitions, actors and the competition 
and collaboration that can leads to policy change (Sabatier, Weible 2007) and the 
Multiple Stream theory (Kingdon 1995), which focuses on problems, policy and 
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politics. The Multiple Stream theory seemed particularly useful in this context 
(Kingdon 1995).  
The Multiple Strem theory conceives of the policy process in terms of three streams - 
a problem stream, a politics stream, and a policy stream. The streams often 
operate independently of one another but, at critical points; a window of opportunity 
(“Policy Window”) allows actors (policy entrepreneurs) to traverse and couple the 
various streams. If they are successful in this regard there may be a significant 
change in the relevant area of policy (Kingdon 1995). Figure 23 illustrates this 
conception. 
Indicators
Feedback
Pr
ob
le
m
st
re
am
Political and 
administatative turnover
National moodPo
lit
ic
s
st
re
am
Value acceptability
Technical feasibility
IntegrationPo
lic
y
st
re
am
Influence 
(Access)
Position
Strategies
New policy scheme
Policy Window
Coupling logic
Decision style
Actors
Pr
oc
es
s
Indicators
Feedback
Political and 
administrative turnover
National mood
Value acceptability
Technical feasibility
Integration
 
Figure 23: The Multiple Stream theory developed by John Kingdon (Kingdon (1995). Adapted 
from Zahariadis (2007). 
 
The Multiple Stream theory provides a comprehensive analytical tool to help 
analysing the policy process, understanding how issues emerge on the policy 
agenda and how actors are involved in policy making. The problem stream includes 
measurable indicators of health status and stakeholder’s concerns. To evaluate the 
problem stream, available health statistics were scrutinised; life expectance and child 
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mortality data from the World Health Organization and health expenditures as well as 
out-of-pocket payments in different socio-economic groups available from a local 
survey. The politics stream embraces the broader political discourse within which 
policy is made, including discussions and solutions that have been pointed out as 
well as political turnover and the national mood. Political turnover and the national 
mood was assessed by studying public and private websites, studying national 
newspapers and interviewing a set of stakeholders which gave a picture of the 
national mood as perceived by them. The policy stream includes discussions and 
solutions that have been pointed out. Text books on the Malaysian health system 
and open access websites from the government and free association together with 
interviews with key stakeholders provided comprehensive data about proposals and 
solutions that had been pointed out and taken into consideration. 
6.3.5 Timeframe 
Policy evaluations require a timeframe that is long enough to cover at least one 
“policy cycle”. According to Sabatier, a decade or more is the minimum duration of 
most policy cycles, which he defines as the time from the detection of a problem until 
a revised policy has been implemented and a reasonable time has elapsed to 
conduct an evaluation of its impact (Sabatier 2007). Ten years were therefore 
considered to be a minimum timeframe for this analysis. But as the Malaysian 
government presents a comprehensive policy paper every five years, it was decided 
to use three policy papers – this meant an analysis over a 15 year period, from 1996 
to 2010. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Content and context 
The first section of the “content and context” findings focuses upon Malaysian laws 
and regulations related to health system financing, partly addressing the first 
research question: “Have health financing reforms taken into consideration the 
various needs of different ethnic or socio-economic groups or other valid issues 
according to the relevant contexts?”. The second section reflects an analysis of the 
Malaysia Plans. The plans were analysed in the context of politics, the economy and 
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equity – a response to the second research question: “How have stakeholders been 
involved and who have been the influential actors?”. 
6.4.1.1 Laws and regulations - content 
A major feature of health financing Act in Malaysia is that health care obtained at 
public health care institutions is funded through general taxation, contributions from 
the Employee Provident Fund and the Social Security Organization in Malaysia plus 
co-payments from patients. The private health care sector, on the other hand, 
depends on out-of-pocket payments or provision via private insurance, which is still 
an under-developed market in Malaysia.  
Payments for health care services received via public institutions and those by 
private institutions are governed by different laws and regulations. Payments for 
health care services within the public health care sector are governed by the Fees 
Act 1951 along with all associated amendments, regulations and orders that have 
been issued subsequently (Malaysian Parliament 1978). Payments for health care 
services at private institutions fall under the Private Hospital Act from 1971 and 
subsequent amendments, regulations, orders and related Acts. 
(i) The public health care sector 
Patients’ co-payments for a visit to an outpatient centre or to a primary health care 
centre is RM1 (USD $0.31) including examination investigations (Malaysian 
Parliament 1982). A visit to a specialist costs RM5 (USD$1.57) including exploratory 
examinations, except for patients who are referred from private practitioners (where 
the examination fees are additional to the service fees).  
In public hospitals, there are three classes of ward. Facilities vary in these classes, 
including the number of beds in rooms and food options. In the first and second class 
wards patients can choose their food but not in third class wards. It is claimed that 
everybody receives the same professional service, but charges vary according to the 
facilities and the degree of “luxury” provided (Health care specialist 2010). Co-
payments are listed in Schedule B of the Fees (Medical) Order33, issued in 2003 
                                            
33 Some regulations in the Malaysian system are termed “Orders”. 
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(Malaysian Parliament 2003). Examples of daily ward charges in a public hospital 
can be seen in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Ward charges in general and maternity wards and in executive wards according to 
the Fees (medical) (amendment) Order 2003. 
CLASS GENERAL AND MATERNITY WARDS EXECUTIVE WARDS 
  Non-air-conditioned (RM) 
Air-conditioned 
(RM) (RM) 
FIRST CLASS: 
Single bed room 
Two beds in a room 
Three or more beds in a 
room 
60 ($18.86) 
40 ($12.57) 
                  30 ($9.43) 
80 ($25.15) 
60 ($18.86) 
40 ($12.57) 
 
120-150 ($37.72-
47.15) 
100 ($31.43) 
 
SECOND CLASS                   20 ($6.29)             30 ($9.43)  
THIRD CLASS                     3 ($0.94)               3 ($0.94)  
 
Treatment and operations are billed in addition to the ward charges and the cost 
depends on the type of treatment. Exemptions are made for civil servants, 
government pensioners and their families and employees of local authorities. These 
groups enjoy 100% coverage.  
The 2003 Order also introduced new tariffs for foreigners (excluding non-citizens that 
have resident permits or individuals who are married to a Malaysian citizen) who use 
public health care institutions (Malaysian Parliament 2003). They have to pay 
considerably higher amounts than Malaysians. General outpatient treatment for 
foreigners costs RM15 (USD$4.71) and an outpatient treatment by a specialist 
(excluding detailed investigations) costs RM60 (USD$18.86). Hospitalisation charges 
are also higher than for native Malaysians, as shown in Table 12: 
 
Table 12: Hospitalisation charges for foreigners in Malaysia. 
Number of beds in a room Ward charges (RM) 
Single bed 
Two beds 
Three or more beds 
160 ($50.29) 
115 ($36.15) 
40-80 ($12.57-25.15) 
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To verify whether these price schedules were followed at public hospitals, the Kuala 
Lumpur Hospital’s website was examined - it confirmed that these fees are used in 
government hospitals (Hospital Kuala Lumpur 2010). A price list from the Kuala 
Lumpur hospital, as well as deposit requirements in case of hospitalisation can be 
found in Table 18 and 19 in Appendix 14. 
In 2007, a new Order, introducing a full-paying-patient scheme was issued by the 
government. This allowed doctors working in selected government hospitals to use 
the facilities to treat private patients (Malaysian Parliament 2007). This new order 
was presented as an attempt to retain qualified doctors in public institutions. The 
patients pay in full for all the services, including registration and consultation fees, 
hospital fees, examination fees and procedure and treatment fees. There are no 
restrictions on who uses the full-paying patient scheme, except for the ability to pay; 
it is available to both Malaysian citizens and foreigners. 
(ii) The private health care sector 
In 1971, the government of Malaysia issued an Act called the Private Hospital Act 
(Malaysian Parliament 1971). This Act was intended to regulate private health care 
services and to ensure that no premises were used as private hospitals unless they 
possessed an appropriate licence. This Act was replaced by the Private Health care 
and Facilities Act in 1998 (Malaysian Parliament 1998), which empowered the 
relevant Minister to make regulations, including fee schedules, for all private health 
care facilities and  services plus all health related facilities and  services (Malaysian 
Parliament 1998). At that stage no regulations existed to control fees at private 
hospitals.  
In 2006, eight years later, two new regulations, based on the Private Health care 
Facilities and Services Act were issued: (i) Private Health Care Facilities and 
Services (Private Medical Clinics or Private Dental Clinics) Regulations 2006 
(Malaysian Parliament 2006b); and (ii) Private Health care Facilities and Services 
(Private Hospitals and Other Private Health care Facilities) Regulations 2006 
(Malaysian Parliament 2006a). In these regulations there are schedules governing 
maximum professional fees at private health care institutions but no fee schedules 
for hospitalisation charges (such as the maximum charge per room). Consultation 
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fees for the first visit with a general practitioner can range from RM10-35 (USD$3.14-
11.00). First consultation with a specialist can range from RM60-180 (USD$18.86-
56.58). A follow up visit with a specialist can range from RM35 (USD$11.00) to 
RM90 (USD$28.29) (Malaysian Parliament 2006a). General procedure fees vary 
extensively depending on the treatment. There are many treatments listed in the 
schedule and some are highly specialised but, as an example, a caesarean delivery 
can cost up to RM2,365 (USD$743.36) (Malaysian Parliament 2006a) and an 
individual psychotherapy appointment (not less than 45 minutes per session) can 
cost, according to the schedule, as much as RM220 (USD$69.15). 
On the website for the Association of Private Hospitals of Malaysia, the price lists for 
individual hospitals were reviewed. At KPJ34 Johor Specialist Hospital, room rates 
range between RM65 (USD$20.43) (six bed non-air conditioned room) and RM450 
(USD$141.44) (the VIP suite) per day. At the same hospital, a deposit required upon 
admission for a vaginal birth is RM2,500 (USD$785.79) and for a caesarean 
RM5,000 (USD$1,571.59) (KPJ Johor Specialist Hospital 2010). At Pantai Hospital 
in Kuala Lumpur, the price for a room ranges from RM98 (USD$30.80) (four bed 
room) to RM928 (USD$291.69) (the Premier suite) per day (Pantai Hospital Kuala 
Lumpur 2010). The deluxe delivery suite costs RM500 (USD$157.16) per day. 
Hospitalisation charges in Malaysia thus depend to a great extent on whether the 
provider is public or private, the type of treatments obtained and the ward class 
chosen by the patient. For example, the price for five days in hospital in a third class 
ward at a public hospital, which is the cheapest option, is RM15 (USD$4.65). At a 
private hospital, the cheapest option for five days can be as much as 30 times that 
amount or RM400 (USD$124) (Pantai hospital in Kuala Lumpur). The price for the 
best equipped room at Pantai hospital in Kuala Lumpur is RM4,640 (USD$14,968) 
for five days (or 300 times the most inexpensive option in a public hospital). 
To place these sums in perspective, the National Health and Morbidity Survey III 
reported that 39% of respondents had a monthly income under RM1,000 
                                            
34 No information was available on what KPJ stands for. 
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(USD$310), of which 36% had a monthly income under RM500 (USD$155) per 
month (Ministry of Health 2006). These figures indicate that a large part of the 
population cannot afford treatment at private hospitals and that some might even 
have difficulties paying the charges for the least expensive ward classes and 
treatment fees at public hospitals. 
6.4.1.2 Malaysia Plans - content and context 
Since 1966, the Malaysian government has published strategic five-year plans. 
These Malaysia Plans have from the beginning focused on economic issues with the 
aim of increasing the welfare of all Malaysian citizens and improving living 
conditions, especially among the poor in rural areas. The plans are comprehensive, 
embracing all subjects deemed to be important for society, including health. The 
content of the Malaysia Plans was analysed in relation to: (i) the political context; (ii) 
the economic context; and (iii) equity. An overview of the findings from this analysis 
is provided in Table 13 (more detailed analytical information can be found in 
Appendix 15). 
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Table 13: An overview of the content of the Malaysia Plans in the context of politics, the 
economy and equity. 
Context 7th Malaysia Plan 8th Malaysia Plan 9th Malaysia Plan 
Politics 
To increase and 
accelerate 
corporatisation and 
privatisation of hospitals 
and medical services to 
improve efficiency in the 
health care system. The 
government announced it 
would gradually reduce 
its role in health care 
provision. 
The private sector was 
encouraged to expand its 
service to complement the 
public sector. The government 
committed to improving 
regulations to ensure access 
for all at private health care 
services. 
The government claims to 
continue to be the main 
provider of health care 
services for the nation; a 
statement which is 
contradictory to the 
statement in the 7th plan. 
Greater individual 
responsibility said to be 
crucial to achieving better 
population health. 
The 
Economy 
A proposal for the 
implementation of a new 
health financing scheme, 
with the aim of reducing 
the financial burden of 
the public sector.  
Public health 
interventions highlighted 
in order to reduce future 
expenditure on curative 
health care.  
The new health financing 
scheme that was not 
implemented as intended in 
the 7th plan reappears in the 
8th plan. The plan recognises 
that, in order to ensure quality 
health care at a reasonable 
cost in both public and private 
health care systems, a new 
health financing mechanism is 
needed. A new health care 
financing scheme is set to be 
introduced to provide 
consumers with a wider 
choice in purchasing health 
services from both the public 
and private sector. 
The new health financing 
scheme was not 
implemented as intended in 
the 8th plan, so reappears 
in the 9th plan with the 
stated aim to enhance 
accessibility and equity 
through the provision of 
high quality, efficient and 
comprehensive health 
coverage for the 
population. 
Equity 
Unhindered access to 
health care services for 
low-income groups 
pledged, as well as 
increased numbers of 
health centres and 
mobile dispensaries in 
rural areas. 
An effort proposed to address 
the shortage of health care 
personnel within the public 
health sector and in rural 
areas. In doing so, improved 
terms and conditions at public 
hospitals and clinics pledged 
for health professionals. 
The government failed to 
improve the ratio of facility 
to population in the rural 
areas, but was successful 
in increasing the number of 
doctors serving the 
population.  
No attempt made to 
address the disparities in 
health outcomes between 
the different ethnic groups 
– disparities only 
mentioned in the context of 
income inequality.  
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The Malaysia Plans are comprehensive and ambitious. Policies related to health 
system financing reforms, however, have not been implemented. No explanations 
are given for why the new health financing schemes, pledged in every plan under 
examination, have not become reality. A lack of supporting documents or references 
is also noticeable in some of the statements in the plans. For example, it is stated in 
the ninth plan that “Although the ratio of facility to population in the rural areas 
generally declined due to relocation of facilities, the quality and delivery of services 
improved with the upgrading of facilities including the provision of diagnostic and 
imaging equipment. These contributed to improvements in the speed and quality of 
diagnosis as well as enhanced patient comfort.” [emphasis added] (Economic 
Planning Unit 2006, p.417). No source is given for this and other claims and no 
reference is made to surveys or data sets.  
6.4.2 Process and actors 
The Multiple Stream theory, applied to the process and actor analysis, conceives of 
three main streams flowing throughout the policy system: (i) problems, (ii) politics 
and (iii) policies (Kingdon 1995). The problem stream encompasses, in this context, 
measurable indicators of (problematic) health status and stakeholder concerns. The 
politics stream embraces the broader political discourse within which policy is made, 
including political turnover and the national mood. The policy stream includes 
discussions and solutions that have been proposed. An analysis of the three 
streams, as well as the actors, is presented later in this chapter but an overview of 
the analysis can be found in Appendix 16. 
6.4.2.1 Problem stream 
In 2004, non-communicable diseases were the main causes of death in Malaysia, 
accounting for 72% of all deaths (World Health Organization 2010). A survey on non-
communicable diseases in 2005 revealed an increased prevalence of raised blood 
pressure, raised blood glucose, hypercholesterolemia, overweight patients and 
obesity (World Health Organization 2007a). The top five main diseases notified in 
2006 were, on the other hand, tuberculosis, food poisoning35, dengue fever, hand, 
foot and mouth disease, and malaria (World Health Organization 2007a). At the 
                                            
35 A number of episodes of food poisoning occurred in some places, especially in schools. 
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same time, Malaysia has experienced considerable improvements in indicators 
commonly used to evaluate the population’s health. Life expectancy at birth 
increased by three years from 1990 to 2008 and the under-five mortality rate fell from 
eighteen to six children per 1,000 live births over the same period (World Health 
Organization 2010). The changes represent a substantial improvement in average 
health outcomes. But it is not clear whether all socio-economic groups have enjoyed 
these improvements equally. Indeed, no information on the development of health 
inequalities in Malaysia is available in the relevant World Health Organization 
Statistics (World Health Organization 2010). 
At a general level, the average improvements in life expectancy and the under-five 
mortality rate are interesting in the light of relatively low health care spending in 
Malaysia as a percentage of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Malaysia 
spent 4.4% of its GDP on health in 2007 but, on average, the member states of the 
World Health Organization spent 9.2% of their GDP on health that same year. 
Upper-middle income countries, like Malaysia, spent on average 6.2% of their GDP 
on health and countries in the Western Pacific Region used 6.5% of their GDP on 
health in 2007 (World Health Organization 2010). These numbers suggest that, 
regardless of how comparisons are made, Malaysia is spending a considerably lower 
percentage of its GDP on health than many other countries. 
More specifically, the National Health and Morbidity survey from 2006 (NHMS-III) 
indicated that 80% of out-of-pocket payment is covered by patients and only 19% of 
Malaysians aged 18 years and above had some form of private insurance (Ministry 
of Health 2006). One recommendation from the NHMS-III report was that 
“willingness to pay” should be studied and used to guide the new national health 
financing mechanism (Ministry of Health 2006). The NHMS-III survey also revealed 
that out-of-pocket health expenditure was associated with domicile, ethnicity and the 
monthly household income. The mean out-of-pocket health expenditure was 1.7 
times higher in households in urban areas compared to rural areas. But even though 
households in urban areas spent more on health, they spent a lower amount as a 
percentage of their monthly income (the monthly income in urban areas is twice the 
monthly income in rural areas). 
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The difference between mean annual household income and mean annual out-of-
pocket payments between ethnic groups was also noteworthy (Figure 24). The 
Chinese, on average, had the highest income, as well as making the highest out-of-
pocket payments. Bumiputeras earned the lowest household income and paid the 
lowest out-of-pocket health expenditures. The annual out-of-pocket payments as a 
proportion of household income were highest among “other ethnic groups”, or 4.3% 
of mean annual income. 
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Figure 24: Mean household annual income (RM) and the mean out-of-pocket annual 
expenditure on health (RM). Source: Ministry of Health (2006). 
Change over time is also illustrative in this respect. Since the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) was launched in 1971 (Economic Planning Unit 2008a), the government’s aim 
has been to reduce poverty, a goal reflected in the Malaysia Plans. The ninth 
Malaysia Plan argues that “reducing socio-economic disparities requires urgent and 
focused attention” (Economic Planning Unit 2006, p.24). But disparities within the 
nation have in fact been widening (Economic Planning Unit 2006). Out-of-pocket 
payments were explored in the NHMS-III survey which revealed that the richest 
group spent five times more on health than the poorest income group (Figure 25). 
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Figure 25: Mean annual out-of-pocket health expenditure in different income groups (monthly 
income). Source: Ministry of Health (2006). 
Although public health care is subsidised and the government has pledged to 
provide the poor with free health care, available data indicate that the poorest 
households, with an average income of less than RM400 per month, pay RM342 out-
of-pocket annually for health care services. That accounts, on average, for about 
7.1% of their annual income. At the same time, the richest households, with an 
income above RM5,000, devote about 2.9% of their annual income on health care 
services. Moreover the fact that secondary and tertiary health care is not free can 
present those who are not rich with particular problems. It is not uncommon that 
appeals for help to pay for health care treatments appear in the newspapers. “These 
kids need your help” is, for example, the heading of one article in the New Strait 
Times on April 13th 2010 (New Strait Times 2010). This was a call from parents with 
children suffering from life threatening diseases who urgently needed surgery. The 
article appeals for donations for four children who, in total, needed RM113,000 
(USD$35,518) to pay for their treatment. Those who wished to help were requested 
to send cheques to the newspaper, which coordinates such donations. Indeed, the 
prevalence of such appeals prompted the government to establish a National Health 
Welfare Fund in 2002. The fund receives public donations from rich corporations and 
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individuals (Chik 2000; Yusop 2009). Poor patients in need can apply for assistance 
through the Ministry of Health. This way of health care financing has been criticised 
on the grounds that it marginalises the government’s role in welfare provision (Chik 
2000; Leng, Barraclough 2008).  
6.4.2.2 Politics stream 
Political debates and innovation are influenced by the national mood and election 
outcomes (Zahariadis 2007). Volatility in politics in Malaysia has been low, with the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) consistently playing a dominant role 
for more than half a century. The UMNO is the largest political party in Malaysia and 
has reflected and perpetuated the nationalist ideologies that have shaped Malaysian 
politics for decades (Lee 2005). Since independence, UMNO has been a major 
partner in the ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN). This has left Malaysia a 
“monopolistic” country with limited innovation in influential political ideologies. The 
two other major parties in the BN are the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and 
the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) (Malaysian Parliament 2010). All these parties 
are ethnically based but there also exist numerous smaller political parties in 
Malaysia that can be categorised as either mono-racial or multi-racial (Ghee, Gomes 
& Rahman 2009).  
UMNO is a right wing political party, endorsing neo-liberal ideologies that view the 
free market as the major driver of economic growth and prosperity (Navarro 2007a). 
The government, under UMNO’s leadership, launched the privatisation policy in 
1983 (Economic Planning Unit 2008b) and it has, since then, privatised (or 
corporatized) several public entities. Their privatisation policy has also had an ethnic 
dimension, favouring Malays36 and other Bumiputeras, although well connected non-
Malay business people have also been able to obtain shares in many of the 
privatisation projects (Lee 2005). Indeed, despite the government’s “One Malaysia” 
campaign, there remains an undercurrent of inter-ethnic tension largely fuelled by 
institutionalised policies that favour one ethnic group over another (Ghee, Gomes & 
Rahman 2009; Economic Planning Unit 2008a). Inter-ethnic marriage is relatively 
                                            
36 The constitution defines the word “Malay” as “a person who professes the religion of Islam, 
habitually speaks the Malay language....” (Malaysian Parliament 1957) (Article 160).  
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uncommon. There are probably many reasons for the separation between ethnic 
groups, but one explanation might be compulsory conversion to Islam when marrying 
a Muslim (Ghee, Gomes & Rahman 2009). 
It can be difficult to analyse national mood through newspapers, particularly – as 
some key informants argued - if the national media are controlled by ruling parties 
(Health care specialist 2010). The opposition has limited access to the media and 
has to use other means such as blogs, websites and publications established by 
their associations to disseminate their opinions. The Coalition Against Health Care 
Privatisation, for example, was founded in 1977 and encompasses 81 non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). The coalition was formed to oppose further 
privatisation of the health care system and to press the government to consult with 
stakeholders before introducing changes in the national health care system. The 
Coalition Against Health Care Privatisation is an active association and has 
repeatedly expressed opinions and suggestions on health system financing. It has 
criticised a lack of transparency in working procedures and limited interest by the 
government in participation from interested people and professional groups 
(Coalition Against Health Care Privatisation 2005a; Malaysian Medical Resources 
2006).  
6.4.2.3 Policy stream 
The analysis of the policy stream in the Multiple Stream model involves, as indicated 
above, analysing the general discussion on health system financing reforms, in 
which solutions are evaluated with regard to their technical feasibility, value 
acceptability and how they integrate into existing political strategies. Some proposals 
survive and are accepted unchanged, while others are adjusted to reflect the 
politicians’ ideologies and values. Options that seem difficult to implement and do not 
conform to the values of the policy makers are not likely to be adopted (Zahariadis 
2007). 
The Malaysian government has used several consultancy firms to evaluate 
possibilities in relation to a new health financing scheme. For example, Karol 
Consulting, a company from Australia, was appointed to study how such a scheme 
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could be implemented in Malaysia (Karol Consulting 2006). The work was carried out 
in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and the Economic Planning Unit under the 
Prime Minister’s Office and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
which sponsored the work. The findings of the study were not made public and were 
classified as confidential. The minister of health claimed that he was not satisfied 
with the report (Choe 2008), deemed it incomplete and decided that the study would 
be terminated before it was completed.  
I obtained a copy of Karol Consulting’s interim report from August 2006. The report 
claimed that the recommendations were based on ideas for a National Health 
Financing Mechanism found in the government's Vision for Health policy. The report 
suggested that the funding mechanism would be based on risk pooling where “the 
rich subsidise the poor and healthy subsidise the sick so that the health status of the 
community as a whole is raised” (Karol Consulting 2006, p.105). The consultants 
proposed that financial contributions to the fund would be based on the ability to pay 
and that a special effort would be made to satisfy the public and ensure that the 
National Health Authority (NHA), who would be responsible for the fund, operated 
according to clearly specified rules. According to the report, however, the 
government’s track record of administering publicly owned agencies was not 
particularly good (Karol Consulting 2006). 
In December 2005, the Coalition Against Health Care Privatisation prepared the 
“People’s Proposal for Health Care Financing.” The main elements of the proposal 
were that there would be a national fund available to cover the cost of health care for 
the people of Malaysia. The fund would be financed without direct contributions from 
individuals. The Coalition urged the government to raise expenditure on health to a 
minimum of 5% of the nation’s GDP, in accordance with recommendations from the 
World Health Organization37. The proposal suggested that the fund should also 
receive some of the profits from the petroleum industry and the whole revenue 
generated by taxes on alcohol and cigarettes (Coalition Against Health Care 
Privatisation 2005b). The proposal stressed the importance of equity when 
                                            
37 This recommendation was never formally adopted by the World Health Organization (Savedoff  
2003). 
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establishing the fund and that the National Health Authority (NHA) should work 
openly and without any “cronyism and corruption”. The coalition suggested that the 
NHA should involve representatives from a wide cross section of Malaysia and not 
only members selected by the prime minister or by the minister of health.  
The proposals from the Coalitions Against Health Care Privatisation and the 
suggestions in the report from the Karol Consultancy were not adopted. They have 
presumably not been found technically feasible or acceptable within the Ministry of 
Health or at the Economic Planning Unit. Alternatively, they simply have not reflected 
the political ideologies preferred by the ruling parties. 
6.4.2.4 Actors - policy entrepreneurs 
The Ministry of Health is responsible for all aspects of public health and plays a 
major role in policy making. The general opinion of key informants, however, was 
that the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), under the Prime Minister’s Office, was the 
main actor in policy making (including public health policy making). Indeed, 
according to the key informants, decision making in recent years has been 
increasingly influenced by the Prime Minister’s Office (Health care specialist 2010; 
Ghani, Yadav 2008). Another strong actor in public health policy making is the 
Malaysian Medical Association (MMA), a national association for medical doctors 
(Health care specialist 2010). Little information was found about health care 
financing on the MMA website, which might perhaps indicate that the MMA has open 
access to the minister of health and his staff and can therefore express their opinions 
and recommendations directly to the Ministry of Health. Powerful actors often work 
behind closed doors and do not need to raise their voices in public through the 
media or the Internet. Another strong actor in the policy process identified by the key 
informants was the private hospital sector (Health care specialist 2010). 
One key informant also argued that powerful and strong NGOs were involved in 
policy making and that the politicians had decided to invite their participation rather 
than let them disseminate their opinions in the media (especially if they were critical). 
Tellingly, if these stakeholders criticise the government publicly, they are often called 
in for a meeting at the Ministry on the pretext of “let’s rather talk about it and discuss 
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it directly” (Health care specialist 2010).  Similarly, it was argued that consultancy 
firms are commonly recruited from abroad and that if their findings do not reflect the 
politicians’ ideologies and values, they are dismissed and replaced (Health care 
specialist 2010). It is uncommon for the Ministry of Health to use specialists from 
within Malaysia, and most unlikely if they have been “difficult” or have criticised the 
existing system publicly, as one of the key informants revealed (Health care 
specialist 2010). 
The interviewees thus characterised, the health policy process to be opaque and 
observed that the politicians and their staff are selective in their choice of participants 
(Health care specialist 2010). Those who are selected cannot expect any feedback, 
information or results from the meetings in which they participate (Health care 
specialist 2010). Interviewees stated that although they were asked to participate in 
a meeting at the Ministry of Health to discuss a new policy, it was more for the 
purpose of giving them a sense of involvement because, they felt, key decisions had 
already been made: 
“I have been asked to participate in meetings at the Ministry of Health to 
discuss new policies. These meetings are perhaps 45 minutes long where 
30 minutes are used for presentation. In fact everything has already been 
decided and no dialogue is expected.”  
Health care specialist 
6.4.2.5 Policy window – new policy schemes 
According to the Multiple Stream approach, a “policy window” opens up at critical 
points when the three independent streams (problems, politics and policy) converge 
(Kingdon 1995). What causes the policy window to open depends upon the 
circumstances each time. If good governance practices are employed and/or a new 
policy maker happens to be in power, the possibility of a policy window opening up 
increases. Volatility in Malaysian politics has however been low, which means the 
same or similar political ideologies have remained influential. For health care 
financing reforms, the policy window seems not to have opened up, except for the 
regular updates of the Malaysia Plans.  
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6.4.3 Governance in Malaysia 
Both the World Bank and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) refer to governance as a process of decision 
making and the capacity of governments to formulate policies and to implement or 
not to implement them (World Bank 2010c; Sheng 2011). To evaluate the quality of 
governance, the World Bank has developed a methodology which they use to rank 
all countries of the world on an annual basis. The Bank employs six categories of 
variables in their evaluation of governance quality: (i) Voice and Accountability; (ii) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence; (iii) Government Effectiveness; (iv) 
Regulatory Quality; (v) Rule of Law; and (vi) Control of Corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay 
& Mastruzzi 2003), (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2009). Every category has a wide 
variety of subordinate variables or indicators based on data gathered from a number 
of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organisations and international 
organisations (World Bank 2010c).  
The six categories used to aggregate data show a declining trend in governance 
quality for Malaysia from 1996 for all categories, except “Government Effectiveness” 
which was 1% higher in 2009 than it was in 1996. All other categories have, on 
average, declined by 15% (from 13% to 22%) from 1996 to 2009, as illustrated in 
Table 14. 
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Table 14: Governance indicators in Malaysia from 1996 to 2009 presented by the World Bank. 
Source: World Bank (2010c). 
Year Voice and accountability 
Political 
stability 
Government 
effectiveness 
Regulatory 
quality 
Rule 
of 
law 
Control of 
corruption 
1996 38.3 58.2 78.6 72.2 74.8 74.8 
1998 43.8 45.2 69.4 69.3 64.3 72.3 
2000 40.4 51.9 78.6 64.9 61.0 66.0 
2002 37.5 58.7 79.1 65.9 63.3 67.0 
2003 38.5 58.2 81.1 70.7 62.9 67.0 
2004 41.8 57.7 84.0 66.8 65.2 69.9 
2005 44.7 61.1 83.5 66.3 65.7 65.0 
2006 31.3 55.3 84.0 66.3 65.7 67.0 
2007 32.2 52.9 85.0 67.5 65.7 67.6 
2008 31.3 51.2 83.1 63.3 64.1 62.3 
2009 31.8 46.7 79.5 60.0 65.1 58.1 
Difference: 
2009-1996 -17% -20% +1% -17% -13% -22% 
Green means: 75th to 90th percentile of maximum scores 
Yellow means: 50th to 75th percentile of maximum scores 
Orange means: 25th to 50th percentile of maximum scores 
 
6.5 Discussion 
The Malaysian government has, since the early 1980s, paved the way for increased 
privatisation within the health system. Increased efficiency and a reduction in the 
government financial and administrative burden has been the rationale for the 
Malaysian privatisation policy (Economic Planning Unit 1996b). Nevertheless, 
government costs have not decreased and management costs have risen along with 
operational costs, largely due to the cost of new medical technologies (Lit 2008).  
Private sector services are usually run for profit and favour free market principles. If, 
however, equitable access and efficient use of resources are the objectives, it is 
difficult to operate health care services solely on free market principles because of 
the inherent market failures in the health care market (Wonderling, Gruen & Black 
2010; Mooney 2009; Folland, Goodman & Stano 2007; Hsiao 1995; Mooney 2003). 
One of the World Bank’s pieces of advice in the 1993 World Health report was that 
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governments should intervene and compensate for problems related to uncertainty 
and market failures by introducing a solid health system financing mechanism with 
the aim of eliminating inequities in multi-tiered systems (World Bank 1993b). Indeed, 
the Malaysian government has repeatedly been advised to reform its health 
financing mechanism. One of the first to recommend this action was the Asian 
Development Bank which, in 1988, recommended a compulsory scheme funded 
through contributions from both employees and employers whereby the government 
would pay premiums for the poor (Ramesh 2007). The government indicated that 
they supported the proposal, but no action was taken at that time. Since then, the 
government has pledged a new health system financing scheme to make health care 
accessible and affordable in both public and private institutions to all Malaysians – 
an aspiration evident in every Malaysia Plan examined in this research and also in 
the most recent plan (Malaysia Plan 2011-2015; Economic Planning Unit 2010). As 
noted previously, no official explanations have been given for why these pledges 
have not been met.  
Concurrently, limited change in payment mechanisms, coupled with privatisation in 
the health care sector, has perpetuated inequitable access to private health care 
services. Without a comprehensive health insurance mechanism and governmental 
subsidies (currently restricted to services received through public health care 
institutions), accessibility to the health care system has been based largely on 
patients’ ability to pay.  
The way the Malaysian government works, as observed in this analysis, gives an 
impression of the development and implementation of an “emerging-strategy” rather 
than a “comprehensive thought-through strategy” based upon an evaluation of all 
potential options and their social and economic consequences. The recent full-
paying-patient scheme is an example of such piecemeal policy making. The full-
paying-patient scheme was a reaction to a “brain drain” from the public sector to the 
private sector, which itself was one of the consequences of the privatisation policy 
driven by the government. The full-paying-patient scheme allows health 
professionals in the public sector to take full paying patients and use public facilities. 
One inevitable consequence of this scheme is increased inequity in health, as 
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people who can afford to pay for the private services will be able to bypass the 
queue and those who cannot will have to wait even longer for the health care service 
they need.  
This not only points to the absence of a coherent strategy but also limited concern 
with social solidarity on the part of those in power. This is clearly reflected in 
occasional discordance between policy documents and the views of individual senior 
politicians, even ministers. A recent interview with the minister of health in The Sun, 
a widely read newspaper in Malaysia, quoted the minister as saying that the idea 
behind the new health financing scheme is to have a “one flat rate”, where everyone 
contributes a standard monthly minimum amount, regardless of their salaries. This 
diverges markedly from ideas in the ninth Malaysia Plan stating an increased access 
for all Malaysians to health care services (Economic Planning Unit 2006; 
Sivanandam 2010). Similarly, the minister claimed that there would only be one 
standard scheme to provide primary health care for all Malaysians, administered by 
the government and in line with the World Bank’s recommendation for minimum 
“essential clinical services“ (World Bank 1993b). Patients who need treatment above 
the minimum will have to pay the costs themselves or buy private insurance. Such 
arrangements indicate no cross-subsidisation between the rich and the poor, which 
makes the payment mechanism inequitable and provides only limited security for the 
most vulnerable.  
These inconsistencies are perhaps not only explicable in terms of ideology but might 
also reflect trends in the nature of governance in Malaysia. According to the World 
Bank’s annual evaluation, as indicated in Table 14, the quality of Malaysian 
governance has declined over the last 15 years, except for the measure of 
governance effectiveness (World Bank 2010c). The trend for the measure of “Voice 
and Accountability”, which includes indicators evaluating the transparency of the 
government’s policies via citizens’ participation as well as freedom of expression, 
was 17% lower in 2009 than in 1996. It is also notable that the “Voice and 
Accountability” score for Malaysia has never been particularly high, reaching only 25-
50% of the maximum score. The “Control of corruption” index has also declined 
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during the timeframe under investigation and was down by 22% in 2009 compared to 
1996 (World Bank 2010c). 
More specifically, in relation  to health system financing reform, it could be argued 
that the Malaysian government has failed in at least five of the eight criteria of the 
UNESCAP definition of good governance (see the discussion on governance in the 
literature review) (Sheng 2011). Malaysian governance has, in the case of health 
system financing reforms, not been accountable and has not responded to the 
population’s rights of equal access to all health care services available in the 
country. The frequent use of the Official Secrets Act also reduces the government’s 
credibility and supports the criticisms made of selective partnership, and opacity, 
which increases the possibility of corruption (Barraclough 2000). This indicates that 
governance working procedures have not been transparent and they have not 
included all stakeholders and thus have not reached wide consensus on how to 
reconcile a new health system financing mechanism to the increasing participation of 
the private sector within the health system.  
In a second broad respect, it has been suggested that egalitarian policies are less 
likely to be implemented if governments are confident about their strength 
(Wilkinson, Pickett 2009; World Bank 1993a). It is not until their power is at risk that 
a “policy window” might open and facilitate the implementation of innovative policies 
(Zahariadis 2007; Roberts et al. 2008). As already observed, political volatility has 
been low in Malaysia, which might be one of the obstacles to health system financing 
reforms. New ideas for health financing might thus be trapped in the “policy cycle” for 
decades. Another explanation might be that the ideas do not comply with the 
dominant political ideology. UMNO, which has been the leading party in power since 
independence, is a right wing political party, preferring neo-liberal ideologies. Neo-
liberal ideologies are based on the philosophy that the best way to improve efficiency 
is to reduce State intervention and to empower the free market (Navarro 2007a). 
More research would help to gain a better understanding of such political 
determinants of health and how they affect health system financing policies and 
inequities in health (Navarro 2007a; Navarro, Shi 2001).  
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There are several limitations to this study. A different mix of data might have yielded 
different results, as might the use of another analytical framework. A local researcher 
might also have had access to information that could have influenced the findings. 
Nevertheless, the results of the Malaysian case study mesh with the results from the 
Icelandic case study in highlighting accountability, responsiveness, 
transparency, inclusion and participation as major governance dimensions 
affecting health systems.  
6.6 Conclusion 
This case study suggests that privatisation of health care services within a system 
that was previously funded through general taxation increases inequity in health if 
apposite changes to health care financing are not introduced in parallel. If the aim is 
to secure citizens’ equal access to all services, regardless of the type of provider, 
governments must adapt the health system financing mechanism to a new two-tiered 
system. The introduction of private health care services requires that the purchasing 
mechanism be reconciled with health care provision so that access does not become 
dependent on the patients’ ability to pay. Successful reconciliation in this regard 
depends upon genuine political will to maintain equity, as well as good governance 
practices. Specifically, the following conditions are necessary.  First, the idea of a 
social security fund, established through fair collection of revenues from society and 
the purchasing of health care services from both public and private providers must 
concur with the political ideology of the ruling parties. Second, those in power must 
be held accountable for developing a new health system financing policy and, even 
more important, for its implementation. And in a third regard, the decision-making 
process must be transparent, allowing fair participation and give all stakeholders a 
voice in the process.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion of the thesis 
This doctoral thesis is compiled from three individual studies exploring the link 
between governance and health systems under different settings applying various 
research methods. The aim was to examine if there is an association between 
governance and health outcomes and to explore how health systems are affected by 
governance quality as defined by UNESCAP. The objective was to explore how 
governance affects decision making and implementation of decisions within health 
systems and whether some categories of the UNESCAP´s definition for good 
governance might be more influential than others. 
The studies indicate an association between health systems performance and 
governance practices; suggesting a complicated interaction and confounding effects 
between different building blocks of societies. The thesis furthermore suggests that 
the association applies for countries at all income levels. The study from Africa 
disclosed a statistically significant relationship between governance quality, 
measured through governance indices, and health system performance, measured 
through child mortality (average outcome) and the ratio between child mortality in the 
wealthiest and poorest income quintiles (equity measure). However, after adjusting 
for confounding factors, governance did not remain statistically significant associated 
with the equity measure. This emphasises the importance of distinguishing between 
average and equity measures and that it cannot be assumed that if average health 
outcome is improved that the improvement has been distributed equally among all 
social groups. The broad definition of governance and the complexity associated 
with measuring and evaluating its quality, represent a major challenge. Despite the 
existence of comprehensive governance indices used to evaluate and rank countries 
according to governance quality, there is always the risk that these indices disregard 
critical factors that play an important role for policy making and implementation of 
policies. This risk was especially apparent in the Icelandic case, which indicated 
severe governance failures in relation to decision making, despite Iceland being 
ranked among the best governed countries of the world (World Bank 2010; Gylfason 
2009). 
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It is one of governments’ responsibilities to lead new public health policy making 
(World Health Organization 2000; Walt 1994; Buse, Mays & Walt 2005; Roberts et 
al. 2008). Policy making can be viewed as a process or a cycle containing distinct 
steps such as problem identification, policy development, implementation and 
evaluation (Roberts et al. 2008). To be accountable, governments need access to 
reliable data and have to be willing to analyse the data and respond to upcoming 
public health threats in an appropriate way (World Health Organization 2000; Walt 
1994; Buse, Mays & Walt 2005; Roberts et al. 2008). Both the Malaysian and the 
Icelandic case revealed limited analytical work conducted by the respective 
responsible governmental bodies prior to decision making. Other case studies have 
shown that good preparation, of which analytical work is critical, is essential for 
successful health system reforms (Sheaff 2005; Tarin et al. 2009). Inadequate 
analytical work and lack of professional decision making processes make 
governments and governmental institutions with the authority to influence health 
system policy less accountable. Lack of accountability in turn weakens their 
capability to be responsive and act in the best interests of the whole society within an 
acceptable timeframe.  
To develop a consensus oriented policy, based on best available data, requires 
transparent working procedures allowing for fair participation (Sheng 2011; World 
Bank 2010; Roberts et al. 2008). In both the Malaysian and the Icelandic case, little 
evidence for analysis and analytical documents could be found; where such 
documents existed, they were difficult to access. In some cases it appeared as if 
policy papers were deliberately concealed from stakeholders and others interested in 
participating in the public health policy making. This was even more noticeable if 
stakeholders were negatively affected by the new policy, indicating selective 
partnership in the decision making process. 
Policymakers commonly establish committees to act as a coordinator in public policy 
making. Individuals chosen to participate and lead such work are often selected from 
a small group of people, who share similar views (Lee, Goodman 2002; Gilson et al. 
2003). This leads to the formation of an “elite” that gains a critical influence over all 
decision making processes. The selected individuals, who commonly are connected 
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to the political parties in power, acquire a unique opportunity to influence policy 
making in their best interests, which is not necessarily based upon evidence or best 
practices and might be at the expense of the broader public welfare (Kaufmann 
2004; Lee, Goodman 2002). Selective partnership is not only inequitable and 
exclusive; it is also a violation of human rights as, according to the United Nation’s 
Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to participate in governing her 
or his country (United Nations 1948). Selective partnership makes the policy process 
biased with limited access for groups with less resources and weaker voice. This 
increases the risk of hostility and suspicion among stakeholder and can affect 
implementation negatively (Roberts et al. 2008). Circumstances like these are also 
more likely to lead to “piecemeal” policy making, answering the requirements of the 
strongest pressure groups and/or satisfying specific requests from constituents 
(Gudjonsson et al. 2005).  
Both the Icelandic and the Malaysian case studies reveal that predominant political 
ideologies can have a significant influence on decision making and the 
implementation of decisions at the expense of analytical evidence; a situation which 
has also been suggested in other studies (Towse, Mills & Tangcharoensathien 2004; 
Gilson et al. 2003; Wagner, Wollmann 1986; Coburn, Coburn 2007; Navarro 2007; 
Navarro, Shi 2001). While both case studies provide some indication of the potential 
negative effects on health systems performance, this area of research remains 
nascent and more systematically collected data is needed. More research is also 
needed to understand the potential influence of different political ideologies on health 
systems reforms and decision making within health systems. 
To alter existing policies can be quite challenging, but in all societies unanticipated 
events happen occasionally that open up a window of opportunity for radical policy 
changes (Sabatier 2007; Roberts et al. 2008). An example of such event is the 
current economic crisis. In the Icelandic case it is described how the economic crisis, 
which was of unprecedented scale, opened up a window of opportunity for health 
system reforms. The window of opportunity can also open up when different political 
parties take over the governmental responsibilities, for example after elections, 
which was also seen in the Icelandic case study (Sabatier 2007; Roberts et al. 
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2008). The counterfactual is starkly illustrated in the Malaysian case, which 
highlights a prolonged failure in governance in relation to the implementation of a 
new health financing scheme, and indicates that the government, which has ruled for 
decades, is overconfident about its strength and can afford to ignore new egalitarian 
policies (Wilkinson, Pickett 2009; World Bank 1993; Zahariadis 2007; Roberts et al. 
2008). 
This thesis, based on the three stand-alone studies, contributes to increased 
knowledge of the association between governance and health systems performance. 
Firstly, it demonstrates a positive statistical association between governance quality 
and health outcomes in Africa, applying a new governance index specifically 
developed for the African countries. Secondly, the thesis provides an evidence for 
pathways through which governance might affect health systems performance; (a) 
through partnership: The thesis suggests that a broad cooperation with 
stakeholders, allowing for fair participation, to be one of the fundamental governance 
qualities. Fair partnership improves health systems performance through improved 
efficiency and equitable use/distribution of resources; (b) through transparency: The 
thesis indicates transparency to be an essential element in decision making 
processes, allowing for open discussion where justification for decisions are made 
clear to all citizens. Transparency reduces the probability of “elite” formations and 
improves health systems performance, in particular equity in health; (c) through 
accountability: The thesis suggests accountability to be a core governance quality 
which affects health systems performance through appropriate responses taken on 
by those who should be held accountable, either through elections or through 
otherwise a legitimate mandate. Thirdly, the thesis indicates that the association 
between governance quality and health systems performance is not restricted to low 
income countries. Even health system performance in a high income country, 
categorised as well governed, can be affected by governance quality. Fourthly, the 
thesis shows clearly how global affairs, in this case a global economic crisis, affects 
a national health system, whose country is an active player in the global financial 
market.  
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To enhance public health, emphasis must be put on improved health and education 
(Sen 1999). It is health systems’ obligation to improve health and distribute health 
goods equitably among all socio-economic groups (World Health Organization 
2000). However, this is a challenging task which requires good governance 
practices, political commitment, strong stewardship and strategic work, based on 
reliable data (Sheng 2011; World Bank 2010; World Health Organization 2000). 
Governments, who are to lead a country, have to monitor and produce health 
statistics, which together with surveys and research support analytical work. Easily 
accessible data can be used as an input for decision making which should be 
executed in cooperation with stakeholders allowing for open and honest discussion 
were all proposals are evaluated, ultimately leading to an informed decision, which 
has the potential to serve the whole society. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions of the thesis 
Governance quality and health outcomes are negatively associated in the African 
region of the World Health Organization, suggesting that better governed countries 
have better population health. Although governance failures have commonly been 
related to lower income countries they can, however, also occur in countries at 
higher income levels. Even resource rich countries, categorised as well governed, 
can fail to apply good governance practices, affecting the performance of the 
national health system. 
Lack of accountability and responsiveness are critical governance failures that affect 
short term decision making and long term reform within health systems. There are 
presumably several reasons for lack of accountability and responsiveness, such as 
ignorance among those who are in power or disagreements based on conflicting 
political ideologies. More research is needed to improve our understanding of why 
this shortage might arise; if and then how it is associated with power dispersion and 
political turnover or how it could be linked to political ideologies and 
battles/compromises between political parties. 
Selective partnership, another governance failure, is based on loyalty to ideologies 
with a consequent exclusion of rivals, even though they represent important 
stakeholders directly affected by new policy proposals. It could be argued that 
selective partnership is a technique applied to ensure preferred ideas prevail, 
particularly in disputable subjects. More research would help to gain a better 
understanding of how selective partnership affects health systems, particularly equity 
in health. 
Lack of transparency appears to be a prevailing weakness in governance. It 
represents an obstacle for stakeholders to access documents that concern all 
citizens, even though there are no indications that transparency might harm the 
nation’s security. No simple explanation presents itself for the opacity, but one 
possibility might be an escape from the obligation to justify decisions or actions to 
the public, especially in disputable cases. 
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Although case studies, as in the case of this thesis, only allow for cautious 
conclusions, they may also provide broader implications and therefore contribute 
towards careful generalisation. In this respect, this thesis adds significantly to the 
current evidence base by suggesting that governance quality is an important 
correlate of health systems performance and identifies areas where future research 
is needed. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Indicators related to governance, financing 
and education used in the AFRO project.  
Table 15: Data related to governance, financing and education in the AFRO study. 
Location GNI¹ Financing² RLTC³ SEO4 Literacy5 Female6 Male7 
Algeria 5,940 188 52.3 57.6 69.9 94 96 
Angola 3,890 71 38.4 32.9 67.4 49 51 
Benin 1,250 46 52.3 36.9 34.7 73 87 
Botswana 11,730 635 81.6 58.2 81.2 85 83 
Burkina Faso 1,130 87 56.5 30.3 23.6 42 52 
Burundi 320 15 48.3 35.9 59.3 73 76 
Cameroon 2,060 80 43.3 44.7 67.9 65 74 
Cape Verde 2,590 278 86.1 47.2 81.2 87 88 
Central African Republic 690 55 42.7 34.9 48.6 38 53 
Chad 1,170 40 40.1 25.6 25.7 49 71 
Comoros 1,140 35 52.8 37.5  50 60 
Congo 2,420 31 43.5 48.7 84.4 52 58 
Cote d'Ivoire 1,580 66 36 42.9 48.7 49 61 
DRC 270 18 24.3 26.3 67.2 47 60 
Equatorial Guinea 16,620 280 43.3 48.5 87 83 91 
Eritrea 680 28 56.6 35.4  43 50 
Ethiopia 630 22 47.9 40.5 35.9 68 74 
Gabon 11,180 252 56.4 61.6 83.8 88 88 
Gambia 1,110 56 54.7 40.5  64 59 
Ghana 1,240 100 72.7 47.3 57.9 71 73 
Guinea 1,130 116 51 32.3 29.5 66 77 
Guinea-Bissau 460 40 34.6 23.3  37 53 
Kenya 1,470 105 56 48.6 73.6 76 75 
Lesotho 1,810 143 69.3 42.9 82.2 74 71 
Liberia 260 39 26.8 36.9 60 39 40 
Madagascar 870 34 57.3 39.4 70.7 96 96 
Malawi 690 70 64 40.7 64.1 94 88 
Mali 1,000 65 50 31.4 24 54 67 
Mauritania 1,970 45 58.8 36.8 51.2 82 78 
Mauritius 10,640 581 80.5 71.4 84.3 96 94 
Mozambique 660 56 50.4 36.7 38.7 73 79 
Namibia 4,770 338 76.7 57.4 85 79 74 
Niger 630 27 51.7 27.6 28.7 37 50 
Nigeria 1,410 50 48.2 40.7 69 59 68 
Rwanda 730 210 46 37.7 64.9 81 76 
Sao Tome and Principe 1,490 141 55.6 41.5 84.9 98 97 
Senegal 1,560 72 66.2 42.3 39.3 70 71 
Seychelles 14,360 812 80.4 70 91.8 100 99 
Sierra Leone 610 41 37.3 27.1 34.8 36 50 
South Africa 8,900 869 78.1 63.5 82.4 88 88 
Swaziland 4,700 353 56.9 46.5 79.6 79 78 
Togo 770 70 47.1 42 53.2 75 86 
Uganda 880 143 55.8 42.2 68.1   
Tanzania 980 45 59.6 43.4 69.4 97 98 
Zambia 1,140 62 60.5 43 68 94 90 
Zimbabwe  147 44.6 38.8 89.5 88 87 
¹ GNI:  Gross National Income (ppp int.$) 
² Financing: Per capita total expenditure on health (ppp int.$) 
³ RLTC:  Rule of Law and Corruption Index 
4 SEO:  Sustainable Economic Opportunity Index 
5 Literacy:  Adult Literacy (%) 
6 Female:  Percentage of net primary school female enrolment ratio (%) 
7 Male:  Percentage of net primary school male enrolment ratio (%) 
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Appendix 2: Indicators related to health outcome, health 
care and infrastructures used in the AFRO project. 
Table 16: Data related to health outcomes, health care and infrastructures in the AFRO study. 
Location U5MR¹ U5MR ratio² Attendance³ DTP34 Hospital beds5 Water6 Sanitation7 
Algeria 38  95 95 17 85 94 
Angola 260  45 83 1 51 50 
Benin 148 2.1 74 67 5 65 30 
Botswana 124  99 97 24 96 47 
Burkina Faso 204 1.4 54 99 9 72 13 
Burundi 181  34 74 7 71 41 
Cameroon 149 2.1 63 82 15 70 51 
Cape Verde 34  89 81 21 80 41 
Central African Republic 174 2.0 54 54 12 66 31 
Chad 209 0.9 14 20 4 48 9 
Comoros 68 1.5 62 75 17 85 35 
Congo 126 1.6 83 80 16 71 20 
Cote d'Ivoire 127  57 76 4 81 24 
DRC 205  61 87 11 46 31 
Equatorial Guinea 206  63 33 11 43 51 
Eritrea 74 1.5 28 97 12 60 5 
Ethiopia 123 1.4 6 73 2 42 11 
Gabon 91 1.7 86 38 20 87 36 
Gambia 114  57 90 8 86 52 
Ghana 120 1.5 50 94 9 80 10 
Guinea 161 1.9 38 75 3 70 19 
Guinea-Bissau 200  39 63 7 57 33 
Kenya 121 1.6 42 81 14 57 42 
Lesotho 132 1.4 55 83 13 78 36 
Liberia 235  51 88  64 32 
Madagascar 115 2.9 45 82 3 47 12 
Malawi 120 1.6 54 87 11 76 60 
Mali 217 1.7 41 68 3 60 45 
Mauritania 125 1.2 53 75 4 60 24 
Mauritius 15  99 97 30 100 94 
Mozambique 138 1.8 48 72 8 42 31 
Namibia 61 1.8 76 86 33 93 35 
Niger 253 1.3 18 39  42 7 
Nigeria 191 3.3 35 54 5 47 30 
Rwanda 160 1.7 28 97 16 65 23 
Sao Tome and Principe 96  81 97 32 86 24 
Senegal 116 2.9 52 94 1 77 28 
Seychelles 13   99 57 87  
Sierra Leone 269  43 64 4 53 11 
South Africa 69 4.0 92 97 28 93 59 
Swaziland 164  74 95 21 60 50 
Togo 107 1.7 62 88 9 59 12 
Uganda 134 1.6 42 64 11 64 33 
Tanzania 118 1.5 43 83 11 55 33 
Zambia 182 2.1 43 80 22 58 52 
Zimbabwe 85 1.3 69 62 30 81 46 
¹ U5MR:  Under-five mortality rate 
² U5MR ratio Ratio between the richest and the poorest U5MR quintiles 
³ Attendance: Birth attended by skilled health personnel (%) 
4 DTP3:  One year olds immunised with DTP3 (%) 
5 Hospital beds:  Number of hospital beds (per 10,000 population) 
6 Water:  Population with sustainable access to improved drinking water sources (%) 
7 Sanitation:  Population with sustainable access to improved sanitation (%)  
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Appendix 3: An interview protocol used in the Icelandic 
case. 
Interview protocol 
Facilitator is always the same, Anna Elísabet Ólafsdóttir 
Participants in interviews are two: the facilitator and the key informant. 
Participants in focus groups are a maximum of three, in addition to the facilitator. 
The facilitator hands out two copies of the letter “For Participants”. She then opens 
the discussions and introduces herself: 
First of all I would like to thank you for your participation and for sharing 
your valuable time and expertise with me. In interviews/focus groups like 
this, it is important that the same procedure is followed. I will therefore 
start the interview/meeting with a brief introduction. Before I do that, I want 
to make it very clear that you can withdraw from the research at any time. 
You have two copies of the same letter. I will sign them both, one is for 
you and one is for me. My copy will be filed and kept until the final report of 
this study has been reviewed. If you want to withdraw from the research 
you only need to call me or send me an e-mail. My phone number and e-
mail address are in the letter. 
Both papers are signed. A copy is given to the participants and one is filed and 
kept in the researcher’s file. 
I now start with the formal introduction: My name is Anna Elísabet 
Ólafsdóttir. I was the director general for the National Public Health 
Institute of Iceland from 2003 until 2008. In 2007 I gained permission to 
start my doctoral study at Brunel University in West London. This meeting, 
in which you have agreed to take part, is part of my doctoral study. 
I ask you to allow me to record the meeting so I can work on the interview 
later. You can refuse, in which case I will try my best to take notes 
throughout the meeting. 
My research is qualitative research about the impact of the Icelandic 
financial crisis on our national health system. It is based on interviews and 
focus groups with people working within the Icelandic health system. It is 
important to make it clear that all information shared at this meeting stays 
within the group. What will be said here is only for this group and my 
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research. I promise the group full confidentiality. No names will be given, 
ever. It is only me that has access to the records and they will be 
destroyed as soon as the research is finished. 
Participants are invited to ask questions if something is unclear 
Recording is started 
The facilitator opens the discussions: 
I have given you one sheet of paper which explains what I would like you 
to discuss in the meeting. 
The facilitator goes through the sheet and explains what the expectations are: 
I have put forward five issues I would like you to discuss, but participants 
can discuss other issues that they find important. 
Let’s start the meeting by discussing what the first governmental actions 
were when the banks were nationalised and it was clear that public 
spending on health had to be reduced. 
Participants are free to speak  
The facilitator allows people to talk freely and interrupts the participants as little as 
possible. She intervenes if the participants are starting discussions which are 
irrelevant to the research. She then tries to take them back to the agenda. The 
facilitator ensures the meeting covers the five issues on the agenda. 
As the meeting comes to an end, the facilitator thanks the participants for their 
valuable contributions and time. 
End of the meeting. 
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Appendix 4: An e-mail sent to key informants requesting 
their participation 
 
Content:  Research on how the economic meltdown has affected the health 
system and equity in health. 
With this letter, I would like to invite you to participate in qualitative research on the 
first impact of the Icelandic financial crisis on the health system and equity in health. 
The research is part of my DrPH study at Brunel University in London. My main 
supervisor is Professor Pascale Allotey, at Brunel University and Monash University 
in Malaysa and my local advisor is Professor Rúnar Vilhjálmsson at the University of 
Iceland. 
Economic downturns occur regularly throughout the world, but the situation in 
Iceland, whereby three of the biggest domestic banks were nationalised at the same 
time, has not many precedents in the world. The situation therefore gave rise to an 
opportunity to investigate how an economic meltdown affects an advanced health 
system. Research that has been conducted and covers financial crises and health 
has mainly comprised quantitative studies, in which the impacts on populations’ 
health and well-being have been investigated. Similar research will most probably be 
executed in Iceland later. 
The aim of my research is to examine the initial response towards the health system 
in an “emergency situation“ like the one Iceland is experiencing. The objective is to 
explore the decision making process in the first months after the economic crisis 
commenced; how the decisions were executed and who were involved in the 
process. Preliminary quantitative data from the health care services will also be 
examined. A study of this kind has not been conducted before, to the best of my 
knowledge, and it is therefore an important study for the global health research 
society. The aim is for the results to be published, both in domestic and international 
journals.  
This research is important to me for two reasons: (i) for personal motives, as this is 
part of my DrPH work and; (ii) it will hopefully add knowledge to the research and 
political society regarding what can be learned from the Icelandic case. Many 
countries are now facing economic downturns and have to adapt their health 
systems to recessions; this is one of the issues the World Health Organization is 
currently discussing.  
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I sincerely hope that you will participate in my research, which is an unstructured 
interview comprising five questions. I will ask for permission to record the interview. I 
will call you in the next few days and hope we can find a convenient time for an 
interview.  
Respectfully yours, 
Anna Elísabet Ólafsdóttir 
I am the former director of the National Public Health Institute of Iceland, but am now studying for my 
DrPH at Brunel University, West London. 
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Appendix 5: Participant’s information sheet in the Icelandic 
case. 
 
The impact of the economic downturn on the Icelandic health 
system 
Research at Brunel University in London. 
Researchers: Anna Elísabet Ólafsdóttir and Pascale Allotey 
Dear Participant, 
First of all, I want to thank you for participating in our research.  
I would appreciate an open and honest discussion about the impact of the economic 
downturn on the Icelandic health system. Please feel free to discuss the issue in the 
way you like, but we would appreciate it if you cover the following issues: 
• What were the first governmental reactions (especially by the health 
authorities), towards the health system as the economic crisis commenced? 
• How did the Ministry of Health and its minister cooperate with its institutions 
and other stakeholders in the aftermath of the economic crisis?  
• Discuss the decision making process and who/what were the key influential 
issues. 
• What were the conclusions and have the decisions been implemented? 
• Will the first action taken have any consequences for equity in health or 
access to health care? 
 
With your permission, the meeting will be recorded. I am the only person who will 
work with the audio recordings from the meeting. The records will be destroyed when 
the research has been approved by Brunel University. The research is anonymous.  
 
Participants can withdraw from the study at any time by contacting me via e-mail or 
telephone. 
 
Anna Elísabet Ólafsdóttir 
Mobile: +354 772 6607 
anna.olafsdottir@brunel.ac.uk 
P a g e  | 162 
 
Appendix 6: Ethics approval from Brunel University for the 
Icelandic case. 
 
 
 
 
School of Health Sciences and Social Care 
Head of School 
Professor Lorraine De Souza PhD, MSc, BSc, GradDipPhys, FCSP 
Chair of Rehabilitation 
 
Brunel University, Uxbridge, 
Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK 
Telephone +44 (0) 1895 274000 
Fax +44 (0)1895 269853 – Health 
       +44 (0)1985 274348 – Biosciences 
Web www.brunel.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Anna Olafsdottir, 
DrPH Student, 
School of Health Sciences & Social Care. 
 
1/12/11 
 
Dear Anna, 
 
I write formally to confirm that studies included within your DrPH thesis were reviewed and 
approved by the DrPH ethics review system that was in place prior to the commencement of 
your data collection. 
 
Yours sincerely 
Christina R. Victor 
Professor of Gerontology & Public Health, 
Director of the DrPH programme.  
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Appendix 7: An e-mail from the director of the National 
Bioethics Committee Office in Iceland 
 
 
Appendix 8: The course of events in the Icelandic case in chronological order. 
 
Figure 26: The course of events in the Icelandic case in chronological order. 
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Appendix 9: The situation in Iceland in February 2011 
The economic crisis has been an endurance test for the Icelandic nation. There is a 
prevailing tension within the society and the nation is divided on almost all proposals 
presented by the government. The Bishop of Iceland described the national mood as 
full of “suspicion” and “mistrust” and “lacking respect,” at the same time as he 
encouraged the nation to put aside feelings like “anger”, “hate” and “revenge” in re-
building society (Sigurbjornsson 2011). Unemployment has intensified and reached 
8.1% in 2010; an unemployment rate that has not been seen for decades 
(Directorate of Labour 2011). Poverty statistics are limited in Iceland, but there is a 
clear sign of increased distress and hardship for some households. Non-
governmental organisations, like the Church Aid and the Committee of Motherhood, 
have distributed food among those in most need and queues have elongated; a 
situation that the President of Iceland called a “shameful blot” on the nation in his 
New Year Address 2011: 
“The economic depression, the “collapse”, as we call it, has constrained the 
livelihoods of thousands of Icelanders such that every week, many people 
stand in line waiting for food handouts. Poverty has been with us for a long 
time, but widespread financial difficulties have now made queues for food a 
shameful blot on our society.” 
 Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, the President of Iceland (Grimsson 2011) 
Iceland’s governmental dept was, at the end of 2010 1,566 billion Icelandic kronur 
(USD$12, 5 billion) representing 104.8% of the country’s GDP (Statistics Iceland 
2011c), but one of the prerequisites for the International Monetary Fund’s (IMFs) 
assistance was a reduction in governmental expenditures. As a response to that, 
some governmental institutions and ministries have been merged including the 
Ministry of Health that was merged with the Ministry of Social Services, forming the 
Ministry of Welfare from January 1st 2011. The Ministry of Welfare was allocated 
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209.4 million Icelandic kronur (USD$1.7 million38) for its first operational year, which 
represents 41% of the state’s expected expenditure in 2011 (Ministry of Finance 
2011). This is a 9% reduction from the total amount allocated to both the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Social Services in 2010, when it was 231.8 million kronur 
(USD$1.9 million)39. 
Governmental financial allocations to hospitals have been reduced and hospital 
management requested to adjust the operational costs accordingly. The financial 
allocation to the biggest hospital in Iceland, Landspitali University Hospital, had 
already been decreased by 11% in the 2009 budget, with further reductions of 4% in 
the 2010 budget and a further 0.1% in 2011, as illustrated in Figure 27 (Icelandic 
Parliament 2007a; Icelandic Parliament 2008b; Icelandic Parliament 2009a; Icelandic 
Parliament 2010a). All numbers have been adjusted to 2011 using the consumer 
price index from Statistics Iceland (Statistics Iceland 2011b). Landspitali University 
Hospital has been run at a deficit for some years, but preliminary information 
suggests a 0.1% surplus in 2010 (Landspitali University Hospital 2011b). Costs have 
been cut by making 670 individuals redundant since early 2009, by reducing medical 
costs by 12%, by decreasing the number of  tests and examinations, resulting in a 
17% reduction and by reducing the length of hospitalisation per patient  from 6.9 
days to 6.7 days (Landspitali University Hospital 2011b).  
The reduction in financial allocations was at first milder at the second biggest 
hospital in Iceland, the District General Hospital in Akureyri (northern Iceland). 
Financial allocations were reduced by 6% in 2009, by a further 4% in 2010 and 0.5% 
in 2011 (Figure 27) (Icelandic Parliament 2007a; Icelandic Parliament 2008b; 
Icelandic Parliament 2009a; Icelandic Parliament 2010a). 
                                            
38 The currency rate used is USD$1 = 125 kronur, which is the same as  the currency rate used in the 
case study. However, the currency rate has changed and in January 2011 was USD$1 = 118 kronur. 
39 Numbers are taken directly from the state budgets, but it is important to keep in mind that the 
inflation rate was around 6% in 2010 (Statistics Iceland 2011b). 
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Figure 27: Financial allocations to the Landspitali University Hospital (columns) and the 
District General Hospital in Akureyri (northern Iceland) (line) according to the State budgets. 
All numbers are adapted to 2011 using the annual average consumer index provided by 
Statistics Iceland. 
The decrease in financial allocations to suburban and rural health care institutions 
was introduced later with the main reduction in financial allocations occurring in 2010 
to 2011. On average, rural health centres, often consisting of both a small hospital 
and a primary health care unit, had to shrink costs by 9% on average from 2010 to 
2011. Hardest hit was St. Josepsspitali in the capital area, which had to reduce costs 
by 27% between 2010 and 2011, leaving the organisation with only 65% of the 
financial resources it had in 2008. Other health centres were not hit as hard, as 
illustrated in Figure 28 (Icelandic Parliament 2007a; Icelandic Parliament 2008b; 
Icelandic Parliament 2009a; Icelandic Parliament 2010a). 
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Figure 28 : Financial allocations to selected health centres according to State budgets in 2008, 
2009, 2010 and 2011. All numbers are adapted to 2011 using the annual average consumer 
index presented by Statistics Iceland. 
In 2011, primary health care in the capital area was allocated 82% of the 2008 
budget. The primary health care institutions have applied different methods to adjust 
to the reduced budget and managed to keep costs within the allocations in 2010 
(Primary Health Care of the Capital Area 2010). Nevertheless, one of the problems 
that the primary health care institutions will have to face in the nearer future is a lack 
of general practitioners (GPs). Recently, the primary health care institution in the 
capital area advertised seven posts for GPs, but no-one applied for a single position 
(Directorate of Health 2010). Country wise, health care centres have tried to 
compensate for the lack of GPs by employing health professionals based on 
individual contracts or contracts with Landspitali University Hospital. In some 
instances, specialists have taken posts as GPs. 
Emigration reached new levels in both 2009 and 2010, summits that have not been 
seen in Iceland since the early 19th century (Statistics Iceland 2011a). Among these 
emigrants are health professionals, some of whom have moved away and taken up a 
new profession in another country, while others have taken part-time work abroad. 
Doctors, who are overseas developing different specialisations, are reluctant to 
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return to their home country, which exacerbates the situation. A survey among health 
professionals indicated that 20 medical doctors had moved away since early 2009 
(Directorate of Health 2010). In this context, it must be kept in mind that Iceland is a 
small country with less than 320,000 inhabitants. However, the number of physicians 
per 10,000 population was 37.3 in 2006 compared to 32.5 per 10,000 population in 
Europe (World Health Organization 2010).  
It is still too early to evaluate the impact of the economic crisis on health outcomes, 
but currently there are no indications of any major changes in health outcomes that 
could be attributed to the economic crisis (Landspitali University Hospital 2011a).  
On the contrary, there are some positive changes related to well known determinants 
of health, such as smoking habits and alcohol usage. Taxes on both tobacco and 
alcohol have been raised and consumption has reduced steadily since 2008, as 
presented in Table 17. 
Table 17: Changes in daily smoking habits and domestic sale of alcohol from 2008 to 2011. 
 2008 2009 2010 
Daily smoking among 15-79 years  (%)1  17.8 15.8 14.2 
Domestic sale of alcohol litres per inhabitant2  4.88 4.68 4.34 
1 from the Public Health Institute of Iceland 
2 from Statistics Iceland and the State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland 
It will be interesting to follow the adaptation of the Icelandic health system to the 
decreased budgets and observe how it will affect the population’s health in the long 
run. It is likely that the Icelandic health system, which has delivered one of the best 
health outcomes seen with a global perspective, was not run as efficiently as 
possible and that the economic crisis has provided an opportunity for health system 
reform, forcing the system to work more efficiently. In an OECD report from 2008, it 
was suggested that Iceland could reduce its health care spending by one-third 
without compromising health outcomes (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development 2008).  
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Appendix 10: Health system financing 
To ensure access to equitable and effective public health interventions and personal 
health care regardless of the ability to pay, a well structured financial mechanism is 
essential. Health system financing is based on the following three main principles: (i) 
revenue collection, (ii) pooling of resources (risk diversification) and (iii) purchasing 
of interventions (World Bank 2006). A framework demonstrating these three main 
principles and the respective flow of funds is shown in Figure 29 and will be 
discussed in more detail in this section. 
 
Figure 29: A framework for health care financing composed of revenue collection, risk pooling 
and health care purchasing. 
Revenue collection involves the process of collecting money from revenue sources, 
which are households, companies or external resources such as donors40. The 
revenue pool (risk pooling) can be state funded, based on revenues collected 
through general taxation and/or collected through salary related income in the case 
                                            
40 Donations are usually in the form of narrowly defined projects like building a hospital or immunising 
certain age groups, although lately some donors have been moving towards a more holistic approach, 
thus supporting long term development. 
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of mandatory social health insurance. The tax can either be a percentage of 
disposable income (progressive taxation) or a flat rate (proportional taxation). If the 
tax is flat and everybody pays the same amount, regardless of their financial 
capacity, those financially worse off will not be supported by those who are better off 
(rich-poor-subsidisation). An additional method of risk pooling is by voluntary 
contribution to private health insurance. Such contributions are usually related to risk 
assessment conducted by private insurance companies, with rising premiums for 
those at increased risk. Most high income countries use general taxation and/or 
mandatory social health insurance. Low income countries in general rely more on 
out-of-pocket payments (World Bank 2006; World Health Organization 2000). The 
state funded system, which is the most widespread form of health care financing, 
provides universal access to health care and is usually based on several financing 
resources. According to the World Bank, state funded systems have the potential to 
be the most equitable form of health care financing (World Bank 2006; Mackintosh 
2007). 
If the health system financing mechanism involves risk diversification (pooling), the 
revenues go into a pool of prepayments, which are redistributed to the members of 
the pool once they purchase health care services. Out-of-pocket payments are not 
part of the pooling mechanism and are thus not risk diversified. Out-of-pocket 
payments are based on the “pay as you use” principle, which is the most unsuitable 
form seen from an equity point of view. It gives no financial protection to the poor 
and is the most regressive form of health care financing (World Bank 2006; McIntyre 
2007; Mooney 2003). According to the World Health Organization, out-of-pocket 
payment should not be used unless no other alternatives are available (World Health 
Organization 2000). 
As demonstrated in Figure 29, risk pooling is a fundamental prerequisite for fair 
financing and equity in health. Its core purpose is to redistribute the financial 
resources collected from members of the pool, based on their needs. Risk pooling 
therefore takes unpredictable individual financial risk, associated with the purchase 
of health care services, and makes it predictable, thus protecting individuals from 
potential catastrophic financial consequences of illnesses (World Bank 2006). Risk 
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pooling is based on the idea of cross subsidisation between income groups, whereby 
the rich support the poor and the low risk individuals support those who are high risk. 
This kind of pooling mechanism even allows the poor low risk individual to subsidise 
the rich high risk individual in some cases; societies that are interested in high levels 
of equity are usually indifferent to who is subsidised by whom as long as everybody 
accesses the treatment they need to live a healthy life (World Health Organization 
2000).  
It is reasonable to state that the bigger the pool, the more risk diversification will be 
achieved. However, this does not imply that small pools are of little value as, 
irrespective of their size, pools will always diversify risk and thus be beneficial to 
participants. Participation in a pool, no matter the size, is always better than out-of-
pocket payments.  
Purchasing of health care interventions/services is the ultimate part of the health 
system financing mechanism. The purchasing part plays an essential role in the 
overall efficiency of the health system, as it determines the quantity and the quality of 
the health system service provided for the money spent. Purchasing, which can be 
by both public and private health care providers, should be based on a well-
structured incentive-based payment system, preferably featuring separation between 
the purchaser and the buyer (World Bank 2006).  
Privately owned health care institutions are usually set up for profit, which means 
following the principles of the free market;41 however, because of inherent market 
failures in health care, it is generally accepted that it cannot solely be operated along 
free market principles (Wonderling, Gruen & Black 2010; Mooney 2009; Folland, 
Goodman & Stano 2007; Hsiao 1995; Mooney 2003). One of the significant market 
failures is the asymmetry of information, which exists because of the gap in 
knowledge between health care providers and the consumers (patients) 
(Wonderling, Gruen & Black 2010). Well educated health professionals have the 
advantage of more and better information than patients, leaving the latter with 
                                            
41 The term “free market” is used to mean an economic mechanism for ensuring efficient allocation of 
resources. 
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inadequate information to make informed decisions in their best interests. If a free 
market is to be efficient, equal information for both the provider and the purchaser is 
a prerequisite (Wonderling, Gruen & Black 2010; Mooney 2009). The doctor must act 
as an agent and inform the patient of the best possible treatment; a problem often 
called the agency challenge. The asymmetry of information and agency challenge 
has the potential to influence demand, making it supply-induced, a failure that must 
be addressed when establishing a comprehensive purchasing mechanism that is 
based on appropriate mixtures of incentives and cost-effectiveness calculations 
(Mooney 2009; Wonderling, Gruen & Black 2010). 
There are several other failures in the health care market that will not be discussed 
in this thesis42. It will only be emphasised at this point that imperfection in the health 
care market requires governments to intervene and take action to compensate for 
the market failures.  
                                            
42 Market failures within the health care market are also related to public health: “externalities” and 
“public goods”. Externalities play a role when it comes to communicable disease and caring. If 
treatment of communicable diseases is left to individual consumption, it will lead to under-
consumption, which is bad for society as a whole (Mooney 2009). Public good is a term used for 
goods and services that can be consumed simultaneously by everyone and from which no one can be 
excluded (Wonderling, Gruen & Black 2010). An example of public goods within the health sector is 
the fight against malaria transmission when areas are sprayed. The free market can hardly deal with 
such situations, as people hope to benefit without having to contribute to the cost, leaving us with the 
incentives for “free-riding” (Wonderling, Gruen & Black 2010). In fact, everybody would benefit from 
this, which justifies governmental intervention (Mooney 2009). 
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Appendix 11: Participants’ information sheet in the 
Malaysian case. 
 
 
                     Participant Information Sheet 
Study title: The impact of health financing policies on health system performance 
and equity: the case of Malaysia. 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide whether 
you will participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being 
carried out and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not 
clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you 
wish to take part. 
Principal Researcher:  
Ms. Anna Elisabet Olafsdottir (Brunel), e-mail: anna.olafsdottir@brunel.ac.uk 
Academic Supervisors:  
Dr. Subhash Pokhrel (Brunel), e-mail: subhash.pokhrel@brunel.ac.uk 
Professor Daniel Reidpath (Monash), e-mail: daniel.reidpath@med.monash.edu.my 
Professor Pascale Allotey (Monash), e-mail: pascale.allotey@med.monash.edu.my  
Chair of the School Research Ethics Committee:  
Elizabeth Cassidy, e-mail: elizabeth.cassidy@brunel.ac.uk 
The study is a doctoral study towards the Doctorate in Public Health (DrPH) 
programme at Brunel University, West-London in cooperation with Monash 
University in Malaysia. This study has been approved by the School of Health 
Sciences and Social Care Research Ethics Committee, Brunel University, UK. 
The aim of the study is to analyse Malaysian health financing policies with the 
purpose of exploring how their decision making process and implementations have 
affected health system performance and the dispersion of health expenditure 
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between users, insurance, the government and others. As you have been an active 
player in public health policy, it would be of great value for our research if you took 
part in it. As participation is entirely voluntary, it is up to you to decide whether or not 
to take part. If you do decide to participate, you will be given this information sheet to 
keep and be asked to sign a consent form. You are still free to withdraw at any time 
and without giving a reason. 
Your participation would be through an interview, which takes a maximum of one 
hour and will take place at your place of work or in another mutually agreed 
convenient location. We would appreciate an open and honest discussion about 
health financing policies in Malaysia, how the policy process has occurred, who has 
contributed to the policy making and how. Please feel free to discuss the matter in 
the way you like, but we would appreciate it if the discussion could touch upon the 
following questions: 
1. Have the health financing policies taken into consideration various needs or 
requests from different ethnic or socio-economic groups or other valid issues 
according to the relevant contexts? 
2. Has the decision making process involved (fair) partnership and who have 
been the key influential actors? 
3. What is your opinion of the performance of the Malaysian health system 
(health outcomes and distribution)?  
 
We hope you will allow us to record the discussion, as it will make subsequent 
analysis easier. Anna Elisabet Olafsdottir is the only person who will work with the 
transcripts. The records and transcripts based on them will be destroyed when the 
final report has been approved by Brunel’s Thesis Advisory Committee. The study is 
anonymous and participants will not be identified in any documents related to the 
study. However, anonymised direct quotations might be used in the final report and 
articles based on it. Participants can withdraw from the study at all stages. If you 
wish to take part, please contact Anna Elisabet Olafsdottir through e-mail at 
anna.olafsdottir@brunel.ac.uk or by calling +354 772 6607. 
 
On behalf of the research team, I would like to thank you for participating in our 
research. 
 
Anna Elisabet Olafsdottir 
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Appendix 12: Ethics approval from Brunel University for 
the Malaysian case. 
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Appendix 13: Monash supporting letter. 
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Appendix 14: Price list and deposit requirements at Kuala 
Lumpur hospital. 
 
Table 18: A price list from Kuala Lumpur hospital. 
Class Daily Ward Charges (RM) 
 Public/Private firm (RM) Government/Pensioner (RM) Non Citizen (RM) 
1 
80 ($22.15) (1 bedded) 10($3.14) / 5 ($1.57) 160 ($50.29) 
60 ($18.86) (2 bedded) 8 ($2.51) / 4 ($1.26) 115 ($36.15) 
40 ($12.57) (≥4 bedded) 6 ($1.89) / 3 ($0.94) 80 ($22.15) 
2 30 ($9.43) 3 ($0.94) / 1.5 ($0.47) 60 ($18.86) 
3 3 ($0.94) FREE 40 ($12.57) 
 
A down payment is required as a guarantee for health care services, as shown in 
Table 19: 
Table 19: Deposit requirements for admission at Kuala Lumpur hospital. 
Citizen 
Ward Class 
Medical 
(RM) 
Surgery 
(RM) 
Maternity and O&G 
(RM) 
First class 700 ($220.02) 1100 ($345.42) 800 ($251.22) 
Second class 200 ($62.86) 400 ($125.61) 350 ($110.00) 
Third class 20 ($6.29) 30 ($9.43) 15 ($4.71) 
Non – Citizen 
First class 1400 ($439.63) 2200 ($690.82) 1400 ($439.63) 
Second class 600 ($118.41) 1000 ($314.02) 1000 ($314.02) 
Third class 400 ($125.61) 800 ($251.22) 800 ($251.22) 
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Appendix 15: Full analysis of the Malaysia Plans. 
The 7th Malaysia Plan (1996 – 2000) 
Political context: The political intention at the time the plan was made was to 
increase and accelerate corporatisation and privatisation of hospitals and medical 
services (Economic Planning Unit 1996a). The political ideology resembled the neo-
liberalistic philosophy that privatisation and corporatisation increases efficiency in the 
health care system and that it helps to retain qualified and experienced manpower. 
At the same time, the government announced that it would gradually reduce its role 
in health care provision, although ongoing provision of public health care services 
was pledged. 
Economic context: The plan predicted an increase in future health care costs which 
would require reconstruction of the health system financing mechanism. The 7th 
Malaysia Plan therefore proposed the implementation of a health financing scheme 
during the planning period (1996-2000). The aim of the health financing scheme was 
to reduce the financial and administrative burden of the public sector - who was to 
take over the cost burden was not documented in the plan. This was not the first time 
a health financing scheme has been on the agenda in Malaysia. It had been under 
discussion for at least 10 years (Chee 2008) at that time.  
Public health interventions were prioritised in the 7th Malaysia Plan, which highlighted 
health promotion and prevention in order to reduce future expenditure on curative 
health care. This was to be done by improving health education and mass media 
campaigns, as well as community based programmes.  
Equity context: The main objective of the Malaysia Plans has always been to 
reduce poverty and income disparities between ethnic groups, income groups and 
regions and to emphasise growth with equity (Economic Planning Unit 1996a). 
Nevertheless, the income disparity widened between social groups during the 6th 
plan period (1990 – 1995) (Economic Planning Unit 1996a). The 7th plan pledged 
unhindered access to health care services for low-income groups, assured through 
governmental assistance, and emphasised the intention to construct new health 
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centres in rural areas, as well as to increase numbers of mobile dispensaries, with 
the aim of extending health services in underserved parts of Malaysia (Economic 
Planning Unit 1996a). 
The plan recognised an increase in the utilisation of health care services from 
migrant workers, who were claimed to “affect the provision of health care for 
Malaysians”  (Economic Planning Unit 1996a, p. 540). The plan presented the 
political intention to charge migrant workers in Malaysia twice the amount paid by 
local people for health care services.43 
The 8th Malaysia Plan ( 2001 – 2005) 
Political context: During the 7th Malaysia Plan there was an increase in public and 
private health care facilities in Malaysia. However, the private sector was almost 
entirely located in urban areas (97.8%) and focused on providing specialised health 
care services using modern facilities (Economic Planning Unit 2001). To meet the 
shortage of health care services in rural areas, the 8th plan pledged enhanced public 
health services in these areas. Nonetheless, the private sector was also encouraged 
to expand its services to complement the public sector (Economic Planning Unit 
2001). To ensure access to private health care services, the government committed 
to improving regulations under the Private Health care Facilities and Services Act 
from 1998. 
Economic context: For reasons not explained in the plan, the health financing 
scheme was not implemented during the 7th plan as intended and reappeared in the 
8th plan. It was highlighted that, in order to ensure quality health care at a reasonable 
cost in both the public and private health care sectors, a new mechanism was 
needed (Economic Planning Unit 2001). It was stated in the plan that “Cost sharing 
concepts through health care financing schemes will be introduced to provide 
consumers with a wider choice in the purchase of health services from both the 
public and private sector. In this regard, a suitable mechanism to institute and 
                                            
43 The 7th Malaysia Plan presented the intention to recruit more foreign nurses to meet the shortage of 
nurses in Malaysia. No comments were made on how they would be charged if they needed to use 
Malaysian health care services (Economic Planning Unit 1996a). 
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manage a health care financing scheme will be implemented” (Economic Planning 
Unit 2001, p.495). 
Equity context: Attention was given to the problem of the unequal distribution of 
manpower within the health care sector. The intention was to make an effort to 
address the shortage of health care personnel in general, but especially within the 
public health sector and in rural areas (Economic Planning Unit 2001). The unequal 
distribution of manpower was, inter alia, caused by increased number of  
professionals seeking jobs within the more lucrative private sector, which was 
primarily located in urban areas. In order to achieve a more equal distribution of 
health care personnel, the aim was to improve terms and conditions for health 
professionals and to provide a more conducive working environment, as well as to 
upgrade facilities in the public hospitals and clinics. 
The 9th Malaysia Plan ( 2006 – 2010) 
Political context: A political objective of improving the nation’s health is presented 
in the 9th Malaysia Plan and the government claims it will continue to provide 
facilities and to run programmes to improve the health status of the country. 
However, greater individual responsibility is said to be crucial to achieving better 
health (Economic Planning Unit 2006).  Privatisation was still privileged in the 9th 
Malaysia Plan, although the exposition is more cautious. The plan pledged 
commitment from the Ministry of Health to continue to be the main provider of health 
care services for the nation (Economic Planning Unit 2006). This statement 
contradicts the statement in the 7th plan in which the intention was to gradually 
reduce the public sector’s role in health care provision. 
Economic context: The health financing scheme was not implemented during the 
period of the 8th Malaysia Plan as scheduled and no explanation was given as to why 
this did not occur. The health financing scheme therefore reappeared, once again, in 
the 9th plan44 with the words “The implementation of the health financing mechanism 
                                            
44 The health financing scheme was not implemented as pledged in the 9th plan and reappears once 
again in the most recent plan, the 10th Malaysia Plan (Malaysia Plan 2011-2015; Economic Planning 
Unit 2010) 
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will further enhance accessibility and equity through the provision of high quality, 
efficient, integrated and comprehensive health coverage for the population” 
(Economic Planning Unit 2006, p.434). 
Equity context: The government failed to improve the ratio of facility to population in 
rural areas, but it managed to increase the number of doctors serving the population. 
At the beginning of the 9th Malaysia Plan (2005), one doctor severed 1,287 people 
but in 1995 the number was 2,153 individuals. The disparity between geographic 
areas had reduced although the difference was still considerably high; in 1999, 372 
people were served by one doctor in Kuala Lumpur, while the number was 4,120 to 
one doctor in Sabah. In 2005 this difference had been reduced, with one doctor 
serving 396 people in Kuala Lumpur and 2,716 in Sabah (Economic Planning Unit 
2001; Economic Planning Unit 2006). 
No attempt was made to address the disparities in health outcomes between the 
different ethnic groups in the 9th plan. On the other hand, the ethnic groups are 
mentioned in the context of income disparities. It was said to be urgent to reduce 
socio-economic disparities, or national unity might be threatened and affect social 
stability (Economic Planning Unit 2006). In the 9th plan, special attention is paid to 
reducing asset and wealth disparities among the various ethnic groups: “Bumiputera 
equity ownership is targeted to attain between 20 to 25 per cent by 2010 in order to 
reach the ultimate target of at least 30 per cent by 2020” and “Appropriate measures 
will also be introduced to increase Indian equity ownership to 3 per cent by 2020” 
(Economic Planning Unit 2006 p.36).  
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Appendix 16: An overview of the analysis of the problems, 
politics, policies and actors in the Malaysian case. 
 
Table 20: An overview of the analysis of the process and actors in Malaysia. 
Multiple 
stream 
theory 
Main findings of the three independent streams Policy entrepreneurs  
Problem 
stream 
Epidemiological transition causing both communicable and non-
communicable diseases to be of burden in Malaysia. Positive 
development in average health outcomes, measured as life expectancy 
and under-five mortality rate, but less is known (at least publicly) about 
distribution of health outcomes in relation to socio-economic groups. 
Although health care services at public institutions are subsidised, the 
government only covers half of the total expenditure on health. The rest 
is paid by private expenditure, of which 80% is out-of-pocket 
expenditure. Specialised health care services might cause financial 
difficulties for patients, who then occasionally have to plea for financial 
assistance from their fellow countrymen in the newspapers. National 
survey indicates different health expenditure depending on: (i) ethnic 
groups, (ii) mean household income and, (iii) place of living. 
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Politics 
stream 
No major changes have occurred in the political arena with a 
“monopolistic” political situation in which the same political party has 
held the leading position in parliament since independence, over half a 
century. Dominant political ideologies are based on neo-liberal 
philosophy which has induced privatisation in the health sector. 
Controversy seen in relation to ethnicity; the government runs the 
campaign “One Malaysia” at the same time as policy papers aim to 
favour selected ethnic groups. Freedom of expression is limited and 
newspapers are said to be linked to ruling parties, which forces free 
associations to rely more on blogs and their own websites to 
disseminate their opinions. Free association criticises the authority for 
lack of fair partnership (selective partnership) and opaque working 
procedures. 
Policy 
stream 
The government has received several proposals on how a new health 
financing scheme might be structured, both from paid consultants and 
free associations like the Coalition Against Health Care Privatisation. 
None have been deemed feasible based on political views, although 
some advice has been based on the government’s policy papers like the 
“Vision for Health” policy. 
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Appendix 17: Health systems performance in sub-Saharan 
Africa: governance, outcome and equity  
 
See the next 8 pages. 
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Health systems performance in sub-Saharan
Africa: governance, outcome and equity
Anna E Olafsdottir1*, Daniel D Reidpath2, Subhash Pokhrel1 and Pascale Allotey2
Abstract
Background: The literature on health systems focuses largely on the performance of healthcare systems
operationalised around indicators such as hospital beds, maternity care and immunisation coverage. A broader
definition of health systems however, needs to include the wider determinants of health including, possibly,
governance and its relationship to health and health equity. The aim of this study was to examine the relationship
between health systems outcomes and equity, and governance as a part of a process to extend the range of
indicators used to assess health systems performance.
Methods: Using cross sectional data from 46 countries in the African region of the World Health Organization, an
ecological analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between governance and health systems
performance. The data were analysed using multiple linear regression and a standard progressive modelling
procedure. The under-five mortality rate (U5MR) was used as the health outcome measure and the ratio of U5MR
in the wealthiest and poorest quintiles was used as the measure of health equity. Governance was measured using
two contextually relevant indices developed by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.
Results: Governance was strongly associated with U5MR and moderately associated with the U5MR quintile ratio.
After controlling for possible confounding by healthcare, finance, education, and water and sanitation, governance
remained significantly associated with U5MR. Governance was not, however, significantly associated with equity in
U5MR outcomes.
Conclusion: This study suggests that the quality of governance may be an important structural determinant of
health systems performance, and could be an indicator to be monitored. The association suggests there might be
a causal relationship. However, the cross-sectional design, the level of missing data, and the small sample size,
forces tentative conclusions. Further research will be needed to assess the causal relationship, and its
generalizability beyond U5MR as a health outcome measure, as well as the geographical generalizability of the
results.
Background
In the World Health Report 2000, a health system is
discussed in terms of “all the organizations, institutions
and resources that are devoted to producing health
actions” [1] (p xi). Notwithstanding this very broad
description of a health system, when it comes to the
analysis of health systems performance, the operational
(nonprocess) approaches have tended to be narrow,
focusing on those aspects of the system that relate
directly to the delivery of healthcare. This is particularly
apparent in the analyses of health systems performance
in high income countries [2-5]; and does not appear to
have been materially influenced by the development of
wider frameworks of analysis [6].
In high income countries the lack of distinction
between a health system and a healthcare system may be
appropriate. With few exceptions, the OECD countries
and the high income non-OECD countries have stable
governments and well developed national infrastructure,
including functioning commercial and financial systems,
embedded utility grids delivering clean water and energy;
systems that facilitate communication and transportation;
liveable national housing; a functioning judicial and edu-
cational system; etc. In these settings, population health
gains are part of a marginal game often based on
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incremental improvements to an existing healthcare sys-
tem that operates within the established context of high
quality national infrastructure [7,8]. It is surprising,
therefore, that the analysis of health systems performance
in low income countries is also based largely on an analy-
sis of systems that deliver care, despite the absence of the
wider infrastructure required to support functioning
healthcare systems [9-12].
Some would explain the focus by arguing the inappro-
priateness of looking at non-healthcare factors, because
an analysis of non-healthcare factors effectively holds
the health sector to ransom - making it accountable for
those determinants of health that do not fall within its
direct control [13]. The difficulty with this position is
the overwhelming body of evidence that demonstrates
the critical role of socio-economic, environmental, and
other structural determinants of health [14]. Further-
more, ignoring broader structural factors assumes that
one can “strengthen” a health system without regard to
the economic, social, and physical context within which
the delivery of healthcare is supposed to occur. If the
health system is not held accountable for these larger
determinants, argued Murray and Frenk, there will be
no advocate in a country for addressing them (p.727)
[13]. If not us then who?
For high income countries the question of the appro-
priateness of using the healthcare system as a proxy for
a health system more broadly is moot [8]. In low
income countries, however, with poor infrastructure,
often weak political, commercial, financial and regula-
tory systems, to exclude non-healthcare system artefacts
from the analysis of health systems performance relies
on a much more tenuous foundation. It is, thus, unlikely
that health systems performance in low income coun-
tries can be reduced to an analysis of the incremental
health gains associated with improvements to the
healthcare system. This point is clearly demonstrated
again by ongoing challenges to universal access to
healthcare [15].
In this article, guided by the broader definition of
health systems provided by the World Health Organiza-
tion, we attempt to refocus the analysis of health sys-
tems performance on one particular non-healthcare
related issue. Specifically, we are interested in the rela-
tionship between governance and the overall perfor-
mance of the health system. Other structural factors
such as the finance and the economy [16], the education
system [17,18], and physical infrastructure [19], have all
been shown to be related to health systems perfor-
mance. Governance, however, has emerged relatively
recently as a measurable, structural artefact of countries
that could be related to performance in a number of
domains [20,21], including health [22]; but there is rela-
tively little research that has looked at this.
Methods
An ecological analysis of cross sectional data was per-
formed to look at the association between governance
and health systems performance in the countries of the
WHO African region (AFRO), independent of other
known healthcare and non healthcare artefacts. The
AFRO region was chosen because of the concentration
of low income countries and the low probability that
many of the countries will achieve the 2015 MDG tar-
gets [23]. The analysis was carried out using the most
up-to-date, publicly available country-level data from
the Statistical Information System of the World Health
Organization (WHOSIS) [24] and the Mo Ibrahim
Foundation (MIF) [25].
Measures
Outcomes
In keeping with the approach articulated in the World
Health Report 2000 (p. xi) [1] health systems perfor-
mance was operationalised in terms of the two separate
dimensions: health outcome (i.e., death and morbidity)
and health equity (i.e., the fairness of the distribution of
health outcomes). The specific measure chosen for
health outcome was a country’s under five mortality rate
(U5MR); i.e., the probability of a child’s death before
reaching the age of five. Although U5MR is a narrow
operational definition of a population’s health outcome,
measures of child health such as the U5MR and the
Infant Mortality Rate have been successfully used as
general indicators of population health because they are
sensitive to both structural changes and to rising epi-
demics that affect the wider population [26-29]. Data on
U5MR were available for all 46 countries in the AFRO
region.
A fair or equitable health system would be one that
produces equivalent health outcomes for the rich and
the poor [30,31]. Using the U5MR as a direct measure
of health outcome, health equity was operationalised as
the ratio of the U5MR in the wealthiest quintile to that
of the U5MR in the poorest quintile. Data on the quin-
tile ratio of the U5MR were available for 30 of the 46
countries in the AFRO region. Combining the two
dimensions of health outcome and equity, a health sys-
tem that was performing well would have a low U5MR
and a U5MR quintile ratio approaching 1.
Governance
Governance was defined here as “a process whereby
societies or organizations make their important deci-
sions, determine whom they involve in the process and
how they render account” (p1) [32]. Governance can be
thought of as a structural artefact of a society; notwith-
standing the fact that it is defined in terms of process.
This is because governance occurs within social struc-
tures created for the purposes of facilitating the process.
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Two AFRO-relevant sources of governance measures are
available: the World Bank governance index [20] and
the Ibrahim Index of African Governance [25]. These
indices are based on data drawn from a diversity of
international organisations, non-governmental organisa-
tions, survey institutes and think tanks. The Ibrahim
Index was selected because of its greater contextual rele-
vance to the AFRO region. It was developed in coopera-
tion with the Harvard Kennedy School and it aggregates
third party data (inter alia from the World Bank) and
original data to create an index that ranks countries in
Africa according to governance quality. The index
assesses nations against 57 different measures. As the
total index included child mortality two sub-indicators
from the 2006 Ibrahim Index that did not include child
mortality in the measure were used to operationalise
governance: (i) “Rule of Law, Transparency and Corrup-
tion” (RLTC), and (ii) “Sustainable Economic Opportu-
nity” (SEO)i) [25]. RLTC captures governance matters
such as the ratification of legal norms, judicial indepen-
dence, and public sector corruption. SEO captures mat-
ters such as wealth creation, macroeconomic stability,
and the “arteries of commerce” including the extent of
the sealed road network, and the availability of
electricity.
The Index as a whole, and the sub-scale were recently,
independently analysed and found to be both reliable (i.
e., the scales could be independently reproduced) and
valid (i.e., they captured, and reflected the position of
the countries on the specific “pillars” of governance)
[33].
Covariates
Four additional, potential confounding factors were
included in the analysis reflecting healthcare, financing/
economy, education and physical infrastructure. For
each factor a number of indicators were used. The
choice of indicators was driven in part by pragmatics,
including the availability of the data, and concordance
with the underlying factor.
For healthcare there were three indicators: (i) the per-
centage of births attended by skilled health personnel,
(ii) the percentage of one year olds immunised with
three doses of diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis
(DTP3), and (iii) the number of hospital beds per 10,000
populations. The first two of these indicators were most
directly relevant to child health, but could broadly be
regarded as indicators of the capacity of the wider
healthcare system. For financing/economy two indica-
tors were considered: (i) per capita total expenditure on
health, and (ii) gross national income (GNI) per capita.
Both financing indicators were measured in interna-
tional dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity (ppp
int.$). For education three indicators were considered:
(i) adult literacy, (ii) the net primary school enrolment
ratio male, and (iii) the net primary school enrolment
ratio female. Net primary school enrolment ratio is the
ratio of the number of children of official school age
enrolled in school to the number of children of official
school age in the population. The net primary school
enrolment ratio male was ultimately excluded because it
was highly correlated with the net primary school enrol-
ment ratio female (r = .95). For physical infrastructure
two indicators were included: (i) the percentage of the
population with sustainable access to safe drinking
water sources, and (ii) the percentage of the population
with sustainable access to adequate sanitation.
Analysis
The analysis of the relationship between U5MR and the
U5MR quintile ratio, and governance and the other cov-
ariates was conducted using multiple linear regression.
The analysis was complicated by issues of confounding,
associated with moderate to high inter-correlations
between the covariates and governance, and missing
data. This is discussed in more detail in the Results and
related issues are described in the following.
The U5MR data were available for all the 46 countries
in the AFRO region but the quintile ratio data was only
available for 30 out of the 46 countries. The final sample
size in the multivariate analyses was affected by missing
data in the covariates.
A small sample size relative to the number of inde-
pendent variables or covariates in a multivariate analysis
can result in (a) over fitting, (b) unstable estimated coef-
ficients, and (c) in the case of this analysis, an increased
likelihood of a Type II error. A Type II error arises
when one fails to reject the null hypothesis when it is
actually false. A small sample size and many covariates
reduce the likelihood of identifying a significant relation-
ship between the health systems performance measures
and the governance measures, even if such a relation-
ship truly exists. Thus, the worst case scenario is that
the analysis described is conservative, and fails to iden-
tify a relationship where one actually exists. This does
not affect the risk of a Type I error, of falsely rejecting
the null hypothesis.
Three linear models were fitted separately for U5MR
and the U5MR quintile ratio. The first model measured
the strength of the unadjusted bivariate association
between the health systems performance, governance
and the covariates reflecting healthcare, finance, educa-
tion, and physical infrastructure. The second model
measured the strength of the adjusted association
between the health systems performance and the covari-
ates in the absence of the measures of governance. The
third model measured the strength of the association
between the health systems performance and govern-
ance after adjusting for the covariates reflecting
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healthcare, finance, education, and physical infrastruc-
ture. The estimated standardised coefficients (b’s) from
the regression analysis are reported, because they sim-
plify the comparison of the relative contribution of the
independent variables and covariates. A sensitivity analy-
sis was conducted to look at, among other things, the
change in the estimates when covariates that reduced
the sample size (due to missing data) were removed,
and the relationship between U5MR and the U5MR
quintile ratio with missing data in the covariates.
Prior to any formal analyses, GNI per capita was log-
transformed to enable a better fit to the outcome
measures.
Missing Data
Missing was an issue for U5MR and the quintile-ratio
data because of the small size of the data set, and the
percentage of the countries that did not have complete
data for all covariates. Multiple imputation of missing
data was attempted, but the data models failed to con-
verge [34].
An examination of the relationship between U5MR
and missing covariates, for countries with and without
missing data, showed no significant relationship. Similar
checks were made for the quintile ratio. Missing data,
nonetheless, remain a concern and this is discussed
further.
Results
An overview of the governance factor (two indicators),
and the four covariate factors (a total of 9 indicators) as
well as descriptive statistics for U5MR and the U5MR
quintile ratio are shown in Table 1.
The U5MR ranged between 13 and 269 per 1,000 live
births; and the quintile ratio ranged between 0.9 (slightly
better outcomes for the poorest than the wealthiest
quintile) and 4 (much worse outcomes for the poorest
quintile). The countries wealth and therefore the ability
to spend on health differed vastly. GNI per capita ran-
ged from USD$260 to USD$16,620 and health expendi-
ture from USD$15 to USD$869.
As a preliminary step, the relationship between the
two selected dimensions of health systems performance
(U5MR and the U5MR quintile ratio) was examined
visually and using exploratory statistics. There was no
discernible relationship between the two health systems
performance measures and the correlation was low (r =
-.15; 95% CI: -.49-.22). This reinforced the notion of
separate outcome and equity dimensions in health sys-
tems performance.
Health Outcome (U5MR)
The U5MR data was modelled first (Table 2). Model 1
shows the bivariate relationship between, U5MR, the 9
covariates, and the two measures of governance. In a
bivariate analysis, the parameter estimate (b coefficient)
is the same as Pearson’s product moment correlation
(r). All 9 covariates, and the measures of governance
were significantly associated with U5MR. The two gov-
ernance measures had the strongest bivariate associa-
tions with U5MR (~.7), followed by sustainable access
to safe drinking water, the percentage of female children
enrolled in school, and the number of hospital beds per
10,000.
Model 2 represents the multivariate model of the lin-
ear relationship between U5MR and the covariates in
the absence of the measures of governance. This model
was included so that a comparison could be made
between it and a fuller model including the measures of
governance. This would help to illuminate the strength
of the relationship between U5MR and governance (i.e.,
when Model 2 and Model 3) are compared. Only 37 of
the 46 countries which had U5MR data were available
for this analysis, because of missing data in the covari-
ates. Model 2 accounted for around 60% of the available
variance (Adjusted R2 = .59). After adjustment, only two
of the covariates retained a significant association with
U5MR, sustainable access to safe drinking water (b =
-.41, p = .03) and the percentage of female children
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for U5MR, U5MR quintile
ratio and indicators used in the analysis.
Health Systems Performance n Mean SD Min Max
U5MR1 46 138.5 62.5 13 269
U5MR quintile ratio 30 1.8 0.66 0.9 4
Healthcare
Births Attend % 45 55.5 22.2 6 99
DTP32 Immunisation % 46 77.5 18.7 20 99
Hospital Beds/10,000 44 13.7 11.2 1 57
Finance
GNI3 (untransformed) $ 45 2,923 3,995 260 16,620
Health Expenditure $ 46 153 200 15 869
Education
Enrollments (female) % 45 69.7 20 36 100
Enrollments (male) % 45 74.1 15.8 40 99
Adult Literacy % 42 62.2 20.6 23.6 91.8
Physical Infrastructure
Water % 46 67.7 16.2 42 100
Sanitation % 45 34.5 19.7 5 94
Governance
RLTC4 46 54.2 14.4 24.3 86.1
SEO5 46 41.8 10.9 23.3 71.4
1U5MR: Under five mortality rate.
2DTP3: Three doses of diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis.
3GNI: Gross National Income.
4RLTC: Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption.
5SEO: Sustainable Economic Opportunity.
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enrolled in school (b = -.57, p < .001). The negative
coefficients indicated that improvements in the availabil-
ity of water, and improvements in the enrolment of
female children in school, were significantly associated
with reductions in U5MR. These two significant associa-
tions were in the expected direction.
Model 3 replicated Model 2, with the addition of the
two governance measures (n = 37). The model accounted
for around 16% more of the available variance (Adjusted
R2 = .76), and identified a significant association between
one of the governance indicators (sustainable economic
opportunities; b = -.90, p < .001) and U5MR, after adjust-
ment for the other governance indicator (rule of law,
transparency and corruption; b = -.12, p = .42) and the
other covariates. The governance indicator for sustain-
able economic opportunities (SEO) had the largest stan-
dardised coefficient of any of the variables included in
the analysis. Female enrolments remained significant (b =
-.32, p = .02), while sustainable access to safe drinking
water was no longer significant in the fully adjusted
model (b = -.10, p = .52). GNI per capita, however,
became significant in the fully adjusted model (b = .41, p
= .04) and showed, counter intuitively, that increases in
GNI per capita were associated with increases in U5MR.
The kind of instability in parameters seen here is a
common issue where there are large numbers of covari-
ates in relation to the sample size, and necessarily raised
concerns about the stability of the estimated relationship
between governance and U5MR.
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine the
stability of the estimated association between the govern-
ance indicators and U5MR. In essence, by varying combi-
nations of covariates, it was possible to increase the
sample size, and examine the stability of the association
between SEO and U5MR. The direction and broad mag-
nitude of the association between governance and U5MR
did not change with the modelling strategy. For example,
removing adult literacy as a covariate increased the avail-
able sample size from 37 to 40 countries, resulting in a
poorer fit of the model with the data (adjusted R2 = .64),
but SEO remained significantly associated with U5MR
(b = -.76, p < .001). Furthermore, because the SEO indi-
cator included a measure of wealth, a further sensitivity
analysis was conducted using an adjusted SEO measure,
having removed the effect of GNI per capita. The results
remained materially the same.
Health equity (U5MR quintile ratio)
The pattern of results was distinctly different for the
models of the U5MR quintile ratio data (Table 3).
Table 2 Three models estimating the relationship between health outcome (U5MR), governance (RLTC and SEO) and 9
covariates representing healthcare, finance/economy, education, and physical infrastructure1
U5MR
Model 1 (41 < n <45) Model 2 (n = 37) Model 3 (n = 37)
b/r p b p b p
Healthcare
Births Attended % -.56 <.001 -.27 .20 -.31 .06
Immunisation % -.44 <.001 .00 .98 .01 .93
Hospital Beds/10,000 -.63 <.001 .03 .90 .02 .90
Finance
GNI2 (transformed) $ -.47 <.001 .09 .68 .41 .04
Health Expenditure $ -.50 <.001 .03 .87 .18 .27
Education
Enrolments (female) % -.64 <.001 -.57 <.001 -.32 .02
Adult Literacy % -.55 <.001 .03 .86 .20 .19
Physical Infrastructure
Water % -.67 <.001 -.41 .03 -.10 .52
Sanitation % -.35 .02 .10 .47 .15 .20
Governance
RLTC3 -.70 <.001 -.12 .42
SEO4 -.72 <.001 -.90 <.001
Adjusted R-squared .59 .76
1Model 1 examines the bivariate relationship between, U5MR, and the 9 covariates, and the two measures of governance. Model 2 examines the multivariate
model of the linear relationship between U5MR and the covariates in the absence of the measures of governance. Model 3 replicated Model 2, with the addition
of the two governance measures.
2GNI: Gross National Income.
3RLTC: Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption.
4SEO: Sustainable Economic Opportunity.
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Model 4 shows the bivariate relationship between, the 9
covariates, the two measures of governance, and the
U5MR equity ratio. No indicators of healthcare, educa-
tion, or physical infrastructure were significantly corre-
lated with the U5MR quintile ratio data (p < .05). SEO
was significantly correlated with the U5MR equity ratio
(b = .42, p = .02), as was health expenditure (b = .53, p
< .001). A number of the indicators had p-values less
than .1, including births attended (healthcare) (b = .32,
p = .09), GNI per capita (finance) (b = .35, p = .06),
sanitation (physical infrastructure) (b = .33, p = .08),
and RLTC (governance) (b = .32, p = .09).
Model 5 represents the multivariate model of the lin-
ear relationship between the U5MR quintile ratio and
the covariates in the absence of the measures of govern-
ance (n = 25); and it accounted for 30% of the variance
(Adjusted R2 = .30). Only two of the covariates were,
independently, significantly associated with the U5MR
quintile ratio. The first of these was the availability of
hospital beds per 10,000 (b = -.73, p = .04). As the num-
ber of hospital beds per 10,000 increased, so there was
an associated improvement in health equity. The second
independently significant covariate associated with the
U5MR equity ratio was per capita total expenditure on
health (b = .88, p = .01). Increases in per capita health
spending were associated with worsening equity.
Model 6 replicated Model 5, with the addition of the
two governance measures (n = 25). The addition of the
governance indicators resulted in a poorer fit to the
data (Adjusted R2 = .21), and neither SEO (sustainable
economic opportunities; b = .19, p = .71) nor RLTC
(rule of law, transparency and corruption; b = .10, p =
.77) were significantly associated with the U5MR quin-
tile ratio. In the fully adjusted model, the only covariate
that remained significantly associated with the U5MR
quintile ratio was per capita total expenditure on health
(b = .85, p = .02).
Discussion
The primary interest was in the association between
health systems performance (as measured by a health
outcome -U5MR - and a health equity measure - the
U5MR quintile ratio) and a non-healthcare factor, namely
governance. There was no apparent relationship between
the health outcomes dimension of health systems perfor-
mance (U5MR) and the health equity dimension (U5MR
quintile ratio). This is noteworthy for two reasons. First,
and purely from an analytic perspective, a weak relation-
ship reinforces the need to model the two dimensions of
health systems performance independently. Second, and
with a policy perspective in mind, in the absence of a
strong relationship between the dimensions there is a
need to take both seriously, and not assume that addres-
sing one will necessarily address the other.
The analysis showed that governance, in particular
“sustainable economic opportunities,” was significantly
Table 3 Three models estimating the relationship between health equity (U5MR quintile ratio), governance (RLTC and
SEO) and 9 covariates representing healthcare, finance/economy, education, and physical infrastructure1
U5MR Quintile Ratio
Model 4 (28 < n <30) Model 5 (n = 25) Model 6 (n = 25)
b/r p b p b p
Healthcare
Births Attended % .32 .09 .31 .30 .32 .34
Immunisation % .24 .19 .15 .55 .10 .72
Hospital Beds/10,000 .07 .73 -.73 .04 -.73 .06
Finance
GNI (transformed) $ .35 .06 -.04 .92 -.14 .77
Health Expenditure $ .53 <.001 .88 .01 .85 .02
Education
Enrolments (female) % .25 .20 -.18 .44 -.24 .40
Adult Literacy % .23 .24 .42 .18 .36 .35
Physical Infrastructure
Water % .15 .43 -.42 .21 -.47 .25
Sanitation % .33 .08 .27 .23 .27 .25
Governance
RLTC .32 .09 .10 .77
SEO .42 .02 .19 .71
Adjusted R-squared .30 .21
1Model 4 examines the bivariate relationship. Model 5 examines the multivariate relationship between the covariates and health outcome in the absence of the
measures of governance. Model 6 examines the multivariate relationship between health outcome and governance, adjusting for the covariates.
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associated with health outcome measured as under five
mortality rate and remained so even after controlling for
the other healthcare and non-healthcare factors (see also
[22]). Furthermore, the result was independent of the
approach taken to the analysis of the data. Although a
causal relationship cannot be established in an ecologi-
cal, cross sectional analysis of this kind, the results leave
open the possibility that good governance helps to cre-
ate an environment in which a health system can per-
form well, and certainly invites further research to
examine the matter of causation.
In sharp contrast, and notwithstanding a significant
bivariate association between governance (SEO) and
health equity, there was no significant association in the
multivariate analysis. Given the weak relationship
between health outcomes and health equity, this may
not be entirely surprising. It raises, questions, however,
about which non-healthcare factors should be future tar-
gets for investigation, and no clear answer presents
itself.
The results should be regarded as preliminary, and
limited by the amount and quality and type of data. The
number of countries contributing data was small relative
to the number of variables included in the analyses, and
the situation was worse for the analysis of equity than it
was for the analysis of health outcomes. Confounding
was an issue. The independent measures are intercorre-
lated and correlated with the outcome measures. Nega-
tive confounding is the likely explanation, for instance,
of the anomalous relationship in which increased coun-
try GNI was associated with a worse U5MR after the
inclusion of governance (Table 2: Model 3). GNI and
SEO are both negatively associated with U5MR (SEO
much stronger) at the same time as GNI and SEO are
highly positively related which might cause the GNI to
turn falsely positive when run in a multivariate regres-
sions including SEO. Longitudinal data (allowing for the
inclusion of time-lags) would strengthen the analysis
considerably. However, the dangers of the ecological fal-
lacy are inescapable. Issues of endogeneity will also
haunt any attempt to jump from an analysis of associa-
tion to a causal inference. Causal order, lurking vari-
ables, and a lack of appropriate instrumental variables
are all impediments, compounded by issues of data
quality and the necessarily limited sample of countries.
Reasoned argument will require ranges of data sources
and ranges of study types.
Although one needs to be cautious about the interpre-
tation of the data, equally, one cannot allow the perfect
to become the enemy of the good. There are no perfect
ways to analyse a data set such as this one, and yet the
question of the role of country-level governance in
health systems performance is an important one, that
has received little attention. In the absence of any
analysis, no matter how imperfect, there can be no
debate; and this analysis at least places the issues “on
the table” and invites the collection of better data. Gov-
ernance is significantly associated with health outcomes.
If the association is causal, and one might anticipate
that it is [14], then it would be unwise to ignore that
possibility because of data quality issues. The unantici-
pated relationship between finance and health equity
certainly warrants further consideration. Ways forward
include (unsatisfactorily) waiting for the development of
better time-series data, and (positively) the development
of focussed case-studies within a handful of countries.
Conclusion
There are a range of indicators, largely under-utilised,
that could provide important points for intervention in
population health. Recent data from large scale studies
such as the Commission on Social Determinants of
Health provided important and alternative ways of con-
ceptualising the factors that should be within the pur-
view of the health sector. Analyses such as the one
presented here provide a powerful argument for inter-
sectoral approaches to population health improvement
outside the health or medical care sector, notwithstand-
ing weaknesses in the data. The indication that govern-
ance matters for health system performance is of
importance for policy making as it could point to struc-
tural interventions that have greater impact on health
outcomes than individually targeted interventions.
The assessment of healthcare systems alone as a proxy
for health systems performance in countries where
broader determinants such as governance and infra-
structure remain inadequate is restrictive both in mak-
ing progress and assessing improvements. More
research is needed to support our finding, research that
uses different type of data such as time series data or
even case studies applying qualitative measures.
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